

FORSAKING ALL OTHERS

TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF NATIONALISM  
UTILIZING THE CASE STUDY OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

by:

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ABSTRACT

Many people would like to believe that nationalism is a thing of the past, a dinosaur belonging to some bygone, uncivilized era. Such a belief is not borne out by recent history, however. Nationalism occupies the political forum with as much force as ever. Yet, in many ways, it remains a mystery to us. The purpose of this study is to explore individual motivations involved in the rise of nationalism, in addition to the role of structural factors. The linkage employed in this exploration is the psychosocial phenomenon of self-identity, including emotions and self-esteem. We demonstrate how individual, socially-constructed self-identity accounts for why some people embrace nationalism while others eschew it. The methodology employed was theoretical and historical analyses of secondary sources and indepth interviews with subjects who had some connection with former Yugoslavia, the country utilized to test the new model. Our analyses yielded the result that current conceptualizations of nationalism from an exclusively macro or micro perspective are unsatisfactory; we require a more comprehensive approach wherein the two perspectives are integrated. Such an integration necessitates a bridge: hence, our new model, which rests on the psychosocial premise, offers a more useful conceptual tool for the understanding of nationalism. We conclude that nationalism is first and foremost a matter relating to individual social self-identity which takes place within a particular context where oppositional forces emerge from structural factors and our membership in a particular group becomes paramount.

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The last word I will write in this section is a dedication to my late father, Branislav (Ben) Momirov, who passed away on March 8th, 1993. Regrettably, he did not have a chance to see me complete my Master of Arts degree, but I hope I did him proud. I miss you, Dad.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
CHAPTER	
I        INTRODUCTION	1
II       LITERATURE REVIEW	13
Nationalism as Social Movement	15
Nationalism as Ideology	43
Nationalism as Psychological Manifestation	63
Towards a New Model of Nationalism	94
III      METHODOLOGY	114
IV      YUGOSLAVIA	127
V      FINDINGS	162
Psychosocial Factors/Self-Identity	170
Ideology	183
Structural Factors	186
Internal	186
External	194
Organization and Leadership	196
VI      DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS	206
The Social Movement Approach	208
The Ideological Approach	215
The Psychological Approach	223
Towards a Comprehensive Model of Nationalism	239
APPENDICES	242
"A"	243
"B"	244
BIBLIOGRAPHY	246



## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Just when talk of the "global village" becomes common among people in daily conversation, when some say they are "citizens of the world" and when the nations comprising what used to be called "Western Europe" decide to merge into something called the "European Community", ethnic violence explodes on the international scene.

When first Slovenia and then Croatia announced their secession from the federation of Yugoslavia, elevating their status from mere republic to that of nation, probably few people in liberal democracies believed that what was to follow would be such virulent internecine warfare — virtually unknown in the North American and European world for over forty years. Many were shocked when Yugoslav Army tanks rolled out of the barracks in Croatian and Slovenian cities in an attempt to put Humpty back together again. Those acquainted with the sometimes dark power of nationalism probably were not. Those people might have realized from the beginning how forceful are the passionate feelings that can be stirred by nationalism and to what extremes it can compel behaviour.

Nationalism in the twentieth century is very often associated with the two World Wars. In the case of the First World War, or the "Great War", nationalism appeared to be a positive force. It was largely responsible for toppling the old empires and helping to usher in political modernity with regard to nation-states and international relations. It was at the end of that particular war that Woodrow Wilson, then President of the United States, made his now-famous liberal pitch for national self-determination. However, after the Second World War, the reputation of nationalism plunged. It took on the overtones of depravity as the civilized world contemplated Nazi atrocities against Jews, Slavs and Gypsies. Nationalism became a scourge for many, a thoroughly discredited force considered best to be avoided at all costs.

Such an attitude towards nationalism has carried with it a rather high price

for some countries. Witness the effects it has had on Canada, a country that threw open its doors to virtually everyone after the Second World War economically, politically and culturally, and now faces a kind of assimilative death at worst (thanks to the ever-encroaching shadow of the Goliath to the south) and an ongoing identity crisis at best. In Yugoslavia, a country determined to rise from the ashes like a Phoenix after the devastation of World War II, as Tito and his fellows publicly outlawed any displays of the ethnic force that had caused so much death and destruction, nationalism went underground. There, in the nether regions of the private soul, it festered, bubbling up from time to time whenever a leader emerged to give it momentum only to be forcefully driven back, until it could no longer be contained. Some ten years after the death of the man whose personal vision had created the modern state of Yugoslavia and who, some say, was the only one who could galvanize it, nationalism took hold again and blood began to spill once more.

Nationalism is a broad term, often used to encompass anything from patriotism to ethnic solidarity. For every theorist of this phenomenon, there is a new approach to its definition and study. Part of the problem of understanding it stems from the difficulty of delineating what is meant by a nation. The very concept of nation is troubling because of its vagueness. Funk and Wagnalls Canadian College Dictionary offers two pertinent definitions: (1) "A body of persons associated with a particular territory, usually organized under a government, and possessing a distinctive cultural and social way of life"; and (2) "A body of persons having a common origin and language".<sup>1</sup> From these definition, specifically the second, it is possible to see such a conception of nation could ostensibly be applied to virtually any group of people. Any number of people who develop a sense, or consciousness, of themselves as having something in common could claim status as a nation. Thus, we might envision a group of upper middle class, English-speaking accountants born in

Toronto and living in Richmond Hill coming to see themselves as constituting a nation. This characterization may seem amusing or ludicrous, but it conforms sufficiently to the above-noted definitions to be at least theoretically possible. A Dictionary of Political Thought clarifies to some degree our understanding of what a nation might be by explaining that Czechoslovakia consisted of two nations within a single state, while the Germans were, until recently, one nation divided into two states.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, a nation is not synonymous with a state, although people who consider themselves to constitute a nation often wish to have their own state and gain sovereignty.

Rousseau binds the concepts of nation and state together by asserting that the nation-state (a nation of people who govern themselves and have political sovereignty) is the most legitimate social contract because the will of the people comprising the nation will be in harmony and it is not a will imposed on them by an outsider, but by themselves.<sup>3</sup> Hence, we see how the term nation takes on a somewhat circular de facto definition wherein a nation is, inter alia, a group of people who govern themselves while a group of people who govern themselves is considered a nation. It would seem evident that we must arrive at more satisfactory criteria by which to describe the "body of persons" who might constitute the members of a nation or we may very well have to concede nationhood to the aforementioned accountants. With such vagueness associated with the cornerstone of the whole conceptualization of nationalism, it is not difficult to understand why there is little consensus on the definition of and approach to the study of the phenomenon. Some have studied nationalism as a social movement or ideology; for others, it is a psychological or cultural phenomenon. We have the top-down, macro approach and the bottom-up, micro one.

For the purposes of this study, we will view nationalism simply as *politically*

*mobilized ethnicity in pursuit of some degree of autonomy or sovereignty*<sup>4</sup>. Ethnicity has been conceptualized by some as a way of labelling and/or stigmatizing people in order to exploit and oppress them. Such a conceptualization fails to address appropriately all dimensions of the phenomenon, however. We must include in any definition of ethnicity the positive elements which people embrace. These elements encompass the vast importance of meaning in its myriad forms. Meaning is derived from ancestral origins, cultural traditions, language and religion, and a sense of belonging to a group of similar others.<sup>5</sup> Meaning is significant for human beings as we are unable to interpret and understand ourselves and our reality without it. Ethnicity also consists of boundaries: those from within the group itself, usually accomplished through the process of socialization, and those from without, achieved through intergroup relations.<sup>6</sup> The boundaries established by outsiders relates to the above conceptualization of labelling and/or stigmatizing. In other words, nationalism is an effort on the part of individuals who share a social identity of which a particular ethnicity becomes a significant element around which these individuals organize their political activities and goals. Their ethnicity becomes the standard that they bear as they enter the political forum and strive for an end in congruence with the way they perceive their standard should be actualized. This is not to say that every member has the exact same perception of his/her ethnicity or the same reasons why he/she joins in a collective effort or even that there is complete agreement as to goals and their realization. There is plasticity in these political efforts and they are not necessarily monolithic enterprises. We must exercise caution, lest we reify the group to which we refer. This is something we should always remember as we strive to understand the total picture of nationalism: that there are many facets and that they are ever-changing, ongoing processes arising out of interaction. The interaction occurs among members of the same ethnic group,

among members of different ethnic groups, between individuals and the state, and between individuals and structural factors that arise in any given situation. Subjective perceptions and interpretations mediate all these interactions as people try to make sense of what is happening to them.

Therefore, individual self-identity is a very important factor when trying to understand nationalism, since this psychosocial component provides the framework from which perceptions and interpretations emerge. No one of us is a tabula rasa when it comes to understanding a particular issue or event; we all have personality traits that have undergone the socialization process of a specific context or contexts which, in turn, determine to a great extent how we will articulate to ourselves what we are experiencing by providing precedents for like situations or issues.

From the above, we can see how studies of nationalism that omit the personal, individual aspect present skewed portrayals of the phenomenon; at the same time, it is apparent that a completely subjective interpretation of nationalism that does not include external and structural factors is equally inadequate. We must strive to integrate the two. For example, studies of nationalism which place it under the rubric of social movements and proceed to analyze the dynamics and structures of social movements and demonstrate how nationalism fits into these models do an excellent job of presenting the external, structural aspect of the phenomenon. These studies show how social movements arise, how they organize and attempt to disseminate information, how they make efforts to achieve their goals, the composition of their membership and the various stages through which the movement itself passes. These are all valuable pieces of information, but they fail really to answer the question of why people join them in the first place or why some do and others do not. Without an explanation of possible human motivations, their complexity, fluidity and myriad variety, these studies lack vitality and seem somewhat deterministic.

Studies of nationalism that rely upon the notion of national integration as their cornerstone are similarly incomplete: national integration is analyzed in terms of its components and processes, such as official language policy and universal education, and we learn how, if integration breaks down, nationalism may arise, but this does not give us an understanding of why people would comply with these processes of integration or, in turn, why they might not. Again, we are left with the impression of determinism; that the processes and components exert their power over human beings who have little or no choice but to follow along until somehow something spontaneously occurs to awaken them from their slumber and cause disintegration to occur. Human motivation is inferred in this scenario but there is little attempt to understand its more intimate workings.

Conversely, to explain away nationalism as a purely psychological or cultural identity fails to uncover the reasons why some people behave in some ways some times while others do not. If nationalism is little more than personal identification with a social or ethnic group wherein cohesiveness may or may not be a significant factor, how do similar interpretations and orientations arise at the same time? If nationalism is nothing more than individuals identifying inner feelings vis-a-vis certain symbols of ethnicity or even with other members of an ethnic group, how do these individuals come to behave in similar fashion? And why at a particular time? There must be structural aspects that intervene to provide frameworks for these individuals' motivations.

When there are already so many approaches to the study of nationalism, so many inherent difficulties with the concept, what more could another study contribute? What stone has been left unturned? What will set this particular study apart from the rest is the attempt to integrate the macro and micro perspectives using the socially constructed self-identity of individuals as the bridge between the

two. Because nationalism is a phenomenon that frequently resurfaces in the world and has the power to bring so much change and destruction in its wake, it is important to continue to study it, to analyze it as thoroughly and creatively as possible to attempt to understand it. We need to explore the factors that contribute to its emergence as well as how these factors might influence people and evoke a response. In this way, it may be possible to foresee situations in which the potential for emergent nationalism resides and deal with it before it explodes into something that would threaten the well-being of others. The predictability of any phenomenon is rather limited whenever human beings are involved, since there is always the possibility of spontaneity and creativity, but a more thorough understanding of nationalism may nevertheless be a worthwhile contribution, if only to lessen its power. If we place human motivations into an equation that includes external and structural components, we may be able to see the kinds of responses that might emerge and discover an answer that gives us a more complete comprehension. To explore nationalism at a grassroots level may offer greater insight into how it functions.

In this study, we assert that structural and external factors constitute a forum in which psychosocial forces emerge and cause people to behave in what may be described as nationalistic fashion. These factors will be taken as "oppositional" ones.<sup>1</sup> Individuals experience or perceive the influence of these factors and interpret them in accordance with their self-identity. How they perceive themselves may or may not tap into primordial sentiment which may then cause them to feel ethnic group solidarity. Ethnic group solidarity may then lead people to become nationalistic and behave in a manner that is congruent with such a response. Individual self-identity will always act as a mediating device; it will shape the way that primordial sentiment is experienced; it will help to determine whether or not



ethnic group solidarity will occur and how it will be actualized; and it will influence what form nationalism will take. Will nationalism be incarnated as the organization of a political party whose agenda is dominated by the drive for secession, as is the case with the Parti Quebecois and the Scottish National Party? Or will it become some form of collective behaviour which includes taking up arms and turning against former neighbours? The way that individuals perceive themselves — who they are and how they will conduct themselves in accordance with that identity — will determine to a great extent which course of action they will choose to follow — provided they have a choice, of course.

The aforementioned "oppositional" model is an elaboration of the one proposed by Scott.<sup>1</sup> Scott's model provides for oppositional forces, real or perceived, which cause ethnic group solidarity with primordial sentiment as the intervening variable. In other words, ethnic groups may experience opposition in some form; primordial sentiment is aroused which, in turn, causes the members of these ethnic groups to feel solidarity with each other. As far as it goes, Scott's model brings together external factors with internal mechanisms. However, it appears to be rather unsophisticated and calls for leaps in logic. For example, why should primordial sentiment necessarily intervene when opposition is experienced or perceived? Is it always the case that ethnic group solidarity results when primordial sentiment is aroused? How would Scott account for members of ethnic groups who feel that their group is being oppressed and fail to experience a sense of solidarity with their fellows? The model does not allow for consideration of such a scenario. Hence, it is important to explore the possibility of other intervening variables, something this study will attempt to do.

In addition, we will attempt to examine the internal dynamics of nationalistic organizations to determine whether these are single-minded monoliths or many-

headed hydras; that is, whether these organizations are unified in terms of goals and sentiments or whether there is a divergence between leaders and members or even amongst the membership itself. We will view this model of nationalism through the lens of the former country of Yugoslavia where various strains of nationalism have ripped the country apart, turning neighbours against each other.

Yugoslavia has been chosen as the case study for this exploration of nationalism because it was an experiment in nation-building that faced almost impossible odds from the beginning and appeared to be reasonably successful for a long time. It was a country comprised of a variety of ethnic groups, religions and cultural traditions, of which the two largest ethnic groups, the Serbs and Croats, have a fairly lengthy history of mutual suspicion and conflict. Many expected that the death of the man whose vision had provided the blueprint for post-1945 Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, would precipitate the disintegration of the country, but it did not. Indeed, Yugoslavia continued to exist for another ten years before ethnic tensions exploded into secession and bloodshed. Since a number of different nationalisms emerged in the country and have been expressed in the most extreme, violent manner, it seems that Yugoslavia is a prime candidate for the study of nationalism.

The methodology employed for this study was primarily a reinterpetive analysis of secondary sources, both historical and theoretical. It was particularly necessary to rely upon secondary sources for the examination of the former country of Yugoslavia. However, in order to acquire some more personal, intimate perspectives on the ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia, interviews were conducted with individuals who have some connection to the country and who now reside in North America. In addition, we used information gathered from interviews given to newspapers and magazines. The interviews were limited to people who presently

reside in North America because it was not possible for the author to travel to the war-torn region to conduct interviews with those actually involved in the conflict. This method has acknowledged limitations<sup>9</sup>; however, since the reason for interviewing was not so much to draw conclusions from quantitative data but to gain qualitative insight into human motivations, it seemed a viable option.

To summarize, nationalism has been historically a significant phenomenon in world politics and has been responsible for a great deal of change. It has been studied in great detail by many scholars, employing a variety of different approaches and methods, but is worthy of further study. Because previous analyses have tended to examine either external, structural factors or individual psychological responses, it is necessary to attempt to integrate elements of these two perspectives in order to provide a more balanced, holistic approach. This study makes an effort to do so, using individual, albeit socially constructed, self-identity as the means for integrating the two. The former country of Yugoslavia is utilized as a case study because its diversity has given rise to several nationalistic factions which have turned on each other in the most extreme, hostile fashion. These nationalistic groups have shocked and horrified the world with their ferocity, leaving many, especially in Western democracies, shaking their heads and wondering how and why such barbarous behaviour could take place in this day and age. The goal of this research is to try to explain how and why.

ENDNOTES

1. Funk and Wagnalls Canadian College Dictionary, Latest Edition, (Markham, Ont.: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1989) 900.
2. Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1982) 312-313.
3. Paul Wilkinson, Social Movement (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971) 37.
4. In adopting this definition for the purposes of the thesis, we recognize that other forms of nationalism may exist; for example, the "non-ethnic" or pan-ethnic civic nationalism or patriotism which promotes allegiance to the state or country in multiethnic societies such as the United States or Switzerland. We also recognize that not all political mobilizations of ethnicity constitute "nationalism" in our sense of the term; for example, ethnic groups may take political action in pursuit of demands other than autonomy, such as Japanese-Canadian demands for compensation for their treatment by the Canadian government during World War II.
5. Julianne D. Momirov Nedeljkovic, Between Two Worlds: The Effects of the Immigration Experience on the Self-Identity of Serbian Women, Bachelor of Arts (Honours) Thesis (St. Catharines, Ont.: Brock University, Department of Sociology, 1991) 57.
6. Wsevolod W. Isajiw, "Definitions of Ethnicity," Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Canada, eds. Jay E. Goldstein and Rita M. Bienvenue (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) 60.
7. This will be discussed at length in Chapter II below.
8. George M. Scott, Jr., "A resynthesis of the primordial and circumstantial approaches to ethnic group solidarity: towards an explanatory model," Ethnic and Racial Studies, 13.2 (April 1990): 147-171.
9. These limitations will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III below.

## CHAPTER II

### LITERATURE REVIEW

To appreciate the diversity of views on nationalism, we shall examine some previously-undertaken studies. The purpose of this review is to investigate the strengths and weaknesses of these theories and models. In this manner, we hope to identify the existing lacunae and attempt to close them by proposing an alternative model. The studies chosen for review fall into two main categories (although there is certainly overlap between them): (1) external/structural explanations and examinations; and (2) psychological/cultural approaches. The first category includes the study of nationalism as a social movement and as a possible result of the breakdown of national integration. The second is comprised of a theory on social group identification and the oppositional model, representing two aspects of the micro perspective. These studies have been chosen because there is a component of collective behaviour involved in nationalism and often members of ethnic groups form associations to achieve nationalist goals. National integration would seem to be a significant element for the survival of nation-states; therefore, its breakdown could contribute to the rise of nationalism (or vice versa). Social group identification and primordial sentiment are the experiences of individuals. Since individuals are the essential elements of nationalism, we must attempt to understand their motivations.

A brief discussion on ideology and how this particular concept lends insight into the subject of nationalism will be followed by the exploration of some theories pertaining to the construction of the psychosocial phenomenon known as self-identity. Self-identity is the linchpin of an alternative model for nationalism that brings the macro and the micro perspectives together.

As has already been discussed in Chapter I, the whole concept of nationalism is problematic. This difficulty is partly due to the vagueness surrounding the definition of nation. Another source of distress is the possibility that what some observers may consider to be nationalist behaviour in reality has other motivations.

Hence, it does not seem correct to call such behaviour nationalist. Imposing an interpretation on some phenomenon which, in actuality, does not conform to that interpretation does not contribute to better comprehension. Finally, an additional component of nationalism, namely ethnicity, is a highly contentious issue as well, a matter introduced previously.

Nationalism is viewed by some theorists as a kind of social movement, organized and mobilized in some fashion. There is a component of collective action or behaviour involved. Therefore, a review of literature concerning social movements and collective behaviour is necessary.

#### Nationalism as Social Movement

In the examination of nationalism as a social movement, we must first consider the fundamental elements and processes that come to be known as social movements. It is necessary to investigate what a social movement is, what kinds of individuals become involved in them and what roles they might play within them, what circumstances might be responsible for the mobilization of a social movement and what dynamic processes might take place within them once they have mobilized.

Social movements are characterized by Paul Wilkinson as follows: (1) there is a collective and deliberate attempt to promote change in a certain way by some method; (2) there must be some degree of organization, regardless of how loose or informal it is; and (3) the movement must be based on conscious will and a commitment to the aims and beliefs of the movement, along with participation by the followers. Social movements rarely grow out of one-dimensional efforts. As such, they "may be concerned simultaneously with values, norms, forms of organization and material conditions and resources."<sup>1</sup> Wilkinson states that the commitment to norms may not

be unitary. He employs Max Weber's typology, delineating three major types of commitment: (1) value-rational fellowship of believers; (2) emotional-affectual following of a charismatic leader; and (3) purposive-rational association for pursuing individual interests. These three forms are not necessarily mutually exclusive, he contends, for there may be overlap among them. Wilkinson also puts forth the notion that there are three types of individuals who become involved in social movements: (1) ideologists (those members who greatly influence the generation and articulation of the ideals and goals); (2) practitioners (those who carry on the activities); and (3) scientists (social scientists and historians who describe, interpret and explain social movements). Again, he contends that there may very well be overlap among these types.<sup>2</sup>

Social movements are linked to culture because they "both initiate and reflect changes in the wider society."<sup>3</sup> Their ideological component is to be found in the way social movements attempt to form public opinion so that they can gain mass support and participation by turning all those discontented individuals in the population to their own purposes.<sup>4</sup> They are also very much political in their orientation for they usually attempt to affect the distribution and utilization of power.<sup>5</sup> Eyerman and Jamison emphasize that the political aspect may be considered to be the core of social movements since the raison d'être of any social lobbying for change is to redefine and renegotiate the political sphere. In doing this, social movements form a linkage between past political endeavours and the present as they seek to open new spaces and bring new issues into the established political forum.<sup>6</sup>

Wilkinson credits Gustav Le Bon, whose theory dealt with crowd and movement behaviour based on the notion of psychological attributes of the crowd, for bringing the collective action aspect to the study of social movements. Le Bon believed that the mentality of a crowd was inferior to that of an individual and that it was



irrational passion rather than rational thought that was expressed in the "subconscious herd instinct of the crowd. Crowds are therefore able to carry out acts of extreme heroism and extreme bestiality and savagery which no rational individual would perform on his own."<sup>7</sup> It is possible, based on this reasoning, that the supportive atmosphere of the group allows for latent tendencies among individuals to emerge because of the sense of anonymity accompanying membership in a crowd. Thus, people might be spurred to do things as part of a crowd that they would never dream of doing as an individual. This assumption suggests that a shift in a person's self-identity must occur; that is, that the person must de-emphasize the individualist component of self-identity which dictates what "I" will do and who "I" am and place greater emphasis on the component which governs the identification with the collectivity so that the person then begins to interpret who "we" are and what "we" are going to do.

According to Joseph Gusfield, social movements are "socially shared activities and beliefs directed toward the demand for change in some aspect of the social order."<sup>8</sup> Samuel D. Clark, J. Paul Grayson and Linda M. Grayson add that social movements may also strive to restore old social arrangements as well.<sup>9</sup> Gusfield associates social movements with collective action for two reasons: (1) the term "social movement" denotes a kind of looseness similar to "social trends", while the term "collective action" emphasizes the group component and a sense of a structured, organized character; and (2) there is a close relationship between episodes of collective behaviour and the development of social movements. Collective action denotes group activity channelled into actions for change.<sup>10</sup>

The idea of movement suggests efforts toward achieving change. Effort consists in activities -- demonstrations, meetings, literature, campaigns. A movement consists of more than the passive sense of discontent, however shared that may be. It also involves beliefs -- perceptions of what is wrong with the society, the culture, or the institution, and what can and should be done about it. What the participants in a movement

share are the activities and beliefs that distinguish it."<sup>11</sup>

From the above, we see the emphasis on not just beliefs, but action. He further points out that structure is an element of both social movements and collective action. Presumably, a social movement cannot consist only of either beliefs or action, but must incorporate the two. It is interesting to ponder how far this notion applies to nationalism; that is, does nationalism have to integrate action and belief to be considered nationalism or simply to be considered a social movement? Further exploration of this question will be pursued below.

Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison bring new elements into the discussion when they speak of social movements being "forms of activity by which individuals create new kinds of social identities."<sup>12</sup> People participate in social activities through their own "frames of reference". Therefore, no action is completely determined or an act of sheer individual willpower because the meaning of the action derives from the context in which it takes place, as well as the interpretation individuals bring to it and/or derive from it. For this phenomenon, Eyerman and Jamison use the term "cognitive praxis". Specifically what is meant is "the creative role of consciousness and cognition in all human action, individual and collective."<sup>13</sup> In terms of social movements, cognitive praxis stands for the ideational or intellectual component of movements that give them their identity. This term incorporates worldview perceptions as well as the particular beliefs associated with the goals of the movement. "Movements are interested in knowledge in a variety of ways, which we identify as the different dimensions of their cognitive praxis."<sup>14</sup>

Thus, these theorists bring the study of social movements into the realm of conscious individuals, not just committed actors and participants or members of a "herd". Eyerman and Jamison attribute the fundamental aspects of social movements to the frames of reference, or socially constructed self-identity, of persons who are

influenced by and, in turn, influence their context. They concentrate on a dialectical approach to social movements wherein context and individual identity interact and synthesize to produce collective identity and action which can then be termed a social movement. Contexts change, self-identity changes and, hence, so do social movements. With this insight, we can better understand not only how this phenomenon emerges, but also how it grows and evolves and may eventually disappear.

Eyerman and Jamison attempt to make sense of the symbolic significance of social movements as they challenge the existing power structure and help to create new knowledge or new perspectives of it. Social movements carve out a new social space through interactions among various groups and organizations. This process enables the formation of the identity of the social movement to take place.<sup>15</sup> "It is precisely in the creation, articulation, formulation of new thoughts and ideas -- new knowledge -- that a social movement defines itself in society."<sup>16</sup> They believe that the cognitive praxis of a social movement is its most important function.

The historical context is also significant for Eyerman and Jamison, who maintain that

[h]istory is not imposed on movements, but it conditions them, it provides their starting points as well as their range of operation. This means that the dimensions of cognitive praxis must be reconstructed in the context of their actualization. [Their] retrospective reading focuses on the interplay between movement identity formation and long-term social processes, that is, between internal knowledge push and external political pull.<sup>17</sup>

Placing a social movement into its historical context allows for an understanding of how it relates to other movements.<sup>18</sup>

Eyerman and Jamison identify three areas of knowledge in social movements: (1) the cosmological (basic assumptions and beliefs); (2) the technological (specific topics and techniques); and (3) the organizational. The cosmological is what provides

the movement's worldview and how it "articulates its historical meaning". It also serves to provide the "utopian mission" of a movement.<sup>19</sup> The technological aspect dictates how the movement will particularly articulate and implement its cosmological aspect, while the organizational arises from the ideas generated by the cosmological position and directs how the knowledge produced will be made accessible to others. "The organizational dimension is thus the way in which movements get their message across, and the organizational forms within which their cognitive praxis unfolds."<sup>20</sup>

According to Eyerman and Jamison, everyone who participates in a social movement may be termed a "movement intellectual" since they all contribute to the movement's collective identity. This, however, does not mean that all movement intellectuals are equal. In fact, some become organizers and others become leaders. This inequality contributes to the hierarchical appearance of most social movements. Furthermore, intellectuals are formed through interactions within a social context. A movement intellectual is one who has emerged from the movement itself while an established intellectual is one who arose from within established social institutional contexts. Intellectuals are important for giving a social movement its ideological aspect.<sup>21</sup>

One of the most important tasks of an intellectual is the formation of the Other, the opponent, which helps to articulate the collective identity of the movement.<sup>22</sup> Eyerman and Jamison are quite eloquent on this particular matter, describing how the Other is constructed and the way that it influences the social movement. For this reason, it is worth quoting them at length:

This Other is not merely an intellectual construction, but is almost always a real social actor, an authority, the government, an institution, the state, or a conglomerate of individuals, the "technocrats", with whom the movement must strategically interact. In the process of interaction, other types of movement intellectuals come into play: those who act as intermediaries between the movement and its Other, translating aspects of the movement's newly articulated worldview into programs from which specific demands can be turned into negotiable items in the arenas of

the established political culture. Movement spokespeople and experts thus filter out aspects of a rather diffuse worldview, which as a source of collective identity has served as a framework for mobilizing supporters, into clearly defined items for political negotiation in the institutional frameworks of established political culture. This is not an unproblematic process, as it involves much internal debate and conflict. Never a matter of free choice, the issues and the arenas of confrontation are often forced upon movements by their opponents, the situation, or by the political culture in which they emerge. This can also lead to "diplomatic" negotiators coming to the fore as significant movement intellectuals. Much as the media can impose one kind of intellectual type on movements, so can the peculiarities of the political culture.<sup>23</sup>

Social movements are shaped by political processes, both internally and externally. As the consciousness of individuals shifts, resulting from their interactions with each other and their opposing counterparts, social movements reflect these shifts. Eyerman and Jamison deem this to mean that social movements are forms of cognitive praxis: the social construction of problems and concerns articulated and responded to by historically-situated individuals. "In other words, social movements are the result of an interactional process which centres around the articulation of a collective identity and which occurs within the boundaries of a particular society."<sup>24</sup>

The political aspect of social movements is fundamental, but it does not represent the sum total of the movement's character. Very often, the political agenda only serves as a means of gaining other social resources or drawing the attention of political leaders to particular problems. There is usually a moral element as well, as movement elites attempt to garner support by invoking higher ideals to attribute to what may be more prosaic goals. Indeed, the moral element is what distinguishes conservatism from utopianism. When a particular social movement becomes imbued with a sense of moral outrage, it may gain the kind of momentum that will turn it into an antisystemic movement. At this point, it becomes crucial for the moral component to be managed properly and responsibly because every member of the movement, not just its leaders, is in a position to decide the fate of many people, thanks to the

nature of mass collective action. Here, the self-identity of members must play a very strong role as people negotiate moral issues and plan agendas around them. The whole process of negotiation and planning takes place within the framework provided by that psychosocial construction.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, we see that individuals are as important to social movements as the collectivity. Action and beliefs are essential components and there must be some sort of organization of actors, however loose, who have made a commitment of sorts to a goal of change. Because of their collective element, they may inspire people to behave in ways in which these people might never behave as individuals because it is contrary to their notion of self-identity. When this occurs, it may be due to a reinterpretation of self-identity that places greater emphasis on the person's membership in the collectivity than on individualist concerns. Social movements are political in nature but not comprised solely of political motivations; they also have components that may include morals, values, norms and notions about the way things ought to be organized and managed. Since they spring out of the conditions inherent in particular societies so that they are all historically and culturally specific, we must next examine some of those conditions.

Wilkinson credits Jean Jacques Rousseau for setting out the principles which legitimate the formation of social movements for the attainment of certain goals. According to his interpretation, Rousseau stated that everyone has the right to organize in his/her own self-interest and to rebel against tyranny. The consent of the people is the only legitimate authority. All people are entitled to their fair share of the wealth of any given society and the assurance of equality is entrusted to the state.<sup>26</sup> Hence, any group which feels it is not sufficiently enjoying the benefits of the social contract has the right to take action to remedy the situation; consent is withdrawn in this instance, something which is perfectly legitimate since people can

only be governed by consent in Rousseau's philosophy. Such a formulation would seem to wed social movements with the ideals of democracy as well as particular interests.

In their discussion of how social movements emerge, Clark et al. propose the notion of social segmentation. That is, social cleavages exist in a society, dividing it into groups between which there is no communication, few cooperative relationships, and sometimes even hostility. These segments often have their own cultural characteristics, a kind of "we-group" feeling they call "group consciousness". "People are aware of belonging to a certain group, and they believe that their personal goals or interests depend on the attainments of that group as a whole."<sup>27</sup> Social segmentation may increase the probability of a high level of discontent and inconsistencies in the institutional structure because some groups acquire values and norms other groups do not possess. This situation makes it more difficult for institutions to operate in a manner that is consistent with everyone's ideas. There is also an increased chance of mobilization under these conditions. Discontent may be directed against the institutions linked with the opposing segment. Any organizations that spring up to deal with the discontent will be composed entirely of people from the same segment who potentially share that discontent. The values and norms of the organizations can be utilized to construct common definitions of institutional deficiency and to formulate new values and norms. Elites will identify with their own segment rather than with other elites. Channels for communication and networks of cooperative relationships are more available because alternative channels and networks are blocked by social cleavages. Thus, an organizational base is more readily available to build new institutional guides.<sup>28</sup>

Clark et al. stress that discontent must reach a high level in order for a social movement to emerge. This discontent can be generated by either a relative decline

in achievements for members of the discontented segment which then causes them to feel relative deprivation, or by status inconsistency wherein achievements are actually rising, but expectations are rising even more. Mobilization occurs when three elements are present:

(1) There is an ideology to unite members. A common set of values and norms is established to overcome initial confusion; sometimes components of existing ideologies are utilized if they apply to the situation at hand. The most important point here is that these ideologies must be indigenous, not foreign imports; being indigenous provides for a common perception of the institutional deficiency and also a remedy for the deficiency. The presence of an ideology increases members' commitment to the movement and thus provides for coordinated action, as well as internal norms for interrelationships among members.

(2) There must be willing and able leadership. This can pose a problem if the members lack the skills or education to become leaders or if the structure on which leaders base their authority is weak, or ill-defined. Leaders may emerge from an already-established base of authority or they may be charismatic, which means that they do not depend on institutionalized norms of obedience. Leaders must be able to identify with a social group to which they do not necessarily belong, they must have special qualities to invoke enthusiasm in their followers, and they must be divorced from the institutions enough that they can still challenge them and suggest unconventional solutions.

(3) There must be channels for communication and a network of cooperative relationships to permit the dissemination of values and norms. These channels and networks facilitate mobilization of a social movement by the very fact that they already exist. A cooperative relationship is a normal social relationship and can readily induce people to accept norms, values and directives being transmitted to



them because they trust each other and can reward or punish one another to enforce conformity.

All of the above-noted things, according to Clark et al., provide an organizational base for social movements. The organizational base may take two forms: (1) communal, whereby members are bound by traditional ties based on kinship, community, ethnic or tribal attachments; or (2) associational, whereby social groups are organized for specifically-stated purposes such as occupational, religious, etc. Membership in organizational structures can mobilize people or restrain them, when the need arises.<sup>29</sup> Eyerman and Jamison emphasize that communications among the various groups and organizations comprising a social movement, between the collective and the individual, and the movement and the public are vital for the survival of the movement itself. It would seem that there cannot be a movement without adequate communication amongst individuals. This imperative generates difficulties of its own. Because of the importance of the local organizations, there can always be tensions between them and the national organization, as well as between the local spokespeople or intellectuals and the national, acknowledged ones.<sup>30</sup>

Social movements seldom emerge spontaneously; instead they require long periods of preparation both at the individual, group, and societal level. No social movement emerges until there is a political opportunity available, a context of social problem as well as a context of communication, opening up the potential for problem articulation and knowledge dissemination. Not every social problem, however, generates a social movement; only those that strike a fundamental chord, that touch basic tensions in a society have the potential for generating a social movement....A movement conceptualizes fundamental contradictions or tensions in society -- what Smelser called structural strains...Yet not even that is enough to determine the emergence of a social movement. Not until the theme has been articulated, not until the tensions have been formulated in a new conceptual space can a social movement come into being, and this is a very uncertain process involving many contingencies.<sup>31</sup>

Eyerman and Jamison go on to state that context formation is just one component of how a social movement emerges, that individuals must be ready to turn "private

troubles into public problems", as C. Wright Mills put it, and to take part in the formulation of a collective identity. The role of people is crucial to Eyerman and Jamison<sup>32</sup> because it is evident that there can be no collective action or movement until individual self-identity has receded somewhat to allow the group aspect to emerge to the forefront. If such a reorganization does not occur, then discontent, tension, perception of institutional deficiency or any other factor that might contribute to the context from which a social movement might emerge will not necessarily result in any action being taken. They propose that knowledge is "the product of a series of social encounters, within movements, between movements, and even more importantly perhaps, between movements and their established opponents"<sup>33</sup> and not just of one individual to be passed down to others.

Another observation on the emergence of social movements made by Clark et al. is that perceived institutional deficiency wherein the objective reality of whether or not institutional deficiency exists is not as salient as the perception of it among certain persons. The perception determines the level of contentment these people may feel with the institutions as they exist. This, however, does not mean that people want to abolish existing institutional guides per se. It simply means that they may consider them to be inappropriate, upsetting in some ways to their sensibilities, or insufficient. These institutional guides may not be providing them with the meaning these people require for living the life they desire.<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless,

[p]erceptions of a deficiency often take the form of opposition to some aspect of the existing values, norms, or leaders under which people live. For one reason or another, people are unhappy with the way their society is operating and they blame it on the prevailing institutional guides or some portion of the prevailing institutional guides. Usually, they either disagree with some of the prohibitions stated by conventional rules or they object to some behaviours that conventional rules permit. The best-known forms of collective behaviour provoked by this sort of perception are groups of people protesting against social conditions.<sup>35</sup>

Collective behaviour, according to Clark et al., is not normless; norms emerge

from the collective behaviour itself as people interact as a collectivity and make efforts to influence others. "New institutional guides emerge as a large number of people begin to subscribe to a new set of values, conform to a new set of norms, or obey new leaders."<sup>36</sup> Thus, it would appear that collective behaviour is not a static thing, but is, rather, an evolving phenomenon. This evolutionary pattern seems to indicate that the self-identity of members of the collectivity is constantly being reinterpreted and may fluctuate between the individualist and collectivist aspects as interactions take place. Clark et al. maintain that social movements tend towards institutionalization in the sense that they are "in the process of developing consistent and stable institutional guides."<sup>37</sup> Once again, we ponder the question of whether this conceptualization of social movements applies strictly to nationalism in all cases. It raises the question of whether nationalism has to become institutionalized.

It is to be noted, according to Wilkinson, that nationalism adds an important element of efficacy to an ideological movement or government. The ideological underpinnings may be strengthened by the nationalistic component which provides an additional source of legitimacy and can be effectively used as an instrument of propaganda.<sup>38</sup> Nationalism may provide the moral element to a social movement for material resources, according to this logic. The ethnicity of a particular group becomes the standard around which members rally (and attract others who may come to identify themselves with the standard even though they may not have been attracted to the original issues at stake and may continue to find these issues unattractive or unimportant); then it takes on new meaning as a moral stance. The nationalist component, with its overtones of family membership, common origins and historical experiences, brings a dimension of cohesion to a movement that might not be available to groups that organize for different issues or based on alternative as-

sociations. Nationalism may provide the quintessential bridge for linking beliefs and actions, and members with disparate motivations with each other; it may be the optimal glue for binding a social movement. We will discuss this matter in greater detail below.

People respond to structural conditions, both real and perceived, by interpreting them from an idiosyncratic point of view and formulating opinions and beliefs which may motivate them to take action. If beliefs and actions come together in multiplicity, we have a social movement with its own ideology and agenda. However, it is worth examining the inner workings of social movements to avoid the tendency to reify them and view them as monolithic enterprises wherein the collective consciousness is seamlessly unified. In our examination, it is helpful to recall what has already been discussed regarding their nature: that social movements are comprised of individuals who are constantly involved in interactions which produce shifting interpretations of self-identity. Social movements are a series of dialectical processes.

Internal interactions of the social movement are very often prone to factionalism since conditions are never ideal and support is rarely homogeneous.<sup>39</sup> Clark *et al.* suggest that, when a large part of an existing social structure is rejected, the situation allows many interpretations to arise. Factionalism sometimes results from rivalries among leaders. At times, factions can work together instead of merely competing with one another. Clark *et al.* point out that some argue that factionalism within a social movement can be positive in that fragments can find their own niche within the movement, competing factions may be motivated to pursue the goals of the movement more energetically, a fragmentary structure makes the movement harder to predict and, thus, fight, and the movement can expand through the multiplication of factions. However, this may also be a weakness since there may

be a lack of unity within the movement and it may generate frustration among the members if they feel little progress is being made. As such, state Clark *et al.*, factionalism is usually seen as a problem by members and is often responsible for the decline of a social movement. Factionalism may also cause the movement to turn inward on itself if the factions become overly concerned with internal bickering and power struggles. It may be a greater problem for movements based on the more rational commitments discussed by Weber in his typology of commitment. Movements that centre around a charismatic leader may be less prone to factionalism because of the membership's devotion to the leader.

Social movements may decline for various reasons or become routinized.<sup>40</sup> What is often the case with social movements is that they do not last long. The decline may be attributable to factionalism within the movement itself, disillusionment or discouragement on the part of the membership. Often the least committed leave first. Being a mass movement also contributes to the instability of a social movement. Instead of decline, it may become routinized when it establishes consistent and stable institutional guides; values and norms cease to be created, becoming accepted and followed. This is the end product of the evolution towards institutionalization mentioned above. Routinization may occur when institutionalized guides become part of the dominant society or when the existing order is overthrown and the movement establishes a new order. Sometimes a part of the movement's institutional guides are absorbed by existing institutions, often as legislation. In other cases, the movement may set up its own institutions and operate independently of those of the dominant society (eg. communes). Clark *et al.* state that what usually occurs is that a social movement becomes accepted as part of the social order as a specialized association when some of its goals are adopted into mainstream society. In that case, the original ideology ends up being watered down. Most members accept the routinization of the

social movement because the guides for behaviour that are provided become more acceptable to others as goals deemed unattainable are eliminated. In addition, routinization provides members with rewards as the organization becomes a source of power, prestige, and sometimes money. Members are always seeking guides for behaviour that will be acceptable to others so social movements are almost inevitably evolving towards routinization. In fact, it is often difficult to detect when a social movement ceases to be such and becomes routinized. When nationalism is the standard of the social movement, routinization may result in preferential policies for the particular ethnic group in question or in consociational government.

Unlike Clark et al., Eyerman and Jamison emphasize the rather ephemeral nature of social movements. Instead of taking the position that social movements inevitably evolve towards institutionalization and routinization, they posit that a social movement tends to disintegrate as its cognitive praxis becomes fragmented and those fragments are either adopted or rejected by the host society. What these theorists emphasize is the notion that a social movement creates "a public space that did not previously exist" and that the organizations that are produced are only the tools for transmission of the movement's cognitive praxis. The organizations and the movement itself are two different things, according to Eyerman and Jamison, and it is a mistake to reduce the movement's meaning to its medium. Evidently they do not agree with Marshall McLuhan's famous stance that "the medium is the message." For Eyerman and Jamison, "[t]he meaning, or core identity, is rather the cognitive space that the movement creates, a space for new kinds of ideas and relationships to develop."<sup>41</sup> They also suggest that the space created by a social movement is always being invaded by other "social actors".<sup>42</sup>

Giovanni Arrighi, Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein draw on Max Weber once again for a two-pronged distribution of power in political communities:

(1) class-structured, where it is linked to the market and distribution of property; and (2) status-group-structured, wherein goods and services are tied to prestige and "the distribution of life chances among the members of the political community (and others) is determined by their membership ('status situation') in the organizing complex of honorifically ranked communal groups, the basic categories of which are 'positively esteemed' and 'negatively esteemed'."<sup>43</sup> Because of distinction by rank, people are categorized and esteemed at different levels which may contribute to their ability to relate to one another and find enough common ground to experience a sense of solidarity. Arrighi et al. hasten to add that the distribution of power by class and status-group are often fused rather than being separate. They point out as well that there is a great tendency to reify groups partly due to the fact that self-conscious groups often legitimate themselves by claiming some kind of preeminence and sometimes their "temporal priority" in terms of other groups. To outsiders, self-conscious groups often appear monolithic in their solidarity and cohesion. This is not entirely true, according to Arrighi et al., since the monolithic appearance is actually the product of the group's relations with others. Groups are actually always changing their characteristics in terms of their interrelations.<sup>44</sup>

[They] are contending that there is a sense in which all these groups are in fact constantly being recreated such that over time we have genuinely new wine in old bottles, and that the emphasis on the continuity and primordality of the group's existence, though it may be of considerable ideological value to its members as such is of very little analytical value to us as observers.<sup>45</sup>

Besides internal interactions that help to shape social movements, external interactions play a significant role in their evolution.

External interactions consist of responses to social movements by the rest of society.<sup>46</sup> There may be panic on such a large scale that people may migrate to get away from a social movement. A crowd may form and attack the members of a movement. Publics may form wherein issues will be debated and opinions formulated.

Sometimes a derived movement will emerge either as a sympathy-movement or a counter-movement. Sympathy-movements will form positive interpretations of the original movement and try to assist the movement in achieving its goals. A counter-movement, on the other hand, will promote negative interpretations of the original movement and attempt to interfere with its goals. Eyerman and Jamison state that at times when society is rife with social movements, some feed off and produce others, especially their own opposition.<sup>47</sup>

The response of the government is often not institutionalized since it is usually ill-equipped to deal with social movements. It takes time to develop institutionalized responses. The government may simply respond to a social movement with indifference, not seeing it as a threat to the existing order. In this case, the government may ignore it, label it deviant and attempt to discredit it. On the other hand, the government may try to accommodate a social movement and be willing to negotiate with it, believing that some of its demands are valid and of no threat to the status quo. This may happen if the movement has enough support that ignoring its demands may cause it to become a threat to the existing order. This is often the case of protest movements. Finally, the government may make an effort to obstruct a social movement if it thinks that the movement is a real threat to the status quo, especially if the short-term goals appear to be reasonable but the long-term goals are threatening. Clark *et al.* point out that these governmental responses are not mutually exclusive; in fact, they are often combined.<sup>48</sup>

The responses of the government have ramifications for the social movement.<sup>49</sup> In the face of governmental indifference, the movement may disappear entirely or become a deviant subculture. Otherwise, it may mobilize greater support and make higher demands or pose a bigger threat. Governmental accommodation may raise the prestige of the social movement and it might achieve some of its goals. The movement



may attract more supporters, but it may lose some because some goals have been achieved or abandoned. The movement may have to formulate new demands. The attempts by a government to obstruct a social movement may cause it to lose support when potential and existing members come to believe that the personal costs of participating in such a movement are simply too high. On the other hand, members may completely reject the existing order and find even more to oppose than before.

To summarize briefly, the literature illuminates several major considerations when analyzing social movements. There must be some level of organization, an ideology must be present, change or its prevention must be the goal, and social movements arise from a specific historical and cultural milieu. People become committed to social movements for various reasons and attempt to carve out new social identities within them, even while they contribute to the effort by the social movement itself to establish a new social space and to disseminate new knowledge throughout society. Social movements are more coherent than simple collective behaviour and they are rarely unidimensional; that is, they not only have a political agenda, they usually also have a moral character, as well as a value-laden vision of what their society should be like. Factionalism is often a characteristic of social movements, a situation that is not necessarily negative (though frequently viewed as such). Communication is essential to social movements to disseminate information to members as well as those outside the movement itself, in an effort to gain support. The formation of the opponent, or the Other, is crucial since it contributes to the articulation of the movement's collective identity; it should be stressed that this is not just an abstract entity, but a real social actor of some kind, whether the government or another collectivity. Intellectuals play a key role in any social movement due to their responsibility in forming the opposition and the ideological stance.

With all this said, we must step back from this rather clinical dissection of social movements and question whether reality is ever so distinct and recognizably classifiable. How much of this analysis is due to the interpretations of social scientists who then impose these models onto their observations? The first problem is in the definition of terminology: for example, how much organization is required to turn collective behaviour into a social movement? How coherent do the ideas or demands of protestors have to be before they constitute a "movement ideology"?

Aside from these basic difficulties, which are, admittedly, endemic to virtually any social scientific study, one wonders whether social movements are really as coherent as the literature implies. Taking the feminist movement as an illustration, we can readily note that there are many components of this "social movement". There are academics who write about a myriad of issues, most often with very little agreement amongst them. There are grassroots organizations with no connections between them and little or no tie to the national organizations in existence. There are individual feminists with no formal ties to any organization at all who are doing their utmost to contribute to the reform of society in whatever way they can. In addition, there are Advisory Councils at the federal and provincial levels of government that may or may not be considered part of this social movement. In short, is the feminist movement an example of factionalism within a social movement or is it many social movements that have been labelled according to a common denominator?

The same questions could be asked about "nationalist movements". For example, what constitutes a nationalist movement? Is a nationalist movement comprised only of organizations with an avowed goal of outright independence? Or those expressing the desire for greater autonomy? Or perhaps organizations promoting elements of cultural nationalism? We could continue, but the point is that it is extremely difficult to establish the boundaries of what constitutes a "social

movement" and who should be included as participants.

Another nagging question is the whole concept of the organization or institutionalization of social movements. One gets the idea that there is some central planning committee with an agenda, sending out directives to various subordinate agencies; in short, there is the implication of some sort of orchestration involved. It is not difficult to envision an octopus-like creature with tentacles reaching out, moving forward on some inexorable pathway. The element of time is also suggested: that there must be some planning involved to organize and mobilize people, as well as to give them an ideological explanation for their actions. To put it another way, it appears that the analysis of social movements is undertaken by social scientists after the fact -- or, at least, once they have become established enough to study -- at which point it is possible to survey the phenomenon and attribute characteristics and categories that may not, in fact, have much to do with the reality of it. As such, the literature on social movements may be somewhat misleading.

This criticism may be even more pertinent to the study of nationalism as a social movement. In fact, Anthony Smith makes it in reference to Neil Smelser's work. He accuses Smelser of "retrospective determinism" because he believes that Smelser argues from an a priori point in history and takes it to the "inevitable" result of an ideological or social movement without considering how individuals or groups might have actively modified or redefined the situations.<sup>50</sup> Smith levels the further charge against Smelser that Smelser cannot account for those groups or "anomalies" that fail to initiate nationalist movements.

From a brief sampling of some of the studies and theories of nationalism, it would appear that scholars readily classify nationalist mobilization as a "movement" without establishing in sufficiently sociological terms that such mobilization is, indeed, a social movement. Anthony D. Smith's Theories of Nationalism will be utilized

as an illustration of such scholarly works since it is considered by many to be one of the seminal works in the field. We will also examine Anthony H. Birch's approach in Nationalism and National Integration<sup>51</sup> because of his reliance on the concept of national integration and what role it plays in the emergence of nationalism.

In his introduction, Smith states that nationalist movements are the basis of his study. He writes, "Nationalism is treated as a distinct ideological variety of social and political movement, with a definite 'directional tendency', a recognisable profile and thrust." He asks, "What is the character of nationalism, as a movement?"<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, he discusses the "heuristic utility" of analyzing the features of nationalist movements. Yet, nowhere in his book does he take the trouble to establish that nationalism is, in fact, a social and/or political movement.

In his critique of Elie Kedourie's work, Smith does to some degree elucidate his own approach to nationalist movements (and, thus, hints at the reason he believes nationalism to be a movement) which is that there is a core doctrine in nationalism that is used as a starting point by nationalistic groups from which they build their own particular theories. Hence, Smith states that there is an ideological component involved in nationalism. He also alludes to the historical context from which nationalist movements emerge. Later, there is some discussion of the possible social composition of nationalist movements wherein Smith states that certain movements at certain stages are comprised of elites whereas others are mostly middle-class phenomena. The intelligentsia always provides a disproportionate number of its members.<sup>53</sup> These points relate back to the sociological analyses of social movements and provide a basis for the belief that nationalism is a movement. However, Smith only hints at these linkages and never actually attempts to establish them.

Smith stresses that the core doctrine of nationalism does not provide a thoroughgoing theory for social and political change, but that it illuminates the inner

life of groups of people and offers a programme for action. Such a conceptualization would suggest rather strongly that Smith conceives of nationalism very much as an ideology. Nationalism rejuvenates people as they revert psychologically to a Golden Age and look to a similar future; it confers identities on people, identities imbedded in the history, ethos, culture and institutions of the group.<sup>54</sup> Smith goes on to write that the "enemy" is conceived of as everything extrinsic to the group itself and that the future sought by this group will not duplicate the Golden Age, but will "recapture its spirit" and allow people to actualize themselves. Both freedom and redemption are inherent in this conceptualization. Smith also posits that there are three ideals that are "fused" by nationalism: (1) collective self-determination; (2) "the expression of national character and individuality"; and (3) division of the world into unique nations, each with something to contribute to the international scheme.<sup>55</sup> As we can see, Smith believes in the presence of the individual within the scope of what he calls nationalist movements; nevertheless, his individuals are quite unidimensional because their psyches can only flourish in the context of the nation's Golden Age. Smith's individual cannot find fulfilment in any other milieu and his/her entire psychosocial development revolves around the ethnic identity. This seems to be highly simplistic and deterministic; the individual has little free will and his/her social self-identity derives from only one group. The portrayal of self-identity here is very static, for it allows no growth or expansion beyond the ethnic group. The impression given is that, if a nationalist movement is successful, self-determination for individuals is at an end and individual identity ossifies.

Employing what he calls "sociological taxonomies" in the study of nationalism, Smith explains that these entail the examination of nationalism as movements rather than as purely ideological phenomena categorized by historical epoch. He favours his method because he feels that some nationalisms (such as Syrian Ba'athism) have been

characterized by multiple ideologies, thus making classification problematic.<sup>56</sup> Smith goes to great lengths to outline new ways to classify nationalist movements in sociological terms, dividing them initially into formal (external factors involved) and substantive (internal factors) and subdividing these two categories until he has refined the classification of these movements down to the subtlest aspects of their ideological characters. However, he does not stop to explain why he considers nationalism to be a movement, nor even what he specifically means by the term "movement". Instead, he relies on some a priori assumptions and/or criteria and goes on from there. This is a serious flaw in his analysis, one that cannot be overlooked, especially in light of the fact that Smith has earlier levelled criticisms at other sociologists for their imprecision and expounds on the virtues of his own taxonomies by stating they are constant in their use of referents and are capable of being used for subsequent research. How can such sociological studies be carried out, based on his work, when he does not operationalize what he means when he uses the term "nationalist movement", nor does he authenticate his use of the term?

Anthony H. Birch is another theorist who writes about nationalism in terms of "movements" but does not establish why he believes them to be movements or what he means by the term. The crux of his argument rests on his construction of national integration. In this way, Birch establishes his support of majority or state nationalism as opposed to that of any minority.

In discussing national integration, Birch states that most modern states are political amalgamations of previously-separate historical communities that have been brought together for a variety of reasons. He calls this political integration. At the level of the nation, political integration becomes national integration. Political/national integration is essential in modern times because of the transformed role of the state wherein citizens are now called upon to endure a great deal of interven-

tion into their lives. This kind of endurance requires loyalty: "They must feel that it is their government whom they are obeying, their country for which they are making sacrifices. They are unlikely to feel this kind of loyalty except in a society that both governs itself and has experienced a process of national integration."<sup>57</sup> The state attempts to create nationalism by replacing minority ethnic culture with its own construction of national culture. Ethnic cultural minorities which refuse to be integrated or assimilated pose a threat to national integration.

According to Birch, nationalist theories are founded upon the belief that human beings are inherently social and that they are formed by their cultural contexts. Furthermore, government is only good when it represents these cultural contexts. He believes that national integration is the "central dilemma of nationalism as an ideology."<sup>58</sup> In producing unifying national culture and superseding minority ethnic culture, governments attempt to instill pride and patriotism in populations, a sense of "one for all and all for one", as it were. People must learn to identify with national institutions and policies to the point where they feel that they are best represented by them and no others. Pluralism may be employed to promote national integration.<sup>59</sup> Birch states that it is used when governments come to the realization that ethnic cultures simply will not die out. Presumably, it is considered better to allow them to operate instead of taking a chance on suppressing them and having them flourish underground until they gain enough strength to threaten the national government. While the government should promote tolerance of minority cultures, as long as they do not threaten the majority or official state policies, Birch contends that minorities have no right to such tolerance.

The question of secession is a very sensitive one for national governments since no national government will be disposed to the disintegration of its domain. Secessionist movements often include what Birch refers to as "romantic nationalists".

These people do not pursue rational, self-interested ends; they are motivated by their emotional commitment to their community. "[The romantic nationalist] is a communitarian, not an individualist. He thinks in terms of the spirit and culture of his people, not in terms of bargains and calculations. He will fight for his case despite any number of rational arguments showing it to be unjustified."<sup>60</sup> Nonetheless, these romantics are not enough to fuel an entire movement; they require the support of the masses and, for that, they must appeal to the material concerns of the other members of the minority. According to Birch, an explanation of this condition must be based on "one constant factor and two groups of historical (as distinct from structural) variables."<sup>61</sup> The constant factor is that romantic nationalists are determined to gain autonomy to ensure the maintenance of ethnic cultural identity. The first group of historical factors includes: the impact of television whereby ethnic cultures may be eroded by the constant exposure of children to the majority culture; "political impatience" or the unwillingness of people to hope that things will improve for their descendants; the greater security of small states in the international system and the existence of supranational organizations, such as the European Community, with which small states may deal in their own right. Birch's second group of historical factors is entirely local and particular to the ethnic group's circumstances.<sup>62</sup> He states,

It is impossible to generalize about factors of this kind. It is vital to realize that nationalist movements need an eruptive factor if they are to capture mass support, but it is difficult in advance of its occurrence to predict what this factor may be or when it may develop. It may be a social or economic factor, like foreign immigration or the discovery of new natural resources. It may be a purely political factor, like the brutal treatment of a minority, the sudden suppression of activities that had previously been tolerated, or an election result that seems to threaten the interest of a particular ethnic group.<sup>63</sup>

In his conclusion, Birch asserts that minority nationalist movements have little chance of success in the face of the rather impressive arsenal of weapons at the



disposal of national governments. One of the most significant of these weapons is control of the police and armed forces. Control of these coercive agencies is surely a strong deterrent for the masses usually involved in nationalist movements, if not for the romantic nationalists. He states, "At times of crisis the police constitute the sharp end of the state."<sup>64</sup> We may extend this metaphor to the armed forces and add that, at times of crisis, the army may constitute the lethal end of the state for minority nationalist movements.<sup>65</sup>

Birch makes national integration sound rather effortless, thus portraying those recalcitrant ethnic cultural minorities to which he refers as being nothing short of intransigent children. This approach tends to belittle the very real problem of securing a "national" identity for heterogeneous or multicultural societies. He even states that ethnic cultural minorities have no right to tolerance by the majority; by stating that this right is absent, Birch implies that these groups have little more than gasterbaiter status in a nation, that they are not entitled to the same governmental representation and protection as the majority because they do not really belong to the nation. Such an illiberal stance seems rather harsh. Assimilation and pluralism are proposed by Birch as two ways to "reduce" ethnic cleavages. These proposals condone either the total destruction of ethnic minority cultures or their (limited) tolerance; neither one, as offered by Birch, pays a great deal of respect to the position of these ethnic minorities in the host society. To put it another way, Birch's solutions infer that the status of these minorities is not on equal footing with that of the majority. An attitude such as this held by a government would seem to provide an exceptional breeding ground for the fomentation of social and political unrest among ethnic minorities.

The conclusion at which Birch arrives is that governments have such an impressive arsenal, both literally and figuratively, with which to fight off secession

by a minority nationalist movement that this kind of movement has very little chance of success appears to be far more equivocal in reality than he would have us think. If we use the former country of Yugoslavia as a case in point (which we certainly will later), we can see that, under certain circumstances, nationalist secessionist movements can gain the support of the international political community against their former government and attain a great deal of success. Furthermore, the impression given by Birch is that majority nationalism, in its guise as national integration, is the supreme goal that should be achieved and maintained, while minority nationalism is intrinsically negative and to be avoided. In other words, ideological/conservative nationalism is desirable, whereas utopian nationalism is damnable. Hence, we have a hierarchy of nationalism in terms of preferential value that does not take into consideration the lives of the people involved and barely seems to even notice that there are people involved. Lastly, Birch never clarifies his terminology or gives any justification for its use.

From the above-noted detailed examinations of the treatment of nationalism as a social movement, we are able to see some of the difficulties involved in such an approach. The first problem is that theorists seem to work from an a priori assumption that nationalism is a movement without bothering to authenticate such a position. ("If it looks like a movement and acts like a movement, then it must be a movement.") Another problem is the use of social movement criteria itself. This is a two-pronged matter: (1) there is reason to question the extent to which the analysis of the phenomena known as social movements can be usefully employed in the study of nationalism; and (2) the literature on social movements is rife with its own conceptual and taxonomic difficulties. Part of the reason for the dilemma is the essential circularity of the argument: we know that society is undergoing strain because of the rise of social movements and we also know that social movements arise

out of times of social strain; similarly, Birch tells us that nationalism arises from the breakdown of national integration and that the breakdown of national integration is observed when nationalist movements arise. This is not to say that there is nothing whatsoever that the literature on social movements can tell us about nationalism. To dismiss the entire analytical field would be frivolous and akin to throwing out the baby with the bathwater. The point being made here is that we should make every effort to avoid the intellectual Black Hole of automatically assuming that mobilization by ethnic/nationalist groups qualifies the phenomenon to be categorized as a social movement and treated as such; this type of approach omits the subtler, more individualistic and psychological elements of nationalism.

Many theorists who talk about nationalism in terms of "movements" also treat it as an ideology. Apart from analytical confusion, these theorists offer some worthwhile insights into the role of ideology in the study of nationalism and thus bring another element into the discussion: the power of ideas.

### Nationalism as Ideology

There seems to be a case for the position that nationalism as a social movement leaves something to be desired in terms of the study of nationalism itself. Historical and contextual trends may give rise to feelings of discontent and social tension and, under the influence of those conditions, people may begin to look around for others of like mind and organize themselves for change. Once they make this commitment and mobilize, we have a social movement. Yet, the scent of determinism lingers in the air. What makes people reinterpret themselves and their contexts? If they begin to waver, do they necessarily drop out? What makes people stay committed to a

situation even when they feel discontent and tension? Does everyone automatically act or react in a nationalistic manner when they experience the influence of outer pressures?

The literature on ideology and the concomitant conceptualization of nationalism as an ideology can shed some light on these questions. "Ideology" is a term buffeted about between the left and the right ends of the political spectrum without much definition or precision. It can mean something negative, something positive or something neutral. It can be a credo, simply a coherently-organized set of ideas, or a way to obfuscate reality and oppress people. Everybody knows what ideology is, yet nobody really seems to know. In short, as Anthony Giddens so aptly puts it: "Nobody can even decide how to pronounce it!"<sup>66</sup> Nevertheless, despite its imprecision and lack of definition, ideology can be very powerful and can have tremendous ramifications. For this reason, if no other, it is imperative to examine the phenomenon of ideology and explore its possible relationship with nationalism.

Terry Eagleton and Raymond Geuss delve into the topic of ideology in order to bring it more conceptual clarity and thereby demonstrate how complex a phenomenon it really is. Geuss' approach is concerned with the classification of ideology for study.<sup>67</sup> Eagleton employs a theoretical, historical analysis of the subject.<sup>68</sup>

Ideology and power are connected at the outset in Eagleton's discussion, although he rejects the idea of broadening the definition of ideology to include everything that would fall under the "intersection between belief systems and political power" because he believes that this would cause the term to lose all meaning. In rejecting such a broad definition and for the same reason, he also rejects Michel Foucault's view that power is everywhere. As Eagleton states, "The force of the term ideology lies in its capacity to discriminate between those power struggles which are somehow central to a whole form of social life, and those which

are not.”<sup>69</sup> If power is absolutely everywhere at all times, according to Eagleton, then there is nothing left to fight against since there is no Other. Some leftist intellectuals may be uncomfortable with this rejection of all-pervasive power because it suggests a hierarchy of struggle, but Eagleton favours this approach since it allows for the distinction of which struggles involve ideology and which do not. Not everything is ideological.<sup>70</sup>

In addition, Eagleton disagrees with the definition of ideology as “discourse bound up with specific social interests” because all discourses fit this description; that is, they are all interest-bound. Thus, once again, ideology loses all meaning. Eagleton argues that the whole notion of interests involves two levels: those at the “deep” level of the body (i.e., nourishment, communication, etc.), which are not ideological; and interests we might call political, which are ideological. His criterion for distinguishing some interests from others is their centrality to the entire social order. By making this distinction (and the one regarding power), Eagleton tries to ensure that ideology retains meaning in order for it to be utilized as an analytical tool.<sup>71</sup>

Geuss divides ideology into three main areas: (1) the descriptive sense; (2) the pejorative sense; and (3) the positive sense. Eagleton’s discussion revolves around six definitions of ideology ranging from very broad and general to sharply focussed and specific. These definitions can be grouped in similar fashion to Geuss’ categories.

At one end of the continuum, we have the descriptive aspect of ideology. For Geuss, this is an anthropological approach to the concept whereby ideology forms one part of the study of any group of people. Ideology in this sense includes the ideas, beliefs, attitudes, psychological characteristics, etc., that are held by the group under study. These facets may be grouped by common denominators and subdivided

into more specific ideologies. Thus, there may be multiple ideologies present within groups, some pertaining to religion, others to economic matters, and so on. Eagleton states that this type of definition of ideology makes it closely related to the concept of culture. Not only does ideology in this usage pertain to "the whole complex of signifying practices and symbolic processes"<sup>72</sup> of a group, but it also refers to the way members live their social practices. A more specific definition of ideology considers it to be "ideas and beliefs (whether true or false) which symbolize the conditions and life-experiences of a specific, socially significant group or class."<sup>73</sup> Now we are nearing the kind of conceptualization Marx and Mannheim attribute to ideology which will be discussed in greater detail below. The notion of power is also creeping into the definition, as evidenced by the phrase "socially significant group or class". Eagleton continues along this axis of power in his third definition wherein ideology becomes a way of promoting and legitimating the interests of "socially significant" groups to opposing interests. The political enters the forum here as the "interests" referred to must be relevant to sustaining or challenging the status quo. Thus, "interest" may be translated to "self-interest", tainting the concept of ideology with the overtones of rhetoric and deception.

Eagleton's fourth definition coincides with Geuss' "ideology in the pejorative sense" because he writes that promotion and legitimation of particular interests now relates to a dominant social power. Geuss himself describes this category of ideology as stemming from the position that it is delusional or false consciousness. He proceeds to discuss the falseness of ideology from the epistemic, functional and genetic aspects, but his discussion goes beyond the scope of this treatment of ideology. The Marxian attitude towards ideology is highlighted in this classification as ideology is viewed as being patently false; ideology cannot contain any veracity. In this sense, it is little more than a weapon to be employed by the powerful against

the weak. Eagleton presents an effective critique of such a simplistic stance on ideology when he points out that many people are often willing to die for their beliefs and that these beliefs have an enduring quality; it is degrading to humanity to dismiss such beliefs as empty and intellectually shallow when they are evidently so meaningful to so many persons. Another point raised by Eagleton is that the efficacy of ideology must derive from its grounding -- at least to some degree -- in the lived experiences, or social reality, of individuals who adhere to it. Ideology may be able to shape needs and desires, but it must also speak to people at some level to persuade them to embrace it. Eagleton concedes that there are falsehoods inherent in ideology, but there are also truths.

The fifth definition of ideology proposed by Eagleton entails the use of ideology to legitimate the interests of a group in power through "distortion and dissimulation."<sup>74</sup> It should be noted that he does not go as far in this characterization as does Geuss in that Eagleton states that ideology is not a tissue of lies, even though it may be taking liberties with the truth. Such a definition may appear to be intellectual hairsplitting, but considering his stance on ideology being made up of both truths and falsehoods on different levels and in different cases, the distinction is a valid one. Eagleton's sixth definition goes one step further and posits that ideology may consist of "false or deceptive beliefs", but that said beliefs derive from the structure of the society, not from a particular sector of the population.

"Ideology in the positive sense" is proposed by Geuss as being vital for human beings because we need to believe in something and to find meaning in our lives and our selves. He characterizes this kind of ideology as more of a "desideratum", something to be created at a future time. This is not to say, however, that this form of ideology does nothing but speak to our needs and desires; rather, "positive ideology", as Geuss refers to it, helps to shape those needs and desires in that it

places restrictions on what kinds we are allowed to have. The salient point in this discussion of ideology in a positive sense is that needs, desires, etc., are not usually static, but highly variable, making it difficult to construct an ideology. Eagleton only hints at positive ideology when he makes passing references to ideologies employed by oppressed groups when they attempt to formulate opposition.

John Plamenatz credits Marx and Engels as the first theorists to employ the term "ideology" when discussing ideas and attitudes specific to a group or community and in expressing their notion of the connection between beliefs and attitudes and human activities.<sup>75</sup> Karl Mannheim took up this theme in Ideology and Utopia.<sup>76</sup> He writes that the production of knowledge is not something in which everyone participates; rather, only certain individuals from particular groups have developed ways of thinking based on a certain style. These ways of thinking characterize their own positions. Most other individuals simply further the thinking that has already been given.<sup>77</sup> The definition of a situation is paramount for Mannheim, who states that a situation is only "constituted as such when it is defined in the same way for the members of the group."<sup>78</sup> People belong to groups not just because they are born into them, or consider themselves to be members, or are considered to be members by others, but when they use the group's definitions of the world as their own. "In every concept, in every concrete meaning, there is contained a crystallization of the experiences of a certain group."<sup>79</sup> Thus, ideology can only emerge from a specific group and it influences the way that people behave. This may seem like a rather obvious conclusion, but it is an important one in that it clears away the notion of "universal" truths and "natural" or instinctual behaviour in human beings. Truth, or knowledge, whether or not it exists on some abstract metaphysical plane, is always mediated by the material social position occupied by the people who articulate it; those who articulate truth or knowledge in similar fashion belong to a



group. In addition, ideology not only provides the content of our thoughts, but it also provides the form for the way we think.<sup>10</sup> It offers a framework for the formation of future thoughts. Hence, we have a spiralling effect where the material social position of people influences ideology which, in turn, influences the material social position of these people. Even if they occupy different statuses in society, Plamenatz suggests that they will still subscribe to the same social ideology in terms of their worldview and that there are certain ideas that they share with all others in society, despite their differing points of view. Plamenatz states,

Just as observers in the physical world could not be aware that they all belonged to one world in which their points of view differ and change unless they shared ideas about that world, unless they understood it in the same way no matter what their points of view, so too the members of a society could not be aware that they belonged to it, and could not sustain their roles inside it, unless they shared ideas about it, unless their understanding of their own and other people's places in society were not relative to their own places. Understanding necessarily requires that ideas not be relative to points of view, whether the 'points of view' are physical or social.<sup>11</sup>

"Shared ideas", as he has employed the term in this case, is quite suggestive of a kind of hegemonic ideology, a matter which will be discussed in greater detail below.

Furthermore, Plamenatz brings up a very significant point when he states that people belong to a number of groups in society, each of which has its own ideology; hence, we all subscribe to a number of ideologies which we share with different people.<sup>12</sup> The reason for the significance of this point is that it illustrates the multifaceted nature of both individuals and ideologies, something which is often ignored or overlooked, especially by Marxist scholars, in the discussion of ideology. We are often given to believe that ideology is a monolithic structure that occupies a central, overriding position in society and allows little or no room for any alternatives; that when an alternative arises, it is always accompanied by a situation of threat and conflict. We are not encouraged to entertain the belief that many ideologies exist at any given time due to the presence of diverse social groups and

that these various ideologies are not necessarily always in conflict.

Utopian thinking has the opposite effect from that of ideology: oppressed peoples are so convinced that the only way to remedy their situation is to completely destroy the existing situation that they are incapable of seeing any positive elements therein. Mannheim stresses that these people are not concerned with the actual reality of the situation, only in their own perceptions. For this reason, utopian thinking is a call to action. With this kind of mentality, people are capable of turning their backs on anything that does not fit in with their perception of the situation and carrying out whatever action they deem necessary as a remedy.<sup>83</sup> "A state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality within which it occurs."<sup>84</sup>

Mannheim believes that ideologies often begin from good and noble intentions and transcend the actual situation; unfortunately, they rarely translate in their realization, falling short of the original intentions because whenever people attempt to interpret them into action, they become distorted.<sup>85</sup> The same may be said for utopias. Utopianism would appear to be one extreme of the continuum of ideology with its attendant perception that the existing order must be abolished in order to realize perfection; at the other end of the continuum is conservatism, the belief that the existing order is perfect and that nothing should be changed.

Utopias can never ultimately be attributed to the vision of one individual, according to Mannheim. One individual is incapable of bringing down the existing order single-handedly. The vision of the individual must strike chords already present in society and be able to articulate them. Once a collectivity adopts the utopian vision and instigates action based upon it, then the challenge to the status quo materializes. "In other words, the key to the intelligibility of utopias is the structural situation of that social stratum which at any given time espouses them."<sup>86</sup> Individual experiences are framed by the utopian vision, Mannheim

suggests.<sup>87</sup>

Utopias are to be understood in terms of the social structure of the collectivity initiating or embracing them; the utopian vision then frames the experiences of the individuals, according to Mannheim. Once again, we observe the spiral effect, mentioned above by Eagleton, whereby the ideological structure is determined by those who construct and espouse it, while the ideology then, in turn, structures the material reality of those individuals, and so on. Most importantly, we note the fluidity of the situation wherein neither the ideology nor individual experiences remain static.

The above-noted characterizations of ideology and utopia may be applied to nationalism. Nationalism may start off as a good and noble intention, transcendent of the situation at hand; however, in its translation to action and reality, it can very well go astray and become extremely distorted. Nationalism can be either conservative or utopian: some nationalistic groups may want to change the existing order while others may wish to retain the status quo in the face of change.

At this point, we may pause to take note of the different characterizations of nationalism. Nationalism as conservatism (i.e., conservative ideology) is that of the State or the dominant group. In other words, if the government of a country promotes nationalism and patriotism, it may be said to be embracing conservative nationalism. There is no interest in changing the existing order. Status quo conditions are salutary for this type of nationalism. On the other hand, nationalism as utopia is the kind of nationalism characteristic of minority groups, especially those that are secessionist or irredentist. In these cases, the minority group mobilizes because it believes that it cannot realize its aims within the existing structure; only by destroying that structure can it accomplish its goals. There is a hint of messianism in this type of nationalism which gives it its extreme nature; this is the type of nationalism that may go to any lengths to accomplish its mission. Its ideolog-

ical character does not allow for compromise or concession; whatever it takes must be done. It turns its back on the old order and, in order to do so with irrevocable finality, it must demonize the old order in the eyes of its followers. Followers of this type of nationalism must be truly convinced that there can be no possibility of achieving their goals under the existing regime and must look upon it with fear and hatred; they must be willing to risk the loss of everything in order to gain everything. When nationalism has a utopian character, we can be prepared to witness untold destruction and brutality.

Another feature of utopian nationalism is its "fairy tale" overtones. Like the slumbering beauty who is so romantically awakened by her prince, who then takes her off into the sunset where they live happily ever after, utopian nationalism offers the promise that, if only the nation would be awakened to its bright future and attain statehood, it, too, would live happily ever after, all its problems solved. Such naivete can have disastrous consequences for the followers of this nationalism. Despite claims to the contrary, small, fledgling nations may find themselves possessing little more than formal political sovereignty while, in reality, they are at the mercy of the giants of the world system and may even face greater oppression and exploitation than when they were part of their former country.

Mannheim raises the point that political conflict has generated ideology because it was discovered that groups in power could become so entrenched in their interest-bound thinking that they either wilfully ignored or unintentionally overlooked any point of view that might possibly pose a threat to their status. "There is implicit in the word 'ideology' the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it."<sup>88</sup> In other words, when someone notices that the way things are being portrayed by those in power has little to do

with the way things actually stand, the notion of "ideology", or justifications produced by those in power, becomes evident. If those in power refuse to recognize the alternative point of view, they may be accused of attempting to exercise hegemony over all of society in an effort to oppress everyone other than themselves. Thus, ideology takes on the overtones attributed to it by Marx, among others, that it is a tool employed by the powerful to obfuscate the reality of the powerless and maintain the status quo.

Perhaps this would be an opportune moment to ponder the difference between ideology and hegemony. If we take hegemony to mean the moral and intellectual leadership of one group over another, a definition which would include ideology under its rubric, we can then concede that there may be a class (perhaps not necessarily a ruling class) or group in any given society whose beliefs, norms, values, mores, ideas, etc. override all others, are espoused in some form by the majority of members of that society, and permeate, in some fashion, virtually every facet of social life. Ideology, on the other hand, is a more modest phenomenon, representing beliefs, attitudes and action in more specific, less generalized areas of social life. By making such a distinction, we can then see how there can be a social group whose ideology is hegemonic and exclusionary and which may eventually lead to the complete denial of the real conditions in society. In such a situation, it is possible for other ideologies to vie for a superior place in the social sphere and perhaps even replace the former hegemonic worldview.

The question that arises from the above discussion is whether ideology and/or hegemony always have political ramifications. There are several ways to approach an answer to this query. First, if an ideology becomes so intensely interest-bound that it acts as an opaque screen to any alternative, the possible result from those who do espouse an alternative will be political mobilization of some sort, ranging any-

where from lobbying as an interest group to a full-scale social movement or even to rioting and violence. Second, if a group is hegemonic but other ideologies exist, a challenge to the status quo may arise; the challenge would have to be couched in political terms since power struggles are intrinsic to politics. Lastly, if ideology is the union of beliefs and attitudes and action, then it is inherently political for, once people begin to act in concert with their beliefs and attitudes, there will always be political overtones. This, of course, would not apply to a belief such as that the world is round. It would apply to a belief such as that each individual has certain civil rights. When one begins to act on such a belief, or assert those rights, there will be political consequences for one has to act within a space where others may hold the same belief and also act upon it. Therefore, the notion of ideology and/or hegemony tends to suggest that political ramifications are intrinsic.

In summary, we have learned from the above discussion of ideology that it encompasses not only ideas, but action, and that the actions and ideas form a dynamic interplay. Ideology emerges from historical contexts and not everyone plays a part in its production; in fact, most people do little more than simply perpetuate it and pass it along to others. It gives us the content of our thoughts and, more importantly, the form. We know that we belong to a certain social group, not just because we believe that we do, or others believe that we do, but when we use that group's definitions of the world. However, we all belong to many groups throughout our lives, so we embrace multiple ideologies. There are even multiple subdivisions of ideology in society and, even though we may occupy different positions in our social system and change those positions from time to time, we all still more or less espouse the same ideology — the one that dominates in our society. The reason for that is because those of us who belong to a certain society must have a common understanding of it and the world in order to make sense of our own and others' positions within

it. Ideologies or points of view may vary, but the shared ideas -- or hegemony -- must be the same.

Ideology occupies a continuum from conservative to utopian. From the conservative point of view, the system is fine the way it is and we can realize our goals within it; utopian thinkers, on the other hand, come to believe that the only way to achieve their aims is to completely change the system or destroy it. In both cases, groups who hold these ideologies can become so intensely interest-bound that they fail to see any other point of view except their own and refuse to acknowledge that an alternative could have any merit. Utopian thinking particularly requires those who espouse it to take action. Ideology, whether conservative, utopian or something in between, must address the needs and desires of people in order for them to embrace it; it must tap into people's lived experience. Power is intrinsic to ideology, whether it is the power a social group must have in order to have its ideological position dominate in society or the power that comes from being an adherent of the dominant ideology.

There are some criticisms of the theories of ideology set out above. The main one is that, despite repeated efforts and a great deal of attention to detail, it is still unclear as to whether ideology is the all-encompassing, umbrella-like phenomenon that dominates the intellectual landscape of society and gives form and content to everything or whether it is the more specific, focused definition that pertains to a certain group or facet of social life. Can it be both at the same time, as some theorists suggest, or does this cause it to lose its analytical precision? If it is one and the other, how do we distinguish between them? An attempt has been made here to address this problem, but much more analysis is required before the dilemma can be settled.

Another problem is that posed by the discussion of ideology as becoming overly

interest-bound and not allowing for alternative visions of reality while, at the same time, it is suggested that ideology must address people's lived experience and answer their needs and wants in order to be truly meaningful. An interesting conundrum emerges here. If ideology is meaningful to individuals, how can they help but become interest-bound and not allow alternative visions of reality? How can one wholeheartedly embrace one vision and yet give equal credence to another, possibly opposing, one? The suggestion here is that no one should passionately believe anything in order to be tolerant or that tolerance breeds a certain amount of indifference in terms of what people believe. Perhaps this kind of ideological shifting not only can, but does, take place in any given society, but then the question arises as to what happens to identity when shifting of this nature occurs.

The whole concept of ideology as presented in the literature gives the impression of a coherent, managed, carefully planned schema. One can hardly help but imagine a number of individuals sitting in an office in front of a drawing board, discussing and laying out the components of a given ideology. There is the suggestion of time as well, for such carefully orchestrated things take time to plan and map out. To say that this image appears somewhat artificial is to understate the case. Obviously this is not a realistic picture. Therefore, we must assume that ideology emerges piecemeal from the actions and thoughts of individuals and groups, is constantly being renegotiated, and requires a fairly lengthy process to become coherent in any context.

That nationalism is a form of ideology is a common position taken by theorists of the phenomenon. As has already been noted above, even those that discuss it in terms of "movements" refer to a "doctrine" or ideological component. On the superficial level at least -- and in spite of some questionable analytical points -- it does make sense to think about nationalism in terms of ideology because we tend to



assume that people have reasons for the things they do. Few of us would argue that individuals are devoid of beliefs and attitudes; or that there is a bifurcation of some sort between the beliefs and attitudes they hold and the behaviour they manifest. Thus, common sense tells us that the concept of ideology has significance where nationalism is concerned.

Arrighi et al. state that what we call "nations" are really just political claims made by ethnic groups that they should have states which represent them and their territory. Such political claims can be utilized by both secessionists and irredentists. They further write,

In point of fact, if we were to use a strict definition of the concept "nation", we should be hard-pressed to find even one "nation-state" in the entire world system. This indicates that "nation" is more the description of an aspiration, or of a tendency, than of an existing phenomenon.<sup>89</sup>

Thus, the only real difference between an "ethnic group" and a "nation" is sovereignty; ethnic groups do not have or claim their own states while nations do. Ethnic groups depend on the creation of nation-states for their structures because nation-states have been the significant political units of the international market system. These political units are dependent for their definition and circumstances on their location in that system.<sup>90</sup> To put it another way, the nation-state is the only real game in town for anyone who wants to be a player. Hence, any ethnic group must make a claim to nationhood, and thus to nation-statehood, if it truly seeks self-determination. These are the only conditions available under which the aforesaid ethnic group can truly aspire to any kind of self-governance or to determine its own destiny. Without the political clout of nation-statehood, it cannot enter the international economic forum, participate in international relations, or negotiate its standing in the international system. It must be a nation in the truest sense. That is why, as Arrighi et al. assert, "[o]ne of the fundamental ideological themes of all modern

nationalism has been the struggle for equality — both the hypothetical equality of all members of the 'nation' and the demand for equality with 'outside' oppressor states/groups."<sup>91</sup> If the ethnic group does not have "equality" with other groups or states, then it cannot participate fully. The attainment of equality with others must be one of the foremost ideological goals because it bestows not only personal dignity upon people, but also the dignity and position due to full citizens of the world community who are represented by their own government in their own state.

Other theorists equate nationalism exclusively with the nation-state as well, as if the attainment of political sovereignty were the only dimension. Tonu Parming and Mee-Yan Cheung simply state, "...political nationalism as an ideology essentially insists that the highest expression of a people's collective identity is statehood, and that the population of a given state should have but a single sense of peoplehood."<sup>92</sup> Jayant Lele discusses nationalism as an ideology in its "umbrella-like" incarnation, or as a meta-ideology. It is behind all ideologies and constitutes the "utopian" core of ideology because of its expression as the "essential sociability" of human beings.<sup>93</sup> Lele writes, "Nationalism continues to remain potent, drives people to suffer repression and inflict it on others only because it is rooted in the social basis of their existence."<sup>94</sup> This social basis is the community, the site of oppression and exploitation which is projected onto those outside the community. As such, Lele suggests that nationalism is the "hegemonic face" of the indigenous dominant class which proposes its own sectoral interests as those of the nation. Unfortunately, Lele fails to point out that the community can also be the site of sharing, generosity, support, tolerance, and a host of other positive phenomena. He offers no insights into why these aspects are overlooked while more negative ones are imposed on others. Nor does he explain why people would allow themselves to be so duped by the

indigenous dominant class that they would adopt and fight for sectoral interests that do not offer anything meaningful for them.

Wilkinson attributes the creed and doctrine for nationalism's ideological component to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. That is, the nation-state is the most appropriate basis for the establishment of the ideal political association (i.e., the social contract). "Universal civilized society" and the general will are harmonized in a republican nation-state because the nation is legitimated by the people.<sup>95</sup> Wilkinson further credits Rousseau and the Jacobins with giving the modern doctrines of nationalism their underpinnings: "[p]rinciples of national solidarity, universal citizenship, equal rights to civic participation and equal treatment under the law."<sup>96</sup> Echoing the position taken by Arrighi *et al.* with regard to the intimate connection between nationalism and political sovereignty, Wilkinson asserts, "Once defined in terms of the entire population within a given territory, or a whole ethnic or linguistic group, nationalism asserts that the nation should become the fundamental and universal unit of political organization. Human society becomes a world of nation-states."<sup>97</sup> He also points out that this doctrine of nationalism has been attacked on three fronts: (1) there is no agreement on what constitutes a nation and there is often much cross-cutting when nations are established; (2) nationalism is often mistaken for the desire for constitutional democracy by Westerners; and (3) nationalism has exacerbated international conflict and has often been the justification for revolution and war.<sup>98</sup>

Anthony H. Birch states that nationalism is a political doctrine that is concerned with the "organization of political authority."<sup>99</sup> He equates the problem of understanding nationalism with the coterminous problem of defining what is a nation.

If one claims that every people or society has this right [to govern itself], one is immediately in trouble. How many peoples or societies are there in the world? How are their boundaries to be defined and charted? If one says that only a national society has this right, how is

one to define a national society without falling into the circular argument that it is a society that governs itself? How, in fact, can one define a nation?<sup>100</sup>

He maintains that national identity has both subjective and objective aspects. It is not completely subjective because the situation and observers play an important part in establishing group/national identity as well. Birch believes that "[a] nation is best defined as a society which either governs itself today, or has done so in the past, or has a credible claim to do so in the not-too-distant future."<sup>101</sup> He admits that there is some circularity in this definition but insists that it is inescapable because of historical reality. For him, nationalism is "a doctrine about the proper relationship between society and the political regime..."<sup>102</sup>

Ernest Gellner calls nationalism a "principle" and argues that it is political and that its claim is to congruence between the political and the national unit. Nationalism defines both the sentiment and the movement concerned with it: "Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind."<sup>103</sup> Gellner delineates the ways in which nationalist sentiment can be violated and sums up this brief discussion by stating that "nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy" and that this legitimacy is based on ethnic boundaries coinciding with political ones and not acting as a divisive tool between the powerful and those without power.<sup>104</sup> He also argues that the nationalist principle may be couched in universalistic terms whereby the abstract concept of nationalism is supported, regardless of its specificity, a la Woodrow Wilson's generalized stance of "national self-determination". However, the universalistic is not usually the case for nationalism; indeed, what tends to fuel nationalism is extreme particularism or ethnocentrism -- "forsaking all others", so to speak, in favour of one's own. Such particularism also generally leads to extremism in the form

of "passions running high" as opposed to "sweet reason".

Gellner's definition as stated above is highly circular and requires the acceptance of certain assumptions and leaps in logic to be adopted. We know there is such a thing as nationalist sentiment because nationalist movements arise from the stimulation of the said sentiment. We must assume that the sentiment has been there all along, mysteriously latent until some stimulus has aroused it, but we are given no insight as to where such sentiment originates and why it is particularly oriented to the "nation". There is, similarly, no explanation why the label "nationalist" is given to the movement which arises from such sentiment. We are expected to simply accept this notion, suggesting that national sentiment is inherent to human beings. But the question remains: why should such a label necessarily be attached to either? And is the stimulation of sentiment sufficient to constitute a movement — or is something else necessary to facilitate acting in concert? There is also the problem of presenting an individualistic concept such as the stimulation of a sentiment with a collective result (i.e., nationalist movement) without adequately accounting for the linkage between the two or the processes that lead from the individual sentiment to the collective action. To be sure, Gellner is hinting at something which we would argue has a great deal of validity; however, the criticism remains that he has not taken enough care to explain and analyze the relationship and progression between the two phenomena.

As we can see, the approach of nationalism as an ideology offers some excellent analytical insights. Specifically, we are able to see that nationalist ideology accords a particular kind of identity to individuals as individuals and as members of ethnic groups. The whole notion of "self-determination" bestows a new way of perceiving ourselves: it empowers us, makes us believe that we can cast off oppressive shackles and rise above our mundane existence, and it gives us a great deal of hope for the

future. In addition, ideology affords moral justification, grants us the opportunity to feel that we are doing something not just for ourselves, but for the sake of others, especially future generations. As David Apter states, "The vaguest of ideologies can be made to shine in the reflected glow of moral indignation."<sup>105</sup> When ideology also taps into our ethnic identity, it can move us to become active political beings, making some of us willing to sacrifice everything to achieve our goals.

Nationalism may be a particularly powerful ideology for this reason: because it has the properties that are afforded by the ideological component in addition to its affinity with a deep aspect of our personal identity, it can marshal an enormous amount of power and passion for a goal that is highly abstract in many ways. To have a state that represents one's own nation is not something most people dream about. Few people in the course of their day-to-day lives probably care very much whether their ethnic group is in a position to enter the international economic forum, participate in international relations, or negotiate its standing in the international system, even though these political situations may have great indirect importance for them. Even fewer people give much of their attention to whether their state is the most appropriate or legitimate basis for the social contract or whether the general will is harmonized with universal civilized society. Yet, these same people may be motivated to lay down their lives for such abstract goals. Hence, nationalism as an ideology engenders something in human beings that cannot be discounted or dismissed.

Nevertheless, we must not forget that the ideological component without the emotional and psychological commitment is like one-handed clapping. Ideology derives its power from its praxis. This requires commitment, something which is emotional and psychological by nature. We cannot fully understand the influence of ideology in nationalism until we try to grasp the mechanics of the emotional and

psychological factors at work. Some theorists have attempted to account for nationalism as a psychological manifestation enuring in individuals or in members of social groups. These studies lend further insights into our discussion of nationalism and require some investigation.

### Nationalism as Psychological Manifestation

Now we come to the other side of the one-handed clapping: the psychological/emotional side of the equation of nationalism. The literature dealing with the ideological component has pointed us in this direction with its references to the ways in which ideology arises from personal experiences, how it must have meaning for those who embrace it, and how it then influences the thoughts and experiences of its adherents. We see the connection between the personal and the political, especially when we take into consideration the fact that ideology goes hand-in-hand with action.

But what is that crucial personal element? We must assume that human beings are not born with allegiance toward any given nation; they must acquire it during their lifetimes. How do they acquire it and why does it sometimes have such power over them? Is it ever-present or does it take on salience at some point? If so, why? Once it has been aroused, are we then held in its thrall for all time? These questions and many others will be explored in this next section as we review the literature on the formation of social self-identity, including ethnic identity, how people come to identify themselves as part of a particular social group, and how their primordial sentiment can lead them to embrace the actions we have come to describe as nationalist.

Theorists of self-identity stress that the self is not a product but a process. Weigart et al. posit that identity is what makes us human beings. Identities are

formed through interactions with others and interpretations by ourselves; that is, our identity is not simply what others impose on us — we must reject or adopt others' perceptions of who we are and discard or integrate them accordingly. Identities are comprised of roles we play in society and social/cultural definitions restrict what identities are available to us. Thus, presumably, it is not possible to be a rocket scientist in a primitive tribal society because its culture and social structure do not allow for such a role. Identities are constantly being incorporated into the self as people take on new roles in society. However, the identity must be validated by others for it to be fully incorporated into self-identity. Self and identity are not one and the same, stress Weigart et al., although self is not possible without identity and identity is not possible without self. This is because there is no "disembodied thinker" who can escape cultural meanings. People strive to maintain their identity through time and space; that is, they need a sense of continuity with the past and with their place.<sup>106</sup>

For George Herbert Mead, the self is formed through the interaction between the "I" which is comparable to Freud's concept of the "id", that untamed, unpredictable aspect with which we are all born, and the "Me", the socialized aspect.<sup>107</sup> Language is extremely important for Mead because it is the instrument through which we interpret our context and the world around us. Indeed, without the organization of symbols that we call language, human beings would not be able to think at all. Hence, the language we use to express ourselves is crucial in the formation of self-identity.

Douglas, an existential sociologist, contends that such a conceptualization of the self is incomplete. He concedes that most "sane" and "adult" (i.e., socially competent) people recognize that they are both individuals and socially defined beings. In other words, we know that we are separate and different from others



while, at the same time, we are also similar to, interdependent with, and often "fused by love" with other people's selves.<sup>108</sup> "The part of us that is different from the others is the 'subjective I', the willing, intending person. The part of us that is socially defined, that anchors us to the social world, that embeds our beings in the way significant others react to us, is the 'social me', what others see in the 'I'."<sup>109</sup> It is apparent that to this extent, he is in agreement with Mead's conceptualization of the social self. However, Douglas augments this theory of the self by rejecting the notion that it is composed of little more than "a composite of social reflections"<sup>110</sup> and insisting that there is an inner self that integrates the mind and lends order to its complex subsystems, orienting our actions as we face the external stimuli of the world in which we live.<sup>111</sup> We need that sense of inner self to act as a framework for, or give a general gestalt to, our lives. Without it, we would feel threatened by external stimuli because we would feel formless, lost, confused, and so on, resulting in lives filled with anxiety and panic. When we are secure at the very core of our selves, we can feel challenged to grow and expand. According to Douglas,

[o]ur need for a sense of inner self seems to spring directly from our sense of time, from our immense memories, from the vast complexity and pluralism of our human mind (with its immensely complex interrelations among subsystems), from our awareness of the many potentially conflicting basic emotions and values that might push us in different directions in life at any given time, and from the necessity we face of choosing plans of action to satisfy (optimally) these conflicting emotions and values over relatively long periods of time.<sup>112</sup>

Douglas further holds that values and emotions are crucial to the self. "Our basic values guide us in choosing the social form of actions that fulfil and enhance our basic emotions, but it is our basic emotions that orient or guide our will in choosing to act at all and then in choosing what kinds of actions to perform."<sup>113</sup> Basic, positive emotions are what human beings consider to be the most vital component of the self and, when aroused, they orient our actions so that our selves will be fulfilled and enhanced. "The more powerful the emotion, the more the self is

oriented, until, at the extreme, the entire sense of self is pervaded by, overridden by, completely in the grip of, the emotion."<sup>114</sup>

Existential sociology, of which Douglas is a practitioner, is the perspective by which human experience in the world in all forms is studied. "A central orientation of this perspective is the fusion of rational thought, action, and feeling."<sup>115</sup> Its intellectual forebears come from existential philosophy. As such, its main premise is "that the world and our selves are essentially meaningless" but existential sociology does not adhere to the belief that such meaninglessness results in negative consequences like alienation, fear, and so on. Instead, its practitioners concentrate on the optimistic observation that human beings constantly seek "to discover viable meaning in order to make life work."<sup>116</sup> The self is believed to be encased in the anatomical structure of the human being and appears to be singular. However, this singularity is to be found within a collectivity or collectivities. "Typically, we see ourselves as members of historically and socially constituted sodalities. The pronominal 'I' defines itself as a member of a plural 'we'."<sup>117</sup> That is, we require a reference group ("sodality") to understand the self. "'I am I' is not an answer that anyone...will respect. Thus we all disembody and socialize the self in the very act of claiming its singular embodiment and individuality. An individual becomes a person, and a person exhibits his or her personification of the social self-referencing group."<sup>118</sup> Furthermore, not only is the self connected with others in its present time and space, it is also linked to previous others historically. Nonetheless, the "I" of self must always struggle against the "we" which gives it its individual identity in order not to be completely submerged in the "we".<sup>119</sup>

In other words, existential sociology posits a strong relationship between our rational selves and emotion. In short, our emotions inform every thought and experience we have throughout our lives. We can no more divorce our rationality

from our emotions than we can split our minds from our bodies. Emotions form the basis for our rationality. As such, our emotions are absolutely fundamental in the formation of our social self-identity. It makes sense to assume that, aberrations notwithstanding, human beings attempt to maximize pleasurable experiences and minimize negative ones. Pleasurable experiences arise from some of the roles we play in society and roles are the building blocks of social self-identity; therefore, social self-identity can be viewed as a collection of roles that produce pleasurable experiences or are in reaction to negative experiences for most human beings.

In this context, the concept of self-esteem would appear to be an essential element of social self-identity. The definition of self-esteem set forth by Baumeister and Tice<sup>120</sup> rests upon the notion of a dichotomy between positive and negative qualities. In other words, they state that high self-esteem involves emphasizing abilities, strengths and good qualities, while, on the other hand, low self-esteem involves an emphasis upon deficiencies, weaknesses and bad qualities. As far as it goes, this definition seems adequate, but it does not go far enough.

Taking the Baumeister and Tice definition as a point of departure, we can expand upon the concept of self-esteem as follows. Pleasurable experiences act as a barometer of self-esteem in that the amount of pleasure or "positive strokes" a person receives will probably serve to raise his/her level of self-esteem or lower it accordingly. Furthermore, the number of sources of "positive strokes" will determine to some extent whether self-esteem will be specific or diffuse. In other words, if the ethnic community, for example, affords the greatest amount and highest consistency of pleasure for an individual, he/she may likely experience his/her self-esteem as being highest within, and specific to, the ethnic community. On the other hand, if an individual derives pleasure from his/her experiences not only within the ethnic community, but also at work, during leisure-time activities, through religious

affiliation, and so on, it is probable that self-esteem will be high and diffuse for that individual, with the ethnic community being only one of many sources of "positive strokes". Hence, not only the level of self-esteem of an individual, but the number of sources of self-esteem, will have significance for social self-identity. Of course, if the ethnic community is the backdrop for all the sources of self-esteem, its significance will be paramount.<sup>121</sup>

Baumeister and Tice propose that there are two systems of control employed by human beings when they confront the world. Primary control is instrumental while secondary control is passive and interpretive. Primary control involves attempts to change the world to suit the individual's needs. Secondary control involves submission to what is perceived as the immutability of the world and the situations confronting the individual. Essentially, "[p]rimary control aims to fulfil one's goals, whereas secondary control aims to avoid disappointment."<sup>122</sup> According to Baumeister and Tice, regardless of whether individuals have high or low self-esteem, they will employ both primary and secondary control; however, the pattern and goal of their employment will differ in relation to the level of self-esteem.

Whenever a situation arises to confront an individual and the result is failure, if the failure can be attributed to external factors, the individual will pursue this course. Such is true for those with high or low self-esteem. Primary control mechanisms will not play a role because of the attribution to external factors: if instrumental behaviour were to be pursued by the individual who has experienced initial failure and externalized it, continued attempts resulting in failures might result in the internalization of the failure, with the possible consequence being a drop in self-esteem. The attribution to external factors is itself a secondary control mechanism, according to Baumeister and Tice.<sup>123</sup> This suggests that, even when people can save face by blaming external factors for a failure, given a choice, they

probably will not continue the behaviour that resulted in the failure, lest it become apparent that the failure was due to their own deficiency rather than any external factor. Therefore, to overcome this tendency, it might be possible to give new labels or interpretations to similar situations that have previously resulted in failure. Such reinterpretation might allow for renewed actions without a loss of self-esteem.

Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that people with high self-esteem will experience more dissonance when they face a situation which conflicts with their views of self. The reason for this heightened dissonance is due to the fact that those with high self-esteem make positive evaluations of themselves, whereas people with low self-esteem tend not to have such self-evaluations. What this characterization tends to suggest is that individuals with high self-esteem who experience cognitive dissonance will embark upon a course of action intended to remedy the dissonance.<sup>124</sup> Hence, we are given some insight into why someone might choose to "exit" from a situation.

Ronald Rogowski presents nationalism as a "rational" phenomenon. Although he sets out three parts to his definition, we will only deal with the following: (1) "the product of value-maximizing (but not merely greedy) behaviour; (2) based almost always on an accurate appraisal of self-interest and social reality (that is, rarely a consequence of hysteria or delusion)".<sup>125</sup> He uses the term "rational" in the sense of maximizing personal benefits after a cost/benefit analysis "where both benefit and cost are evaluated idiosyncratically but consistently"<sup>126</sup>; that is, he defines "rationality" in its economic manifestation. Thus, nationalism arises out of personal choice after a careful calculation of costs and benefits. Nevertheless, it is not a purely individual matter; such an orientation towards rational choice applies to groups as well.

Rogowski posits that individuals/groups make calculations on the bases that

they will be in a position to supply personal skills for which there will be demand in the anticipated state and that such a state will also provide a corresponding supply/demand equation for other "socially important skills" belonging to the individuals/group.<sup>127</sup> Based on these premises, Rogowski describes various forms of nationalism and their related hypotheses. Without going into excessive detail, he links social mobility, changes in the mode of production, cultural integration, and changes in the terms of trade between cultures both in societies that are characterized by clearly dominant and subordinate groups and those that involve multiple cultural groups that are relatively equal in terms of socioeconomic status.

Despite the fact that there is little emotion expressed in Rogowski's characterization of a kind of nationalism that is based on purely "rational", cost/benefit analyses, we may infer from the literature dealing with the self that emotion is the basis for all rationality and, thus, even the most calculated cost/benefit analysis arises from the desire to maximize personal pleasure or "positive strokes". Nationalism may provide an excellent rallying tactic for individuals who seek to raise their self-esteem and view an elevated level of status for their ethnic group as a way of achieving such an end. After all, an individual has little hope of overturning a social order by him/herself such that, if he/she believes that his/her lack of socioeconomic status is due to his/her membership in a certain group (and we are always members of groups), he/she will likely attempt to rally others in the same group around the same cause: elevation of group self-esteem through elevation of group socioeconomic status. Such an end may only be achieved in certain situations by espousal of nationalism.

We may ask why such individuals would necessarily choose the ethnic group as the interest group to be employed for such social change? The answer lies in the suggestion that the ethnic group may represent a specific enough group to allow for

both profound identification (i.e., because ethnicity can be viewed as transcending and cutting across all other statuses, in addition to the fact that ethnicity has symbols and markers around which to rally) and strategic political organization. To illustrate, organizing all women in an attempt to precipitate political change is an extremely difficult task since, although gender can be seen as transcending and cutting across all other statuses, there are few symbols and markers to denote a specifically female culture with which all women can identify; furthermore, a political organization consisting of the entire adult female population in any given society (or, indeed, the world) would tend to be exceedingly unwieldy.

Although Rogowski claims that the orientation towards rational choice is not exclusively confined to individuals, his characterization of the rise of nationalist movements nevertheless emphasizes individual choice rather than the group dimension. He does not explain adequately how the orientation might take on a group character. In fact, many theorists of a psychological approach to nationalism seem to have a difficult time demonstrating how their rather solipsistic models make the transition to group form. For an explanation of how an individual becomes at least psychologically attached to a group, we will look at the following model set forth by John C. Turner.

Members of a social group are usually characterized, according to Turner, as those who identify themselves as having interests in common with certain others. "This definition stresses that members of a social group seem often to share no more than a collective perception of their own social unity and yet this seems to be sufficient for them to act as a group."<sup>128</sup> He rejects the "social cohesion" model as it pertains to social groups since he does not feel that it is borne out in empirical study. The social cohesion model suggests that the element of affectivity must be present in social groups, that members of social groups are bound together by their

cohesiveness. It "rejects the members' attraction to each other, to the groups as a whole and to group activities."<sup>129</sup> For Turner, the "social identification" model is a better explanation for social groups because it is based on the assumption of cognition. That is, members identify themselves and others through the use of abstract social categories which then become part of their self-concept through the process of internalization. Group behaviour, then, is the product of the interaction between self-cognition and social-cognition. In other words, one identifies a group, one identifies oneself as belonging to that group, then one interacts with others of the group accordingly. Turner asserts that the primary question determining group membership is "Who am I?": hence, "what matters is how we perceive and define ourselves and not how we feel about others."<sup>130</sup> Social cohesion, he states, is not a necessary or sufficient condition for group formation while social identification may be both. In addition, social identification can better explain inter- and intragroup relations as it can account for the manner in which individual needs for positive self-esteem motivate people to assign positive values to the characteristics of the group to which they belong and to distinguish their own group from others.

Distinction is made by Turner between social identity and personal identity. Social identity is the collection of categorizations of self and others, while the personal identity relates to personal tastes, intellect and psychological characteristics. He hypothesizes that there may be times when personal identity and social identity conflict, when self-image is exclusively based on group membership. Social identity does not operate at all times. It needs a trigger in order to be awakened. Here, Turner seems to echo what Douglas has already argued: that there is a core self which organizes the complex subsystems of the mind, of which social self-identity would be a part. Certain situations will arise in an individual's life which will cause some facet of social identity to come forward and gain salience. Ethnic identity is an



example of such a facet of social identity. In such a case, salience need not be permanent (and probably is not) nor does the salient feature of social identity cancel out the other components.

Turner points out that, once individuals identify themselves as belonging to a particular group, there is a strong tendency to attach positive characteristics to that group in spite of negative labels that might be generated by outsiders. Members of groups also continue to identify themselves and others according to group attributes once they have made their social identification. It is argued that subjective status and prestige derive from positive comparisons of the ingroup to outgroups. When comparisons are negative, subjective status and prestige are low.

Thus, the need for positive social identity motivates a search for, and the creation and enhancement of, positive distinctiveness for one's own group in comparison with other groups. Where the ingroup lacks positive distinctiveness, members will be motivated either to leave that group physically or dissociate themselves from it psychologically and aspire to membership of a higher status group or to adopt creative and/or competitive strategies to restore its positive distinctiveness.<sup>131</sup>

Turner concludes that the need for positive self-esteem is the significant contributing factor in inter- and intragroup behaviour.<sup>132</sup> Thus, he has explained not only why members would desire to be part of a group and remain members, as well as why they might choose to disengage from their particular group. Social self-identity and self-esteem are important variables in these dynamics.

As was stated above, ethnic identity is a facet of social self-identity. It is a term that is often discussed in the literature but is sometimes confusing; hence, we need some sort of definition of it.

Frances Aboud construes ethnic identity to be made up of self-identity and ethnicity.<sup>133</sup> "Ethnic self-identity, therefore, means knowing that oneself is defined in part by attributes which are in turn used to define an ethnicity."<sup>134</sup> Aboud states that self-identity is based on the ability to distinguish oneself as different

from others and, hence, be "identifiable in a social context." Furthermore, being different from others serves an informational function, allowing us to describe ourselves by means of contrast. "Thus distinctive attributes contribute to self-identity simply by enhancing the availability of information about oneself."<sup>135</sup> Ethnicity enhances the contrast of self-other through ethnic differences; therefore, it enhances self-identity. Ethnic identity is, in turn, "strengthened through contrasts with members of other ethnic and national groups."<sup>136</sup>

Edward H. Spicer argues that both group cohesion and personal identity may be strengthened by the existence of "opposition". Spicer discusses "persistent cultural systems"; that is, identity systems that adapt to changing environments rather than disappearing. He defines identity systems in the following terms: "The essential feature of any identity system is an individual's belief in his personal affiliation with certain symbols, or, more accurately, with what certain symbols stand for."<sup>137</sup> Identity systems are not only individual, but collective as well. The main feature of collective identity is "[a] relationship between human individuals and selected cultural elements -- the symbols..."<sup>138</sup> The symbols are what give meaning to the collective identity. There is an historical dimension in the notion of persistence; that is, culture is cumulative and it is important for people to have a sense that what they experience personally has been experienced by previous generations as well. The symbols and historical dimension provide individual motivation to continue the historical process and fulfil the group destiny. It should be noted that the history in question need not be based on fact; rather, it is the perception of the members of the collectivity that is paramount, that the history have meaning for them. Of significance is that these identity systems persist in other cultural contexts.<sup>139</sup>

Opposition is part of the process of persistence in these identity systems as

groups struggle to resist being incorporated into other cultures or organizations. The groups develop clear-cut symbols to distinguish their own culture from that of the host society especially and those of other groups within their milieu as well. Resistance is probably strongest against the cultural group in control — because it is in control and has the power to assimilate the minority. Continued opposition is instrumental in the formulation of persistence, not only because the minority group struggles against the dominant one, but because the dominant group is affected by the oppositional process as well. What is interesting to note is that state power often acts to dissipate the identity system of the group which possesses it, presumably because that group feels so secure in its position that it is not required to struggle to maintain its culture. Unfortunately, in order to assimilate other cultural groups, and because governance involves compromise to accommodate the various elements to be found in any society, the group possessing state power may have cultural hegemony, but that culture may become diluted.<sup>140</sup>

Symbols are usually associated with land and language, according to Spicer. If the land is lost, the identity system can actually be reinforced — provided that certain structural conditions are maintained by the group. Although Spicer does not elaborate on this point, it can be assumed that he is referring to such structural conditions as religious customs or cultural organizations. The loss of language is similar to the loss of land: like the myth of "our land", certain words and/or phrases can become sacred in the religious or ritual life of the group.<sup>141</sup>

Spicer states that the identity system actually develops independently of cultural maintenance. Once again, this is a function of the process of opposition. The identity system develops out of the meanings that members of the group attribute to certain symbols and have significance for them. "The meanings amount to a self-definition and an image of themselves as they have performed in the course of their

history. The selection of cultural elements for symbolic references goes on in terms of the character of this image; the frequent shifts in emphasis are part of the process of maintenance in response to alterations in the environment."<sup>142</sup>

Three spheres of participation are delineated by Spicer: (1) communication through a shared language; (2) moral values held in common; and, (3) "political organization for achieving the objectives of group policy".<sup>143</sup> It is not possible to maintain an identity system without the participation of members in all three of these spheres; however, participation fluctuates. Spicer explains that language is a fundamental sphere of participation because it assists in the maintenance of internal solidarity even while it establishes boundaries between the group and others. Common moral values help to guide groups through the oppositional process by informing them of the ideal behaviour to pursue in their own course and assisting them in making judgments about the behaviour of the others. The greatest fluctuation occurs in political participation because organization is necessary for such participation. There may be periods wherein the group is organizationally weak for various reasons. This low point of participation does not mean that the identity system has disappeared; it may be maintained by language and morals even while political participation is at an ebb.<sup>144</sup> Nevertheless, we may suggest (from the discussions of social movements above) that organization and political participation are fundamental prerequisites of nationalist mobilizations.

Anya Peterson Royce attempts to employ Spicer's oppositional model in her study of the Zapotec Indians of Mexico.<sup>145</sup> She reinforces the notion that ethnic identity is only one of many identities from which people may choose. Furthermore, it is not just primordial sentiment but, rather, a resource that can be manipulated or ignored in accordance with whatever situation faces the individual. Whether it is salutary to employ an ethnic identity will determine its utilization. It must be

beneficial to the individual to have an ethnic identity in a particular situation. Power, perception and purpose are three dimensions that Royce states are present in any consideration of ethnic identity.

Power is usually in the hands of the dominant group which is in a position to determine who is an "ethnic". Subordinate groups tend to have more information about the dominant group than vice versa. There is some indication here that there will be jockeying for power as the dominant group attempts to keep the subordinate groups in an inferior position while subordinate groups vie with each other and the dominant group for more power, prestige and status. Groups perceive themselves and others, and thus create symbols and stereotypes. "Symbol construction and stereotype building are not unidirectional processes, nor do they occur in isolation. Like everything else having to do with ethnic identity, the presence of 'others' stimulates, molds, inspires."<sup>146</sup> Symbol construction plays a significant role in the persistence of identity since symbols help to maintain boundaries between the group and outsiders and, in addition, assist members of the ingroup to differentiate between themselves. The flexibility of content of symbols is important for the survival of ethnic groups, since the more flexibility, presumably the more chance of group viability in any given situation and time period. "The ability of an ethnic group to maintain boundaries, hence survive as a distinct identity, may depend on its ability to marshal an impressive array of symbols. Conversely, a symbol system without boundaries cannot continue to exist."<sup>147</sup> Purpose is another important facet because, according to Royce, everyone has the desire to improve their own situation at some point, even if their purpose is not conscious. Interaction or opposition is implied because there must be some contact with other groups in order to instill the notion of "improvement" of one's situation. Thus, there must be some intergroup vying for scarce resources.

Royce's point regarding the "situational use" of ethnicity has merit in terms of the whole notion of multiple identities and deriving "positive strokes" from ethnic identity. She suggests that the situational use of ethnicity implies:

- (1) that individuals can choose, within certain constraints, between a variety of identities;
- (2) that individuals will maximize the options available to them and will use ethnic identity if they perceive an advantage in so doing;
- (3) that individuals have to contend, in this process, with other individuals engaged in the same process whose interests and perceptions may be quite different.<sup>148</sup>

This conceptualization proposes that ethnic identity, whether it stems from primordial sentiment or not, involves personal choice and interactional situations with others. Hence, the idea of "exit" as an option emerges; that is, one of the choices available to people who employ an ethnic identity or whose ethnic identity becomes the "master status" in a given situation is that of opting out of such master status or employment of ethnic identity. The implication here is that there is intra-psychic conflict among identities with the result that another identity emerges with some salience. In addition, external stimuli or oppositional factors do not determine the outcome of any interaction; there is always idiosyncratic agency involved.

Using Spicer's model, George M. Scott, Jr. has derived a proposition which binds primordial sentiments to the oppositional circumstances which stimulate them. With this relational approach, ethnic group solidarity becomes a psychosocial manifestation. He also relies on the work of Edward Spicer as the basis for his oppositional approach. According to his interpretation of Spicer's model, "the degree of an ethnic group's identity will vary in direct proportion to the amount of opposition encountered by the group"<sup>149</sup> and primordialism (i.e., "a psychological explanation for the behavioral phenomenon of ethnic solidarity"<sup>150</sup>) is an intervening variable, also directly related to the amount of opposition. "Opposition, then, does not lead directly to ethnic solidarity, but operates indirectly through the

psychological mechanism of primordial sentiments."<sup>151</sup> When and if ethnic groups perceive opposition, members will look back to a "glorious past" or "golden age" and cleave to whatever symbols are deemed salient, thus strengthening ethnic identity and ties with other members. It is important to note that opposition can take almost any form and the term "perception" is definitive; that is, opposition can be a wholly subjective matter.

Some of the external factors that might come into play when we examine how nationalism among subnational groups emerges are: oppression of the ethnic group by the host society, attempts at assimilation of the ethnic group, a policy of multiculturalism where cultural pluralism is tolerated and perhaps even encouraged, displacement of the ethnic group by the host society or another group or groups, forced migration by the host society, and even non-action by the host society wherein it does nothing to assist in the survival of the ethnic group. These factors may be real or simply perceived by the ethnic group.

Part of non-action of governments involves the "ethnic trap". This situation may evolve where ethnic minorities insist on preserving their traditional culture and language, to which insistence governments acquiesce. Unfortunately, what may happen, as in Quebec up to the time of the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s, is that the ethnic minority then is left behind economically, socially and politically. Its members are not able to compete with members of the majority culture for economic and/or political opportunities because they do not possess the skills and education or their lifestyle has not prepared them for successful competition. Thus, when the government takes the non-action stance in such a case, it is indirectly, and perhaps even inadvertently, playing a significant role in maintaining ethnic inequality and oppression.<sup>152</sup>

A multicultural policy wherein all ethnic groups are granted equality and

legitimacy in the eyes of the state may act as an oppositional factor in terms of ethnic group solidarity or as a stimulus to nationalism. For example, the multicultural policy introduced by Prime Minister Trudeau in the face of nascent militant Quebec nationalism was a measure argued by many purely to defuse said nationalism. The policy essentially tried to reduce the Quebecois to just another ethnic group in Canadian society and thereby undermine their claims to nationhood. In the case of Yugoslavia, Tito declared the Muslims to be a nationality under the 1974 Constitution, giving them collective rights and legitimacy. This action reduced the traditionally competing Serbian and Croatian claims to Bosnia-Herzegovina by making the Serbs and Croats into nothing more than two large ethnic groups in an essentially Muslim republic. In such cases, a multicultural policy can pose a threat to ethnic nationalism as an undermining device. Nationalists can either be assimilated into the pluralistic environment or they can become even more militant.

The final point that Scott discusses in terms of his proposition is that the direction of causation is essentially circular, which accounts for the fact that ethnic conflict can escalate so precipitously. Expression of ethnic group solidarity can lead to greater opposition, which may then result in increased ethnic group solidarity, and so on.

Another author who has taken a specifically psychological approach to the study of nationalism and self-identity is Leonard Doob, who unites patriotism and nationalism by stating that the former is a feeling while the latter consists of demands which stem from the feeling. Doob asserts that it is not possible to have "zero" patriotism, that there are only positive or negative degrees. Furthermore, while patriotism is personal, nationalism is always social. Thus, we see the orientation towards bringing the personal commitment of individuals into the social, collective realm of demands and presumably actions. He does not, however, leave the matter of



what patriotism is at the simple assertion that it is a feeling. Rather, Doob goes on to elaborate that the referents of patriotism are emotional attachments to land, other people and culture. He states that these are also the basic components of national consciousness. In addition, there is what he calls a "reciprocity of influence";<sup>153</sup> that is, the land, people and culture influence individuals who, in turn, influence these entities and so on, creating a spiral that can go on indefinitely.<sup>154</sup>

Doob explains that patriotism entails a continuity with, and a link to, the future as well as the past. As human beings come to realize that others before them have lived and died and that they, too, will die, they gain comfort from the knowledge that they are part of an endless chain which flows into the future. People need a rich heritage in order to feel pride, an important component of patriotism and nationalism. Sacred symbols are also required to provide a reference point for feelings. People can invest their emotions in objects which represent their heritage, which objects, in turn, will evoke patriotism and national pride.<sup>155</sup>

There are two interacting factors which mediate the way people understand their world, according to Doob: (1) "the stimulus pattern evoking the experience", and (2) "the person's own predispositions".<sup>156</sup> He utilizes the spiral which results from the passage of time to rescue from circularity his argument about personal predispositions being explained by patriotic ones: "The time factor...permits a graceful exit from the circle into the usual Spiral. Over the years nationals acquire a set of tendencies, the patriotic predispositions. Perception is affected by these predispositions and, as a result, patriotism grows stronger or weaker after each experience."<sup>157</sup>

According to Doob, distinctiveness is essential to all organisms for they must perceive that they are different from others. He suggests that people come to see what they consider "their own" in terms of land, other people and culture as being

distinctive and, when they compare "their own" to those things associated with another group, they come to elevate their distinctiveness to a virtue. This argument presupposes that people have distinguished their distinctiveness in terms of a certain group and have identified themselves as part of said group, as well as having had contact with at least one other. Such identification is acquired through socialization; that is, people are socialized to be patriotic.<sup>158</sup> Doob states that the perceived distinctiveness does not have to be scientifically proven; in fact, it is the emotional investment of the people that lends the quality of distinctiveness and, indeed, similarities must be ignored. People value their own integrity, an important element of self-identity. Thus, when they consider significant others, they endow their own distinctiveness on them; this endowment makes people feel outstanding, bringing them prestige and status higher than those belonging to the outgroup. The judgment of superiority usually accompanies the sense of being distinctive and nationalists can invoke reasons to justify their own belief in such distinctiveness. Doob asserts that the level of patriotism depends on the strength or weakness of value judgments made about the ingroup and outgroups.<sup>159</sup>

A list of evaluations, both egocentric and ethnocentric, is elaborated by Doob, but it is not necessary to go into a detailed discussion of these at the present time.<sup>160</sup> What is most significant from these evaluations is the point he makes that "apparently people feel more comfortable or relaxed in front of those who are similar to themselves",<sup>161</sup> largely because there is a sense of predictability in a situation, or during an interaction, involving homogeneous others. He even goes so far as to suggest, at one point, that people will seek to surround themselves with homogeneous others when dissimilar others seem to be threatening. Here he is hinting at the logic behind "ethnic cleansing".

The discussion of the transition from the passivity and individualism of

patriotism to the collective action of nationalism is grounded by Doob in his statement that preservation and/or expansion are necessary under patriotism<sup>162</sup>: hence, every society has a network of media which constantly reinforces the link between personal welfare and that of the nation (although he never elaborates on why the media would be so inclined). "Ultimately, therefore, all citizens and especially the patriotic ones continually see a connection between their important values, their way of living, and their surroundings. The surroundings are their country and they have come to possess an impressive arsenal of words, symbols, and objects which frequently remind them of that link."<sup>163</sup> The nation represents the kind of group affiliation that pervades every aspect of people's lives -- or, at least, can be made to appear so. Since it is so pervasive, a threat from another "national" group can be perceived as being "life-threatening". Here Doob echoes the importance of "oppositional" factors emphasized by Spicer above. Thus, people will take steps to preserve or change their way of life. Doob asserts that the initial action taken may be defensive and may draw from the traditional means of preservation that have been employed by that group up to that time.<sup>164</sup> However, if the group becomes so discontented with its way of life or the alterations it believes are taking place, members may "deliberately, unblushingly seek the action they believe will change or preserve what they had -- or what they think they once had."<sup>165</sup> This is the moment when "national" or ethnic groups become nationalist: they make demands for action that may be anywhere from nonovert to overt behaviour. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind, and Doob explicitly brings up this matter, that national demands, like all human demands, are not necessarily "pure" in nature. There may be hidden agendas that express the motives of leaders, communicators or followers who are simply taking advantage of a given state of affairs.<sup>166</sup> Hence, we must bear in mind that "nationalist" mobilizations not be pure -- that is, they may be

adulterated by those whose behaviour conforms with that expected from nationalists, but their actual motivations may have nothing to do with nationalist sentiment. This observation does not have to involve a negative judgment; the motivations of these people may be just as, or more, altruistic than those of nationalists. For example, they may be fighting for their homes or families, not for any ideal of national self-determination.

Doob makes the connection between personal behaviour and the collective behaviour of nations when he states that the latter can be conceptualized as the former writ large. Frustrations can be dealt with in a myriad of ways ranging from aggression to submission.<sup>167</sup> As such, there is no formal agenda that nationalist groups must follow, even though statehood seems to be the goal most often attributed to such mobilizations. Doob elucidates the justifications that may be employed by these groups, all of which are beyond the scope of this discussion, and even sets out the aims involved in war and peace strategies.<sup>168</sup>

Nationalism is facilitated, according to Doob, by a number of personal phenomena and experiences.<sup>169</sup> These include the fact of sharing numerous cultural traits, not biological ones; interaction among people facilitated by the occupation of the same land, region or territory; geographical or cultural isolation from other groups, a matter which may be voluntary on the part of the particular group; economic self-sufficiency; shared language; an understanding of their own culture; temporal factors involving the evolution of traditions arising from generations of people living together and sharing a history; and leaders who hold meaning for the members of the group and who are intelligible to them. The presence of the enemy is also significant for nationalism.<sup>170</sup> This may seem rather obvious, but it is worth noting that having an "enemy" is very important in terms of engendering loyalty in the members of a group. Hostility can be directed at that enemy, creating a safety

valve within the group, and a scapegoat is born whereby all troubles are attributed to the enemy.<sup>171</sup> This may serve an important function for national self-esteem because individuals can excuse any deficiency they suffer as individuals and as members of the group by deflecting the blame to an external factor — the enemy. In this way, nations and their members can still maintain their positive evaluations of themselves and continue to derive pleasure from their experiences as members.

Doob provides an excellent analysis of the personal processes involved in nationalism and goes far in establishing the connections between individual perceptions and experiences and collective action. However, the question remains as to why people would invest emotional attachments in land, people and culture, or, in the case of minority nationalism, why human beings bestow emotional attachments on the subgroup and not the host. Furthermore, why is it that not every member of the ethnic group will endow such emotional attachment to the subgroup? These questions need to be answered for a more satisfactory understanding of the psychological aspect of nationalism.

A salient point is raised by William Bloom who states, "Inasmuch as every identification is made with an external social actor, identification is, of course, a social act as much as a private psychological one."<sup>172</sup> He adds that there are always at least two parties involved in any identification: the identifier and the identified.<sup>173</sup> This is significant from the point of view that we often believe that, when we identify with someone or something, the experience is purely personal and individuated; Bloom demonstrates that it is inherently social since there is always another party of some kind involved in such identification. He draws on the writings of Freud, Mead, Erikson, Parsons and Habermas to construct his version of identification theory. Although it is beyond the scope of this work to outline his construction in detail, it would be helpful to bring out some of the more noteworthy

matters cited by Bloom. He quotes Freud as linking emotion with identification; that is, identification is made through an "emotional tie with an object". Furthermore, Freud notes that not only do infants internalize the attitudes or social identities of significant others, but so do adults. Identification is made with specific individuals and "diffuse groupings". Thus, it must be understood that the forging of emotional bonds by adults as well as children forms the basis for identification with other significant individuals and groups, causing identification to be an ongoing process that takes place throughout our lives. In addition, the success of an identification rests on its gratification of primary needs for survival of the individual and its assurance of the acceptance of the individual by his/her social environment. Erikson drew the conclusion that the individual has a secure sense of identity, something which is absolutely crucial to the psychological well-being of any human being, when a "feeling of contentment" is experienced.<sup>174</sup> Once again, it is clear that there is an association between emotions and self-identity.

Bloom states that Erikson made ideology into a psychological phenomenon. Ideology is the social institution which "guards" identity. The psyche must appropriate ideology, which is composed of identifications already made in history and culture, and synthesize an identity based on partial knowledge (called "totalism"). Any threat to ideology or culture is, as such, a threat to personal identity and requires defence. Further, a change in historical circumstances threatening to a generalized identification (i.e., group identification) will also threaten individual identification within the group. The result of such a threat will be either individual resynthesis or bolstering of the old identification, or a concerted effort on the part of the members of the group to resynthesize or bolster the old identification.<sup>175</sup> Bloom explains how the group will undertake such a response as follows:

The degree to which the group will respond as a whole will depend upon certain historical and existential bonds within the group: geographical propinquity, length of time passed together, class, ethnicity, religion, ritual and the degree to which that particular identification is crucial to the general identity. The form that the group reaction to a shared identity threat takes will be determined by a configuration of shared perceptions and commonly accepted communications about the nature of the crisis. Both the perceptions and the communications are, of course, vulnerable to manipulation — particularly so since individuals, and individuals as a group with a shared identification, may seek together to enhance their sense of identity.<sup>176</sup>

A possible political consequence of such group response to a threat is mobilization on a grand scale. According to Bloom, "[m]ass mobilization is possible when the individuals in the mass share the same identification."<sup>177</sup> However, Bloom does not appear to take into consideration that members of any group will also be members of other groups and, as such, have multiple identifications. Nor does he note that identifications are always being added as new circumstances arise and increasing or decreasing in their salience as people find themselves in changing situations. This is a basic flaw in his theory regarding personal identity and national identity: he does not make strong enough linkages between individual identities and group activities.

Bloom avers that identification can only be triggered by "meaningful and real" experience. It must be positive and "psychologically beneficial" for the individual to make such an identification. He reminds us that symbols and ideologies per se are incapable of evoking identification. "For an identification to be made, the symbols have to be appropriate as a mode of behaviour and attitude for a particular and real experience."<sup>178</sup> This statement is as true for nationalist ideologies as any other, according to Bloom. What is problematic about such a position is the definition of "meaningful and real experience". Such a phrase can be taken as broadly or as narrowly as the reader chooses and this fact weakens Bloom's statement for it can be said to explain everything and, hence, nothing.

Equally problematic is Bloom's definition of national identity as being "...that condition in which a mass of people have made the same identification with national symbols -- have internalized the symbols of the nation -- so that they may act as one psychological group when there is a threat to, or the possibility of enhancement of, these symbols of national identity."<sup>179</sup> The notion of "same identification" is a fallacy because individual interpretations based on purely personal traits are not considered. Even if people do make the same identification in a particular instance, there is no concession to the other identifications these people might have made in other instances. No two people can share all the same identifications, even if they originate from the same family, let alone the same social group. Similar criticism can be made for Bloom's reference to "one psychological group". Implicitly he suggests that a collective consciousness is able to arise from this mythical group and, once again, erroneously attributes identical interpretations to all its members. Bloom's argument emerges as being simplistic and static, ignoring the fact that experience is ever-changing and always open to reinterpretation; in fact, his individuals seem to be quite incapable of independent thought once they have made an identification with a group. Furthermore, Bloom never seems to consider the ramifications of outside labelling -- that some individuals may be forced to make an identification with a group because others have deemed that they, in fact, belong to that group. A more appropriate analogy is that individuals are like multi-faceted diamonds revolving in an atmosphere full of elements which may influence them from time to time in varying degrees.

Bloom goes on to define what he calls the "national identity dynamic" as being "the potential for action which resides in a mass which shares the same national identification".<sup>180</sup> He states that the mass may act as "one unit" when a situation affects the group identity. Thus, according to Bloom, individual interpretations and



"meaningful and real" experiences somehow disappear, leaving only a monolithic mass. However, he fails to explain how a collection of individuals manages to translate what is essentially an intrapsychic experience (i.e., national identity) into collective action. Hence, Bloom's identification theory, stated as being highly dynamic, becomes static and unidimensional when it translates into action. And the problem still remains: why do some people with the same identification fail to act in concert with the others? Why do some people drop out? In addition, if it is true that people desire to protect previous identifications (as Bloom suggests), which are very complex and multifaceted, how do they decide which facet to protect? What happens if they cannot protect all the facets at once? Bloom provides no satisfactory answers to such questions.

Individuals can make other identifications and these can be one-to-one with other persons or with all of humanity. When other identifications result in divided loyalties, Bloom states that, because everyone is unique and has a unique history, many personality factors as well as external factors must be considered; behaviour will depend on the psychology of the individual and "environmental input". He claims that his imprecision is due to the fact that some people have the personality to ignore external factors while others do not.<sup>181</sup> Hence, Bloom has created for himself an escape hatch but without any logical basis for doing so.

Bloom points out that successful nation-building requires nation-destroying. Although Bloom is referring here to the need for the state in a multinational society to destroy minority nationalisms in pursuit of "national" integration, the point may also be applied to the emergence of minority nationalism — identification with the overarching "nation" must be destroyed if minority nationalism is to flourish. Without going into the details of successful nation-building, let it suffice to say that, according to Bloom, success is achieved in this realm when national loyalty

transcends all others and when the state can rely on its citizens' support when competing internationally with others. Nationalism would appear to be a corollary of successful nation-building. Once again, Bloom makes it clear that, in order for individual identification with the nation to take place, that identification must correlate with the actual experiences of human beings and "directly touch" them, and must be personally beneficial from the point of view that it provides psychological stability. "Thus the propagandist or prophet might incessantly sell the nationalist notion -- i.e. that there exists this nation and this nation should have an independent state of its own -- but the sale will not be made unless the purchaser experiences a direct psychological benefit from the transaction."<sup>182</sup> Bloom's statement makes good sense if we harken back to the literature on self-identity which demonstrates that self-esteem is an essential contributory factor in the formation and content of self-identity.

There is also a structural component involved in nation-building. Bloom states that, where the process has been successful, there must have been some historical circumstances that would have acted as stimuli to identification with the nation-state: the state would have moved to act as either the people's benefactor or saviour in response to these stimuli. Nation-building is never complete, notes Bloom, since there are always individuals or groups present which have not made identification with the nation and because historical circumstances are ever-changing, producing possibilities of alienation of groups and/or individuals.<sup>183</sup> When nation-building is not successful, or takes place at a very low level, there is a greater possibility that other identifications will be salient. However, since the state has the power of coercion, usually controls the media and "owns an ideology" that is legitimate, it has the luxury of an esteemed position in any nation and will be that much more likely to attract identification. Because the international system essentially pits nations

against one another, the "us/them", "ingroup/outgroup" ethos is perpetuated to the point that it is virtually impossible to think in any other terms.<sup>184</sup> Such pervasive competition sets the psychological stage for thinking that is exclusive and segregationist, for better or worse.

Bloom discusses mass mobilization in terms of national reaction to international threat. According to him, an international threat to what is perceived as national interest may trigger the national identity dynamic, which may then mobilize the mass. National prestige is described by Bloom as being "the influence that can be exercised or the impression produced by virtue of events and images that devalue or enhance national identity."<sup>185</sup> Prestige increases by virtue of anything that acts to enhance national identity. Despite the fact that Bloom's dynamic is circular in the extreme, it contains some valuable insights into the psychological processes involved. He suggests that outside influences act upon the collective and individual psyches of people within a group and that it is the psychological motivations of those people, as much as any external or structural factors, that plays a significant role in what action the group will take. Even though Bloom himself speaks of nations within the international system, the same dynamic would operate just as well on the subnational level. However, we must bear in mind that, regardless of the certainty Bloom displays that those with a shared identification will act in concert and be of the same mind, individuals bring unique elements and interpretations into any situation so that there would be a great deal of flexibility and variability in the form and content of any sort of response to a situation. Nevertheless, identification itself can provide the "fuel for mobilization", even though there are degrees of attachment, whether sentimental or instrumental, in any identification.<sup>186</sup>

All of the theorists above provide cogent arguments on the importance of a psychological element in nationalism. They illuminate how individuals and their

private orientations matter very much to any collective nationalist action. The significance of these individuals and their orientations lies in the fact that, without personal commitment, no group can function to fulfil its agenda. Therefore, nationalisms, whether they be social movements and highly organized, or ideologies with well-planned strategies and intellectual/moral entrepreneurs, require followers — people who view nationalist goals as personal goals, intimately involved in their own hopes and aspirations. Since human beings are neither automatons nor mere dupes, these people must derive something from nationalism that speaks to them personally, whether that "something" be material gain or psychological benefit.

Rogowski believes that individuals make rational choices to become involved in nationalist causes, weighing costs and benefits, supply and demand. Spicer suggests that there is a more nostalgic, sentimental character to nationalism when he argues that identity involves a sense of continuity with past generations in terms of personal experience and shared culture. For him, opposition from outgroups acts as an important catalyst in the process of maintaining an identity system. The group, usually in a subordinate position, struggles against assimilation; its culture and identity become more salient to members. Royce uses Spicer's oppositional model for her work and stresses that what Spicer calls "primordial sentiment" is also a resource, a tool to be used for personal gain or satisfaction. If the individual finds ethnic identity to be beneficial, he/she will employ ethnic culture in an attempt to increase power, status or prestige. Royce also elucidates the fact that ethnic identity is just one of many identities an individual may have. Scott has constructed a model derived from Spicer's that utilizes primordial sentiment as an intervening variable between opposition and ethnic group solidarity. Scott is clearly attempting to bridge the gap between opposition and action, as well as that between individual psychic orientation and group identity. Leonard Doob concentrates on a somewhat

psychosocial vision of patriotism and how it may become the social manifestation of nationalism. Patriotism is a feeling, while nationalism arises out of demands made on the grounds of that feeling. Doob stresses the importance of distinctiveness, or being different from others. This phenomenon is important because it helps people to understand who they are, the group to which they belong, and the group in terms of other groups. He sets out a number of ways in which people evaluate their own and other groups, suggesting that a sense of superiority of one's own group is in operation when making these evaluations. Another point raised by Doob is that preservation and/or expansion are necessary for any group, something which can very often lead to nationalist mobilization. Bloom's contribution to the psychological approach to nationalism is his concept of identification. Identification is made by adults as well as children, so such a process can occur at any point in life. It can be made with individuals or with groups, even those that are diffuse and somewhat abstract; as long as the individual making the identification feels an emotional tie with the identified, the identified presumably can be anything. Identification is successful when it gratifies primary needs for survival, survival being employed in loose terms, when it assures that the identifier will be accepted in his/her social environment. According to Bloom, when identity is threatened, people will move to protect it; this can explain mass mobilization of any kind and, in particular, nationalist mobilization. In other words, when many individuals make identification with an ethnic group or "nation", and this collective identity is threatened, these people will be motivated to take action to remedy the threatening conditions.

Thus, coming full circle, we can reiterate that all these theorists have made significant contributions to the understanding of nationalism as a psychological manifestation. However, they have all failed to incorporate one highly salient point: why do individuals make such identifications, feel patriotism, experience primordial

sentiment and so on? What motivates a human being to involve specifically ethnic identity in his/her own collection of social identities? By the same token, why do others, ostensibly ascriptive members of an ethnic group, reject such an identity or, at least, accord it no salience? From the above discussions, we can see many reasons and occasions for action based on ethnic identity, but we can only infer why people would embrace an ethnic identity in the first place. Hence, a model incorporating such a motivation is essential for a thorough and complete comprehension of nationalism.

#### Towards a New Model of Nationalism

In order to flesh out a more all-encompassing model of nationalism, it is necessary to incorporate the macro, or structural, approaches, the nationalism-as-social-movement and nationalism-as-ideology perspectives, with the micro, or psychological, one, and then add the all-important missing component of individual motivation. To do this, we will start from individual orientation and move outward.

Each individual comes into this world with a unique configuration of personality traits that have been inherited from previous generations. We have emotions and needs which must be met. It could even be said that, in the early days of life, human beings are little more than emotions and needs. As we grow, we come to identify ourselves with significant others, especially with those who become linked with our emotions. When we get positive feedback from these significant others and our interactions with them, our self-esteem begins to build and we tend to associate our self-esteem with these others and these interactions. We learn language, initially from our caregivers and eventually in other interactions, including institutionalized ones, such as school; sometimes we acquire more than one language in this way.

Language gives us a set of symbols with which we can think about ourselves and the experiences we have. Every language, because it is embedded in culture, contains limitations such that the language will frame our interpretations; it will provide a framework for our thoughts as well as the content. As such, acquiring more than one language can mean multiple frameworks for our thoughts, something which can very well affect our self-esteem and our self-identity if there are conflicts involved. Conflicts may arise from the values that are transmitted to us through the very language we use, since culture is conveyed through language. For example, our language may allow us to interpret a situation or ourselves in a certain way, while another language may produce another interpretation that may be quite different. We may come from a family that has high status in Portugal and our ethnic language would provide us with a particular view of ourselves; in the meantime, that same family may be working class in Canada where the English language may cause us to view ourselves very differently and, in fact, negatively if our English reflects our class position in this country. Of course, it is important to bear in mind that language is a purely social phenomenon so that such a conflict would not be occurring on a completely psychological level, but on a social one as well.

We also acquire roles as we grow and these roles, for better or worse, become incorporated into our self-identity. If the roles cause us to feel negatively about ourselves, we will probably seek to minimize them in our lives as much as possible in order to decrease the damage to our self-esteem. We may seek out other roles which act to increase our level of self-esteem. The roles available to us are limited by culture and require validation from others. The roles we assume and the frequency with which we assume them are probably dictated to a large extent by the kinds of emotions they engender within us. Thus, if we hate playing the role of disciplinarian, for example, we may try to avoid playing it as much as possible, or play it only half-

heartedly when forced to do so. In short, the amount of commitment we feel to that particular role will be significant.

Just as our roles and language derive from interactions with others, so do our identifications. None of us is a completely unique entity, totally divorced from association with others; we all belong to groups, ascriptively if not in any achieved fashion. Identifying the groups to which we belong is an important and necessary function for self-identification. We need others by which to compare and measure ourselves. We are always in the process of distinguishing ourselves and the groups to which we belong. Such a process is mandatory for coming to some understanding of distinctiveness as individuals and as members of a particular group or groups. But ascription is not enough for identification. We must also achieve some sort of status in a group if we want to be a fully-accepted member; other members of the group require some sort of achievement. We might have been born into an aristocratic English family, but the mere fact of our birth into such a group is not enough; we must also work to acquire the social and cultural markers of it or we will likely suffer alienation or ostracism. In short, we will not be a member of the group if we do not make some sort of commitment to it, even at the most superficial level. Obviously, we can assume that self-esteem and emotional attachment play a role here. If our self-esteem suffers from being part of a particular group and we do not actually like that group, we may opt out of working to achieve membership in it.

Socialization plays a very important part in our identification process. We are socialized by others to fit into society and certain groups; we also socialize ourselves in the same manner. Self-socialization is largely the result of desiring to belong to a specific group and choosing to do so. If we are born into a Danish family in Canada, they will likely socialize us to some degree to be Danish, to fit into the ethnic group and the kind of society from which they came. At the same time, we will likely be



socialized by our family and definitely by others to fit into Canadian society. As we get older, we may choose to socialize ourselves into Greek culture if we marry someone belonging to that ethnic group with a strong ethnic identity. On the other hand, we may choose to reject some of those socializations and concentrate on only one. Those socializations, like language and roles, may never be completely expunged from our self-identity, but they are not necessarily salient; we can work to keep them buried within our repertoire. Our inner self, the emotional and personality core with which we came into the world, will act to frame these desires we have and choices we make. It will organize our repertoire according to what is meaningful and significant to us and us alone. Granted, there may be times in our life when we will not be given the luxury of choosing, when external or structural factors may work to deny us any choice, but we may espouse a certain identity only for expediency or survival while not having a real commitment to it. At these times, we will likely seek an exit from this coercive situation.

Alternatively, we may seek to escape from a situation into which we entered voluntarily if elements begin to emerge which cause a conflict among our social identities. For example, we may go to war on behalf of our country because we identify ourselves as a Canadian and that particular component of our social identity feels threatened, thus becoming salient (i.e., our master status at that time); however, if, once we are in the battle theatre and we see our fellow Canadian soldiers committing atrocities or we are called upon to commit such acts, our humanitarian element of self-identity may be aroused, creating a serious conflict among our values and beliefs. Should the conflict become psychically unbearable and our humanitarian identity win out over our ethnic/nationalist identity, we may very well seek to exit from the situation in whatever way might be open to us, including minimizing our actions to the point where they fit somewhat with our values and beliefs.

From such a scenario, it is easy to discern the role our emotions play in our rational choice; it may not be quite so clear what role our self-esteem takes. Our sense of self-esteem may be diffuse or specific. If it is specific and it hinges on our social identity as a "good" Canadian citizen, then our level of self-esteem related to actions directly associated with our concept of being a "good" Canadian citizen, such as fighting for our country, may be high. Therefore, abandoning a course of action that affects our level of self-esteem so much may be extremely difficult, if not impossible. As such, we would be less likely to allow our humanitarian identity to override our Canadian identity and seek exit from the latter. Instead, we may engage in rationalization in an attempt to reconcile our actions with our values, beliefs, and self-concept. However, if our sense of self-esteem is diffuse and our Canadian identity is just one of many social identities which give us a high level of self-esteem, the possibility of exiting from a situation which causes conflict among our values and social identities is greater. Any particular situation which affects our self-esteem in a negative fashion has a good chance of being discarded in order to replace it with one which enhances our sense of self-esteem. Such a case makes sense in terms of cognitive dissonance theory wherein a person with high self-esteem is more likely to take measures to remedy situations of inequity or injustice because he/she has a high level of self-esteem and the situation does not jibe with his/her sense of who he/she is.<sup>187</sup>

It is almost a truism to state that we are committed to the configuration of identities that makes up our self-identity. This commitment is both rational and emotional, for it makes sense to have a stable identity. Hence, we will work very hard to ensure that our identity remains stable. If something comes along to threaten it, we rally whatever resources might be at our disposal to eradicate or minimize the threat. If the threat can be seen as relating to our membership in a group, group

support and/or mobilization may be one of these resources. Therefore, if we experience a threat to our ethnic identity, we may turn to the ethnic group for support. If similar threat is perceived by others in the group, we may be able to mobilize them to challenge and deal with it. Such mobilization is especially possible if we can tie the threat to ethnicity using ideology.

Since ideology stems from people's experiences, an ideology that provides both explanation and remedy for a particular situation might be highly accessible to those whose identity is being threatened. Of course, some people may experience discontent and feel a vague sense of inequity or injustice without being able to put a finger on the exact cause. For these people, an articulated ideology, especially one which lays blame at the door of outside groups or factors, thus alleviating the belief in personal shortcomings, could prove very attractive. Given a label and definition of the situation, masses of people could be fairly easily convinced that this is the answer to their problems. But until people feel an emotional commitment, ideology remains just an abstract argument with unrealized potential for action. When ideology takes on real power is when people can tie their own experiences and those of significant others to whom they are bound by emotion to what is being articulated; that is, when the threat is perceived as real and affecting oneself and one's loved ones. As C. Wright Mills suggested, tying personal troubles to public issues can be the catalytic moment when people are willing to stop just talking and start taking action -- drastic action, if need be.<sup>188</sup> Hence, ideology can appeal to both the converted and also to those without an inkling that they need converting.

Ideology may also appeal to those individuals whose self-esteem is low. These people may not have a general sense of self-satisfaction or feel that they are failures because their lives are not going the way they had hoped. Ideology that preaches that their lack of self-satisfaction or sense of failure is not due to their own

shortcomings, but is the result of oppression by a dominant group and, at the same time, builds up the ethnic identity of such people is likely to raise their self-esteem. The net result would probably be the enhancement of the self-esteem of the whole ethnic group. Individuals and groups with heightened self-esteem have more of a tendency to employ primary control; that is, they are willing to take steps to remedy whatever problems they believe are facing them.

If the support of the majority of the members of the ethnic group is deemed to be present, and if structural conditions are conducive, ethnic ideologues may put forth a nationalist platform that goes so far as to include secession. Structural conditions play a very important role in the kinds of demands ethnic ideologues will formulate. Secession or irredentism are rather impractical if the ethnic group is not territorially concentrated, for instance. If the state is highly oppressive and repressive, a nationalist ideology might go two ways: it might attempt to achieve limited political recognition with the hope of building upon it in the future, or it might try to expand to create an alliance with other groups by broadening specifically ethnic demands to more generalized ones. In either case, it is likely to attempt to garner general support from the rest of society (and the world, if possible), at least on a nominal level.

In a federal state, nationalist demands may be more along the lines of some sort of consociational arrangement, especially if the group is territorially concentrated such that political representation would be facilitated. The same arrangement might be possible in a unitary state, but the autonomy of the group could be severely limited. The strength of opposition by the state or other powerful groups in the society will have a great effect on the ideological stance of the group since it is likely to influence how radical and militant the group becomes. A great deal of opposition may force the group to go underground or begin to employ terrorist tactics. At the

same time, it would tend to make members of the group cleave together to a greater extent, enhancing group solidarity. Opposition, especially repression, may bring other members of the group to whom ideology had not appealed sufficiently into the circle such that the group would become larger as well as more cohesive. Through cohesion, ethnic identity would become better-defined and take on greater salience.

Ideologues are likely to cash in on this golden opportunity by creating a more pervasive argument based on myths and symbols, past history, and so on. Members of the ethnic group would likely find themselves steeped in ethnic ideology to the point where virtually every facet of their lives and experiences could be viewed through the lens of ethnicity — and opposition. People who come to believe passionately that they are being treated unjustly simply because of their accidental ascriptive inclusion in a group make good candidates for social movements. If they are pushed up against a wall and feel that they must fight for their survival, they may go to any length to alleviate the threat, casting their opposition into the role of deadly enemy. Once the combat mentality of enemy versus ally, or "them" against "us", sets in, the threatened identity can take on a salience hitherto thought impossible and allow people to engage in activities of which they might otherwise have believed themselves incapable. The role of ideology in such a case is to keep people believing they are facing a mortal enemy and that they are being persecuted because they happen to be a member of a certain group. Constantly articulating and interpreting events is the indispensable contribution of ideology.

Communication and organization are essential for a group seeking political redress for its perceived problems and past grievances. Ideology is intrinsic to both but the importance of leadership cannot be underestimated. Leaders may be ideologues or leadership may fall to those whose strength lies in organization; occasionally a charismatic leader comes along who is able to gain support based solely

on personal qualities. In any case, effective leadership is usually organic; that is, it arises from the ranks of the ethnic group itself. Such leaders might have already enjoyed prestige and status within the group as community or religious leaders. Organization is easier if institutional structures were already in existence, such as church groups or social clubs. The nationalist movement that arises under these circumstances is an ongoing, spiralling or cumulative process: ideologues interpret and articulate events and group identity, leaders pass on ideology to followers and outsiders and organize them, followers interpret ideology and make it personally meaningful, while playing their roles within the movement and providing their own feedback to leaders; leaders then integrate this feedback into their organization and communications and pass along messages to ideologues, who then take this information and incorporate it into the ideology, and so on. The spiral continues in this manner. At the same time, opposition acts as an independent variable to influence the movement and the process.


Roles are fluid within the movement, especially due to external influences, but also because of internal dynamics, so that they are constantly being reinterpreted. Unlike Le Bon's notion of the herd, we would argue that individual identities and realities are enormously influential for group consciousness which, although it has serious import in itself in terms of individual meaning, interpretation and behaviour, is always being recreated as varying factors come into play. Certainly the fact that there is some anonymity within a group allows for individual behaviours that might not be pursued under other circumstances; and there is peer pressure among the members to conform to group identity and behaviour. Nevertheless, it is arguable whether anyone ever completely loses personal identity and becomes just a mindless follower. Such a characterization is attractive to structuralists, but it seems unlikely, at least for any length of time. People may very well become caught up in

the heat of the moment or behave in what might be considered an uncharacteristic fashion for a short time, but this may, in fact, be a facet of identity that has not enjoyed prominence at any previous time due to socialization. In addition, people can always get to a point where the group or movement comes into conflict with their other social identities such that they exit. Indeed, members dropping out is a problem for social movements. At any rate, we prefer not to reify group consciousness but, rather, posit that it is an ongoing spiralling, or cumulative, process.

As has already been suggested, opposition plays a vital role in the processes outlined above. The response to group demands will help in the group's formulation of its next move. The level of organization and coherence of ideology will correlate with the strength of opposition. Whether the movement takes on a utopian character will also depend on the response of the "Other", or the perceived enemy. If group demands are sufficiently thwarted, the moral aspect of ideology will probably come into play with a vengeance. With demands thwarted, institutional deficiency is likely to be perceived to the point where the group believes that existing institutional guides must be replaced with their own. At this time, the movement becomes antisystemic and utopian. This is also the catalytic moment when the movement will espouse any action necessary to achieve its goals.

We have seen from the above-noted discussion how important the psychosocial component of individual social identity is to a model of nationalism. (See Figure 1) Although such a model could be applied to any group mobilization, we believe that it is particularly a propos to the study of nationalism. The social movement and ideological approaches have been the dominant ones regarding nationalism in the past, despite the fact that there have been some significant attempts at employing a more psychological orientation. However, these previous studies have all tended to ignore their alternatives: structural approaches have omitted the psychological

FIGURE 1  
MOBILIZATION, OPPOSITION AND SALIENT SELF-IDENTITY





element while psychological ones have paid insufficient attention to the structural aspects. There appears to have been little attempt to make meaningful bridges between the two. That has been the goal of this particular model: to integrate the macro and micro paradigms. The all-important core and linkage have been provided by our conceptualization of social self-identity. Such a conceptualization is clearly not a psychological one as much as a social one, for formation of individual self-identity always arises from interaction with at least one other actor, be it an individual, a group, or an abstraction. Social self-identity is the key to understanding the dynamics of nationalism for it addresses a vital issue that has been missing in all previous models: why people become nationalists. Without this key, we cannot hope to understand why some people find nationalist social movements and ideologies appealing and others do not. While the models of nationalism-as-a-social-movement and nationalism-as-an-ideology have tended to be somewhat deterministic, suggesting that all those who ascriptively fall into a certain category will be affected identically and espouse such nationalisms, social self-identity opens up a space for individual motivation and agency. It can explain both why some people embrace nationalism and why others do not. It can suggest why nationalism might be present in some situations while it is absent in others. To that end, we will analyze the case of the former country of Yugoslavia in an attempt to discover the insights our new model can offer. But, first, we will discuss the methodology to be employed in undertaking a preliminary test of our revised model.

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CHAPTER III  
METHODOLOGY

Methodology plays a very important role in any research since it acts as a framework for the data collected. In other words, the type of methodology utilized will determine to a great extent what kind of data can be gathered and how it will be interpreted. Quantitative methods have certain requirements, specifically that variables be operationalized in strict terms, such that these requirements limit the kind of results we can hope to obtain. On the other hand, qualitative methods are limited to some extent by their very nature: for example, it is difficult to combine indepth interviewing with the principles of random sampling. Certain studies lend themselves better to one method or the other, as do the goals of the research themselves.

For this particular study, the methodology employed was largely historical and theoretical, drawn from secondary sources, combined with some intensive interviews. Since our goal was to locate lacunae in the existing studies of nationalism and construct a new model, it was necessary to analyze critically the theoretical models that had already been constructed. In order to test the new model, historical and current literature on the political situation in the former country of Yugoslavia had to be utilized to determine its applicability. Due to the fact that events were unfolding in that region on a day-to-day basis while this study was being conducted, it was very difficult to obtain current information. Furthermore, since much of the media reporting seemed to contain certain biases, the task of gathering data was greatly complicated. Construction of the new model required research into theoretical matters such as the formation of social self-identity and the nature of ethnic identity, as well as the role of self-esteem in identity. All of these theoretical works, which were often unrelated, had to be brought together and reinterpreted to demonstrate their significance to the new model.

The value of incorporating historical analysis in any social scientific endeavour

is to be found in its ability to illuminate evolutionary trends. We have the opportunity to observe how past events shaped current phenomena. As Williamson *et al.* state, "biography", or life history, is intrinsic to every social form from the individual to an organization. Furthermore, since "social life is constantly in a state of transformation,"<sup>1</sup> it is imperative that we look back in time to survey the process of transformation that has already occurred. Put in a different way, Williamson *et al.* argue that, without historical analysis, social scientists cannot address themselves to the fundamental questions of how and why social and political forms came to assume their present shape and how they will appear in the future.

As with any other methodology employed, historical analysis involves some limitations. Accuracy is a problem which may affect fundamentally the validity of the data. Even primary sources may not be accurate since every person who records an event does so from a particular point of view. There is no way to screen out personal interpretations, regardless of how objective the recorder purports to be. Secondary sources, of course, may be even more biased because of the additional element of interpretation. Generalizability is a further difficulty arising from historical analysis due to the specificity of contexts and their social antecedents, according to Williamson *et al.* However, we must bear in mind that accuracy and validity are difficulties encountered in any social science research because every human being brings his/her own personal bias to any interpretation of events or situations. Historical figures are no more guilty of this than are present ones. The same is true for generalizability: any time we study a particular phenomenon, it is entirely possible that we are studying something which cannot be generalized to any other context.

By surveying history, we are in a better position to see how current social life came to be organized as it is. The fact that adaptation and transformation have occurred in human history to produce such organization is amply displayed through

historical analysis. We are not able to comprehend behaviour without reference to its context, or culture. To fully understand culture, we must view it through the lens of history because culture is cumulative; the values, aspirations, achievements and dreams of its practitioners are to be found within it.

Therefore, we come to the conclusion that historical analysis is an indispensable tool whenever we approach the study of any sociopolitical phenomenon. We are not arguing for historical determinism, however. The point is that we should attempt to situate a phenomenon within its historical context in order to better understand where it stands in relation to certain factors, if at all. Another major contribution of historical analysis is that it provides the testing ground for social scientific theory.<sup>2</sup>

Theoretical methodology may come under attack from some sectors of the social science community for its essentially intangible, unmeasurable nature. It is not verifiable by means of what has come to be considered the "usual", or "accepted", ways of testing data for significance and margins of error and so on. Such methodology requires a great deal of subjective interpretation and abstraction. As such, it may be considered imprecise and speculative, more in the realm of philosophy than social science. Moreover, some may argue that theory and methodology are distinct; they are two separate entities and should not be mixed together. We contend that this is an erroneous approach, that, as Bruce L. Berg states, "Data gathering is not distinct from theoretical orientations. Rather, data are intricately associated with the motivation for choosing a given subject, the conduct of the study, and ultimately the analysis."<sup>3</sup> As a form of qualitative methodology, theorizing attempts to probe the nature or essence of things.<sup>4</sup> Its concern is not to measure things that have been conceptualized according to certain criteria and then operationalized in such a way as to give shape to those conceptualizations; its concern is, rather, to approach

certain phenomena in their natural, essential form and create conceptualizations from that. As such, it is inductive logic rather than deductive.

In assessing his own methodology, William Bloom makes several very good points in defence of theoretical methodology. One of the first and most significant is that, although the discussion of covert attitudes and psychosocial processes is somewhat abstract, these attitudes and processes manifest themselves in overt, observable actions and behaviours. In short, we can see the results; our task is to theorize the possible causes underlying them.<sup>5</sup> Few people would argue that human beings are devoid of psyches. Bloom points out that the two major streams of thought regarding psychological processes, the behaviourist and psychoanalytic, both agree that "[t]here is a bio-psychological drive to internalize the behaviour of significant others in order to create identity. Furthermore, this is an ongoing adaptive process throughout life, concerned with fundamental aspects of psychological well-being."<sup>6</sup> In this study we characterize the product of this dynamic not as a psychological one, but as a social or psychosocial one, since there is ample evidence to show that the dynamic is always social and, thus, involves interaction. If we agree that human beings have psyches, then we must concede that these psyches play some sort of role in their behaviour. Hence, it is logical to observe behaviour and attempt to theorize about its underlying motivations, despite the fact that we cannot prove our theorizing using "hard" scientific methods. We must rely on common sense to test our theorizing.

Bloom argues that a psychosocial trait that has appeared to manifest itself throughout various societies at various times in history merits a theoretical explanation. It is not reductionism, he suggests, if there are no other reasonable explanations that can be generalized.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, any attempt to theorize or explain involves ruling out alternative explanations. Bloom's position makes a good deal of

sense from the point of view that any phenomenon that seems to be evident in ancient history as well as recent, in tribal societies as well as industrialized ones, is a phenomenon which could be classified as being universal to humanity. As such, it deserves some kind of accounting, necessarily a theoretical one.

Like philosophy, social and political theory need not be testable to be valuable, according to Bloom. Their virtue lies in providing coherent ways to discuss social and political phenomena by proposing insights and possibilities.<sup>8</sup> The true test for such theorizing is "intellectual rigour in terms of the internal consistency of its logic."<sup>9</sup> Falsifiability derives from its ability or inability to stand up to evidence, as in the case of our present model of social self-identity: by testing it through the device of employing a case study, we can demonstrate whether it is falsifiable or not.

In summary, we can see from the above discussion that theorizing is an important component of qualitative methodology. Its validity lies in its ability to stand true in the face of evidence and logic. The virtue of theorizing in social science is similar to that of philosophy: it furnishes a kind of guide for interpreting information. The guide provides us with insights into our subject matter.

Many of these arguments can be used to defend the qualitative device of intensive interviewing. Interviews were undertaken in addition to theoretical and historical methods in an effort to remain true to the spirit of triangulation, which is using multiple approaches to data-gathering. Berg advocates this strategy because every method provides a different way of viewing data. Hence, using multiple points of view helps to enrich the picture that emerges and serves as a check on the possibility that faulty methodology may distort findings if only a single method is used.<sup>10</sup> Such an approach was particularly a propos for this study since its very nature calls for talking to people in order to attempt to discover their personal motivations concerning nationalism. It is difficult to try to discern how social self-



identity plays a role in an individual's orientation to nationalism without actually talking to people. However, because of the actual conditions in former Yugoslavia, to say nothing of financial constraints, it was not possible for us to travel there to speak to individuals. For that reason, our methodology had to consist in large part of analysis of secondary sources. Because we did not believe this to be sufficient, we decided to conduct some interviews with people who had some connection to former Yugoslavia to enhance our understanding of individual motivations.

It must be recognized at this point that there are some limitations involved with interviewing people who currently reside in Canada and have not experienced the conflict in former Yugoslavia on a first-hand basis. Regardless of whether they have friends or relatives in the war-torn regions, these individuals have no knowledge of what it is like to actually be in former Yugoslavia under the current conditions. Indeed, some of these emigres may have left Yugoslavia because they had realized that war might be imminent and, for whatever reason, did not want to become embroiled in the struggle. Therefore, their reflections must be considered in light of their presence outside the country.

The philosophical stance we took in conducting these interviews was derived from feminist methodology. Even though, in this case, the interviewees were not women, we believed that it was still important to apply the same philosophy to the interviewing process. Ann Oakley suggests that the interview relationship should be non-hierarchical and imbued with the interviewer's identity as well as that of the interviewee. In this way, she believes that the interviewee's voice will be better heard.<sup>11</sup> Dorothy Smith stresses that interviewees should not be turned into the objects of the study, rather they should be the subjects "as knowers and actors."<sup>12</sup>

In this study, six indepth interviews were conducted. The interviewees were all males, their ages ranging from their late 20s to their early 50s; some of them were

recent immigrants, others had been here most of their lives; between them, they represent many of the protagonist groups (Serbs, Bosnian Serbs, Croats) embroiled in the present conflict. The age, sex and ethnic composition of the interviewees was entirely random in the sense that interviews were conducted with whatever subjects could be found and induced to consent to an interview; there was no preference for interviewees of any particular ethnic group, although attempts were made to seek out members of all the largest ethnic groups of the former country of Yugoslavia. These people were assured total confidentiality and asked to give oral consent to being interviewed prior to each interview. We informed them of the nature of the study and that their participation was completely voluntary; they could decline to answer any question and stop the interview at any time. No demographic information was sought; in reporting our findings, their names have been changed and their identities carefully concealed. The tapes of the interviews have been put away for safekeeping.

Attempts were made to have members of ethnic organizations fill out questionnaires with respect to the subject matter of this study in order to achieve a wider sampling. These attempts, unfortunately, were completely unsuccessful. In some cases, we wrote to organizations asking for permission to send them questionnaires for their members to fill out and return by mail, ensuring total confidentiality, and received no response whatsoever. In other cases, there was initial agreement, the questionnaires were mailed off, but, despite follow-up letters, no response ensued. We can only speculate as to why there was a failure to respond in the above-noted cases. Some of the organizations consisting of non-Serb ethnic members might have been unwilling to participate in any research on nationalism conducted by a researcher with a Serbian last name. On the other hand, perhaps they did not want to risk identification of their activities to anyone outside the group. Those organizations that initially agreed to participate and then failed to respond to follow-

ups or return the questionnaires might have reconsidered their original assent upon seeing the questions. Perhaps the questionnaires were distributed to members who then failed to fill them in or return them, despite prompting. Most people lead busy lives and might have little incentive to fill out a questionnaire that requires a fair amount of time and thought to adequately answer. Perhaps the answer to why some people will fill in questionnaires while others will not is to be found in this very study!

At any rate, the six interviews were intensive enough to provide fascinating insights into the matter of social self-identity and nationalism. There were two instruments used to carry out the interviews. They are appended to the thesis as Appendices A and B. Appendix A was reserved for those interviewees who were not formal members of ethnic organizations which might be construed as nationalistic. These people were what could be termed "free agents". Hence, the questions pertained to them as individuals in an effort to solicit purely personal interpretations. Appendix B was only used in one case where we had prior knowledge of the interviewee's involvement with an organization. The questions contained in this instrument approached the matter in such a way as to seek the interviewee's interpretations both as an individual and as a member of an organization.

The questions were always open-ended, regardless of whether we used Appendix A or B. In this way, we believed we could create a dialogue rather than just a straight interview where people answered questions and nothing more. We hoped that, by making the interview informal and conversational, the interviewee would relax enough to offer more information, which, indeed, was the case. In fact, the interviewees usually volunteered far more once the questions were finished and we asked them if they had anything else they wanted to discuss. At that time, they would reveal their own agendas at great length, raising no objection to the fact that

the tape recorder was still running. It was through these ad hoc discussions that a great deal of insight into the interviewees' attitudes and interpretations was gained, adding immeasurably to our understanding.

The successful use of the technique of developing a conversation from an interview highlights two points that Berg raises. The first is that the interview itself is a rather unnatural interaction between two people because one of them has a script to follow.<sup>13</sup> The very "unnaturalness" of the interview might serve to discourage open communication because the interviewee may feel tense, guarded, vulnerable; he/she may feel like a suspect being interrogated by the authorities. Such tension might lead to the giving of responses that are only superficial or what the interviewee believes the interviewer wants to hear. This would be an unfortunate result, especially when we are trying to delve into the interviewee's personal world. In this case, we would have obtained something diametrically opposed to what we were seeking when undertaking qualitative analysis. The second, and related, point is the importance of establishing rapport between the interviewee and the interviewer. Although Berg emphasizes how rapport is established using a variety of dramaturgical techniques, the implication of his discussion is that, without sufficient rapport between the participants of the interview, there is likely to be a high level of mistrust on the part of the interviewee, who will then tend to employ a series of avoidance techniques when answering questions. As mentioned above, such avoidance will result in misleading data and the negation of the whole purpose of using the interviews. Instead of getting into the interviewee's reality, the interviewer may be left with nothing more than a false reality presented by the interviewee as a defence mechanism.<sup>14</sup>

Most of the interviews were conducted either in the interviewees' homes or their places of business to ensure their maximum comfort. What made them highly

challenging was the fact that most of them had to be conducted in a mixture of English and Serbocroatian. The questions were translated into Serbocroatian prior to the interview. This was not a problem because we used a dictionary to supplement our own knowledge of the language. However, when it came time to make impromptu probes during the process of the interview, it became more difficult since Serbocroatian is not the language in which we were educated and, thus, we did not know at times how to express in exact terms what we were attempting to probe. At that time, the salience of language to identity became very clear to us; that is, when we have to switch from a language in which we are educated and are thoroughly familiar with the concepts to a language which we learned on an informal basis, our identities change from that of intellectual graduate student to that of inarticulate child. Fortunately, the interviewees were eager enough to pursue the discussion that they made every effort to assist us. We are convinced that nothing vital was lost due to language problems.

Findings were analyzed by grouping responses into various categories that corresponded to the themes comprising the integrated model of nationalism. Separate chapters were given to the historical data on Yugoslavia and the findings from the interviews while the section on discussion was used to incorporate insights gained from the two.

Clearly, our methodology has been oriented towards gaining insight into the essence and nature of nationalism. We were attempting to establish a linkage between social self-identity and collective behaviour in the context of external and structural factors. For such a study, we needed to use qualitative, rather than quantitative, methodology. We could not have undertaken our study in this form if we had had to rely on the rigours of measurement, operationalization, statistical significance, and so on. We needed to use methods that allowed for the employment of theoretical and

historical works, as well as interviewing people. As such, this study highlights the salience of methodology. Because our work did not lend itself to quantitative methods, the data yielded are of a very different character from those that surveys or content analysis might have done. Our conclusions would probably also have had a different nature. We employed two forms of qualitative methodology in order to give our analysis more scope, attempting to remain loyal to the logic of triangulation. The next step is to demonstrate how our evidence fits with our methodology.

ENDNOTES

1. John B. Williamson, David A. Karp, John R. Dalphin, Paul S. Gray, in collaboration with Stephen T. Barry and Richard S. Dorr, The Research Craft: An Introduction to Social Research Methods, 2nd ed. (Glenview, Illinois; Boston; London: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1982) 240.
2. Williamson et al. Chapter 10.
3. Bruce L. Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Boston; London; Sydney; Toronto: Allyn and Bacon, 1989) 4.
4. See Berg 2.
5. William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 129.
6. Bloom 129.
7. Bloom 133.
8. Bloom 137.
9. Bloom 139.
10. Berg 4.
11. Ann Oakley, "Interviewing Women: A Contradiction in Terms," Doing Feminist Research, ed. Helen Roberts (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1981) 41.
12. Dorothy E. Smith, The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987) 105.
13. Berg 14.
14. Berg 27-36.

CHAPTER IV

YUGOSLAVIA



It is our contention that an adequate comprehension of the present is not possible without looking into the past in an effort to observe the trajectory of events. For nationalism especially we must try to understand how history might influence the current dynamics taking place, since nationalism rests to a great extent on conceptions of the past. Ethnic identity combines notions of a shared history, myths about the past, and a sense of continuity in experiences between previous generations and those of the present. The past is also pertinent to the present in that it has helped to shape the present by putting into place certain institutions and structures whose effects are felt today. In this chapter, we will review the history of the former country of Yugoslavia and its peoples in an attempt to understand the various factors which contributed to the virulent explosions of nationalisms that took place in the early 1990s.

To summarize briefly the early history of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, let it suffice to say that in approximately the sixth century the South Slavs, "an extremely primitive people with no connections with ancient civilizations",<sup>1</sup> migrated from southwestern Russia in tribes and clans and settled in the region now known as the Balkans. The geography of the area helped to scatter and isolate them from each other. The Serbs populated the present-day territories of Serbia, Bosnia, Hercegovina and Montenegro, with some pockets of Serbs located in Macedonia and Dalmatia. Due to the Ottoman conquest in the Middle Ages, some Serbs later migrated voluntarily and with the encouragement of the Habsburgs into territories comprising the Austro-Hungarian Empire, specifically Hungary. The modern-day Krajina region was known as Vojna Krajina, or the Military Frontier, because of its origin as a military stronghold created by the Habsburgs in an effort to block the advancement of the Ottoman Turks into Europe. The Croats, meanwhile, took up residence in areas now known as Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia. The Slovenes settled in the Julian Alps,

later to be incorporated into a duchy called Carantania in 952 A.D. by Emperor Otto I. Later, Carantania was split into Carinthia, Carniola and Styria.<sup>2</sup> Bosnia and Hercegovina were settled by Serbs and Croats but, by the late fifteenth century, had been conquered by the Turks. Many Christians left the area, while the ones who remained were subordinated to Slavic nobles who had converted to Islam to retain their feudal status.<sup>3</sup> What are now known as Macedonians are essentially descendants of people who were the product of Serb absorption of the Bulgars who inhabited the region. The Bulgars became Slavicized, abandoning their Turkic origins. Thereafter, the Serbs, Bulgars and Greeks, who had been in control of the Macedonian Church for a time while the area was under Ottoman rule, competed for control over these people and their region.<sup>4</sup>

Although most of these peoples derive from the same ethnic roots, their histories are quite different. Croatia was once an independent kingdom but was squeezed between the advancing Venetians (by sea) and Hungarians (by land) at the beginning of the tenth century. It accepted the suzerainty of the Hungarians and remained, for the most part, under Hungarian rule until 1918.<sup>5</sup> It did, however, maintain some degree of autonomy even under foreign rule, although Lederer states that it gradually lost its national identity.<sup>6</sup> The Serbs, meanwhile, had expanded into a large medieval state by the middle of the fourteenth century when the Ottoman Turks invaded and conquered them. Five hundred years of vassalage ensued wherein the Serbs were reduced to an isolated peasant populace. Their religion, Serbian Orthodox, helped to preserve their identity and a literary revival took place in the eighteenth century led by Obradovic and Karadzic, the latter of whom adopted the Hercegovinian "sto" dialect and standardized it into the literary language. The same dialect was adopted by Gaj, a Croat, so that the two ethnic groups came to speak the same language, even though the Croats used the Latin alphabet while the Serbs

utilized the Cyrillic.

In 1804 the Serbs staged an unsuccessful armed resistance against their Turkish overlords. The Turkish administration took such harsh repressive measures against the Serbs that by 1815 there was another revolution. Backed this time by Russia, the Serbs were successful in obtaining their autonomy and Milos Obrenovic was formally recognized as the prince of the pashalik of Belgrade.<sup>7</sup>

Serb chauvinism was manifest in the dreams of Prince Michael Obrenovic, who came to power in Serbia in 1860, aroused by the unification of Italy. He wanted all the South Slavs liberated from the Austrian and Ottoman Empires and united into one state, with Serbia in the role of "the Piedmont of the Balkans".<sup>8</sup> Since Serbia was too weak to accomplish the task of unification itself, support had to be generated among the other South Slavs.

The Turks never succeeded in conquering the mountainous region of Montenegro where Prince Ivan established his capital and ruled independently as a theocrat.<sup>9</sup> Although the theocracy was abolished in the mid-nineteenth century, Montenegro remained independent until it joined with its South Slav brethren in 1918.

The Croats, meanwhile, were not as successful in throwing off the yoke of foreign oppression. Croatian nationalism was aroused indirectly thanks to the efforts of Emperor Joseph II of Austria to Germanize the peoples of the Habsburg Empire. Croats looked upon the achievement of their Serbian counterparts with a mixture of admiration and envy, staging their own armed rebellion in 1871. Unfortunately, it failed and the Croats were demoralized and more rigorously repressed by the Habsburgs.<sup>10</sup>

One of the main points of competing interest between Serb and Croat nationalists was control over Bosnia-Hercegovina, the territory separating the two ethnic groups, whose ethnic composition was mostly Serbs, Croats and Slavic Muslims.

Each group realized that control over this zone, which was still held by the splintering Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century, could very well determine which one would predominate politically in any Yugoslav union. Since the independent Serbs were already acquiring more and more territory (between 1817 and 1905, Serbia's territory doubled) while the Croats were still subject to foreign rule, Croatian nationalists tended to fear that Yugoslavism was merely a euphemism for Serb domination. Nevertheless, many Croats were in favour of the unification of southern Slavs into one independent state.<sup>11</sup>

In Slovenia during the sixteenth century German nobles attempted to gain autonomy by staging a Protestant Reformation. Slovene culture flowered for a time as religious materials began to be printed but repression by the Habsburgs resulted in publishing being moved to Germany. A counterreformation took place and Slovenian students were sent to Austrian universities as another measure to solidify relations with the monarchy. The Slovenian language remained alive among the peasants while the higher classes spoke German or Italian. Economic ties with Germany and Italy strengthened, resulting in an indigenous Slovenian middle class which eventually became self-conscious enough to begin to view the Slovenes as a nation. Napoleon conquered these lands and annexed them to his empire as the Illyrian Provinces. He laid down an infrastructure and fostered the growing Slovenian self-awareness. The concept of a common link among the various South Slavs of the Illyrian Provinces was also bestowed upon these people by Napoleon. Despite the return of the Austrians in 1813, the Slovenian culture continued to flourish such that, by 1843, the peasant dialect had been transformed into a literary language and was being disseminated to the masses. For a time throughout the 1860s the Slovenes rallied for more autonomy, enlisting the support of their South Slav compatriots, the Croats and Serbs, but by 1871 they had substantially abandoned

these aspirations. The notion of a union of the South Slavs remained alive among many, in spite of the repression by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, giving birth to a debate among Slovenes as to the implications of such a union for their own culture.<sup>12</sup>

During the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries a group of Bosnian nobles attempted to assert autonomy in the region, throwing off the Catholic and Orthodox religions in favour of a Christian offshoot known as Bogomilism. The Hungarians persecuted the Bogomils in order to re-establish their own dominance over them and their territory. Under Stefan Tvrtko I, Bosnia was joined to the principality of Hum, another area populated by South Slavs, in the fourteenth century. Tvrtko was later crowned king of Bosnia and Rasko, proceeding to conquer parts of Croatia and Dalmatia, and his troops fought with the Serbs against the Turks at Kosovo. After his death, a Hum nobleman rose to power, obtaining the title "Herzeg", which is German for "duke", from which the name "Hercegovina" derived. As has already been mentioned, the Bogomil nobles converted to Islam to save their feudal status, eventually rebelling against their Turkish overlords. This rebellion caused the Turks to take all power away from the Slavic Muslim nobles and to impose a highly centralized system of government. The Austrians began to invest in the region, helping to create a Christian middle class. However, because the Christian serfs were still suffering from extreme oppression, they led an all-out uprising in 1875 in Hercegovina which eventually resulted in a European war. The Turks were defeated in this war and were forced to surrender Bosnia and Hercegovina to the occupation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In an effort to solidify their position, the Austrians instituted a policy of relocation wherein northern Bosnia was colonized by Catholic Slavs and Germans. Baron Kallay, the administrator, established an infrastructure in the region but, at the same time, played up the differences among the Muslim Slavs, Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs.<sup>13</sup>

Macedonia's early history was comprised of a series of foreign dominations by the Bulgars, Byzantines, Serbs and, eventually, the Turks. The Turks were responsible for retarding Macedonia's cultural progress by destroying the indigenous aristocracy, turning the Christian peasants into serfs and placing the Macedonian Church under the control of the Greek patriarch. Bulgarians became active in the region during the nineteenth century, upsetting both the Serbs and the Greeks. For a time Bulgars ruled Macedonia when it became part of the newly-formed Bulgarian state created by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. However, the Treaty of Berlin in the same year returned Macedonia to the Turks. Secret nationalist societies were spawned in the late nineteenth century as a result of the rivalry over Macedonia among the Bulgars, Serbs and Greeks. Eventually all three rivals signed agreements settling their respective claims over the Macedonian people and their territory.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, there was some sense that the South Slavs were brethren by the beginning of the nineteenth century. The desire for collective security against the great powers also drew them toward each other, since they seemed to share a common desire for autonomy from imperial rule. From the preceding overview of their varied histories, it is possible to see that foreign oppression was common to all of them, as was the struggle for self-determination. Each of them experienced external threats to their cultures and the eventual awakening of self-consciousness. Alone they faced formidable odds in the achievement of their nationalistic aims; hence, they realized that they needed one another in order to break free. They appeared to arrive at the conclusion that it was better to live with other South Slavs than to live under non-Slavic domination.

Another pertinent matter raised by this overview of the early history of the peoples of former Yugoslavia is how opposition contributed to their burgeoning self-

consciousness. As Spicer stated, their identity systems persisted, despite many, many years of foreign domination. In various ways, each group organized and mobilized against its opposition. At the same time, their historical experiences left indelible marks on these peoples: the Slovenes and Croats were Westernized due to their incorporation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire; the Slovenes were Germanized to some extent due to their economic ties and rule by German nobles; the Serbs were the first to break free of their oppressors and establish their own autonomy, giving them the sense that they were "natural" leaders for their fellow South Slavs and making the Croats suspicious of them; the Bosnians were split into oppressed Christians on the one hand and, on the other hand, Slavic converts to Islam whose conversion was made on the basis of securing their socioeconomic status, thereby establishing themselves as anomalies in both the Slavic and Muslim worlds; and, finally, the Macedonians were virtual pawns in the power plays among Serbs, Bulgars and Greeks, making them suspicious of all these groups. Nevertheless, these diverse peoples overcame their differences sufficiently to turn to each other for assistance in breaking away from their non-Slavic oppressors.

During World War I, ignited by the assassination of the heir to the Habsburg Empire by an extreme Serb nationalist, the South Slavs hurried to join forces before the victors divided up their lands as wartime spoils. They had been weakened by the war, having lost great portions of their populations, and feared, no doubt, that they would not be able to resist whatever measures their former allies might wish to take at peace talks.<sup>15</sup> As a result, "the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" (renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929) was proclaimed on December 1, 1918 in Beograd, six weeks before the Paris Peace Conference was scheduled to take place; thus, this unified southern Slav state was not a creation of Versailles. Aleksandar Karadjordjevic, the Prince Regent of Serbia, was to rule the new kingdom. The name

"Yugoslavia" was not given to the state at that time because Pasic, the pre-war prime minister of Serbia and leader of the Serbian Radical Party, was afraid that Serbia might be completely submerged in a state so named. It is significant to note, however, that the fact that Serbia and Montenegro voluntarily gave up their sovereignty to become parts of a large state -- made up of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro -- is something of a concession by Serb and Montenegrin nationalists.<sup>16</sup>

The unification did not, however, constitute a happy ending for the Serbs and Croats or the other groups that had joined them. There were many unresolved issues among them, not the least of which was how Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Muslim peoples with different histories and cultures would be able to find a common path to follow. Having a Serb king as their ruler no doubt instilled fear of Serb hegemony in the hearts of the others who must have felt that, having paid such a high price for their autonomy from foreign empires, they were not going to surrender it now within their own state. Another great problem was whether the state should be unitary or federal, the Serbs being in favour of the former while the Croats favoured the latter. The Slovenes preferred autonomy but ultimately went along with unitarism.<sup>17</sup>

The seed of nationalities problems was already planted from the time of unification due to the fact that the new kingdom was not acknowledged as a multinational one; rather, it was based on the notion of a union of major South Slavic peoples. This was a fallacy, since Germans, Magyars, Albanians, Macedonians and Muslims were also enclosed within its boundaries. Instead of exchanging reciprocal neighbouring populations as other Balkan states had done, the new state kept them within its territory in the belief that these peoples could be assimilated. This was a grave error of judgment, since, as Djordjevic states, "[d]eprived of their national rights, the dissatisfied minorities turned into destabilizing factors, feeding both the



extreme political right and left, encouraged and supported by revisionist European powers."<sup>18</sup>

Political struggles, chiefly between the Serbs and Croats, dominated the interwar years, effectively rendering all parliamentary and party matters questions of nationalism. Acrimony came to a head when a Montenegrin shot and killed Radic, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, and several other Croats during a debate in the Skupstina in 1928. The Croats boycotted the Beograd government, establishing a separate parliament in Zagreb. They called for a federal state to replace the unitary, Serb-dominated one. King Alexander took harsh, arbitrary measures to deal with the dissent. One of the major consequences of these actions was to arouse an extreme right-wing ultranationalist group called the "Ustashi" amongst the Croats.

The Ustashi were not the only ultranationalists in Yugoslavia. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) was another such group, having split into two factions after the First World War. One faction demanded that Macedonia be annexed to Bulgaria and carried out terrorist activities in Yugoslavia throughout the 1920s. The other favoured communism and a Balkan Federation with an independent Macedonia included.<sup>19</sup> Communism was favoured by IMRO since the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Comintern had debated the issue of Macedonia (as well as the other national questions) and, by 1923, had agreed that a federal solution was optimal for solving the matter; they had also come to the conclusion that each nation had a right to form a separate state.<sup>20</sup> At times, IMRO and the Ustashi cooperated with one another since their goals were similar: the overthrow of Serb domination.<sup>21</sup>

Croats achieved some measure of their much-desired autonomy on the eve of the Nazi invasion. Hitler attacked Yugoslavia; the king and his government fled the country, leaving it to the Germans, who promptly dismembered it.<sup>22</sup> Eventually a civil war broke out between the royalist forces and the Partisans (or communists) led

by Josip Broz Tito. Yugoslavia's problems were further compounded by the rise to power of the ultranationalist Ustashi in Croatia. Led by Ante Pavelic and supported by the fascists, the Ustashi delivered a severe blow to the future of Serb-Croat relations with their genocidal policy against the Serbs (and others) which resulted in Serbian retaliation. The brutality of the Ustashi even appalled the Nazis. "Of Yugoslavia's 1,700,000 war deaths (11 per cent of the population) about a million were due to interethnic strife."<sup>23</sup> This was possibly the most significant result of this period in Yugoslavian history -- something which would haunt the country from that time forward. The atrocities committed against the Serb population within the territory controlled by the Croats would never be forgotten by the Serbs. They were willing to sacrifice their personal suffering if it meant a better, stronger Yugoslavia for everyone -- but not if it contributed to Croat improvement alone.

Previous history detrimentally influenced the early years of the South Slav union, as we have seen. Even when they realized they must cleave together to escape their foreign domination they could not overcome their mutual differences and suspicions, largely the result of the histories they sought so desperately to flee. External opposition became secondary to internal opposition as Croats especially struggled against possible submersion in a Serb-dominated unitary state. The seeds of nationalities problems had been sown from the inception of the country. The new state failed to deal adequately with the non-Slavic minorities within its boundaries, chauvinistically believing that assimilation was the best course to follow. Issues that had been left unresolved at the time of unification among the major South Slavic ethnic groups proved to be highly contentious since they were based on different world views. There was an obvious failure to forge a strong unified national ideology, so many ideologies competed for power. Intransigence, particularly between the Serbs and Croats, caused more problems. Groups mobilized in order to

deal with their own concerns, often in the form of political parties established along nationalist lines, sometimes in more virulent guises. Ultranationalist extremists were born out of this failure to compromise and mutual suspicion. Against this backdrop, along with the Second World War, the civil war in Yugoslavia was waged from which Josip Broz Tito and his Partisans emerged triumphant. It was incumbent upon the victors to forge a new Yugoslavia.

The nationalistic excesses of the Second World War horrified so many people, including Serbs and Croats, that, for a time, ethnic conflict was regulated internally by most members of the groups. The extent of devastation, both material and social, resulting from the war was also significant in terms of contributing to relative harmony among the nationalities: post-war reparation allowed the nationalities question to recede into the background for a time. Development and modernization were the foremost concerns of the new regime under the leadership of Tito and the Partisans. Nevertheless, the future of the problem was foreshadowed by the fact that development was pursued in terms of economic equalization, placing new industries in backward areas, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro.<sup>24</sup> From the time of Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union in 1948, centralism was gradually abandoned, giving over much of the economic and administrative powers and party organization to the republics. Because the six republics were based loosely on historic national territories, albeit not necessarily homogeneous areas, each government became the spokesperson for its respective majority nationality. "When disputes arose over economic or political questions, local leaders tended to dust off all the old flags and symbols and return with enthusiasm to the battles of the past."<sup>25</sup>

When the communists assumed power, declaring on November 29, 1945 that the monarchy had been abolished and creating the Federative People's Republic of

Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavs felt that a new era was being ushered in.<sup>26</sup> The new constitution of January 1946 was modelled on the Soviet one of 1936. Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia were to be six sovereign nation-states free to exercise their right to self-determination "by coming together in a federation."<sup>27</sup> To allay the fears of the other groups concerning the prewar hegemony of the Serbs, the Serbian republic was weakened by creating within its boundaries the Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, in addition to declaring Montenegro and Macedonia to be republics in their own right.<sup>28</sup> Such actions came to be reduced to the equation "Weak Serbia = Strong Yugoslavia", something which became a thorn in the side of Serbs. The federal government retained the power over defence and foreign policy, economic planning, the currency and banking system, communications, law and maintaining the social system. This effectively meant the only powers retained by the republics were those pertaining to cultural and linguistic matters. The Federal Assembly was comprised of two houses, one being elected, the other formed from representatives of the republican assemblies; however, the latter met rarely and had no real power. The real power was vested in the Communist party itself which was centralized and hierarchical, consisting mostly of Tito's wartime cronies.<sup>29</sup> Of course, Tito himself dominated the whole system. If all else failed during this period, pure repression was usually the answer. In fact, anyone who voiced opposition of any kind was likely to be branded a wartime collaborator and imprisoned, or worse.<sup>30</sup>

The structure of the Yugoslav state after the war, formally giving concessions to the various nationalities while paring down the potential power of Serbia, seemed to have reassured many non-Serbs, especially considering that Tito was half-Slovene, half-Croat. The break with Stalin in 1948 also drew the various peoples of Yugoslavia together, giving them a sense of pride in defying the Soviets and surviving without

them. Because Stalin had attempted to incite insurrection among the Yugoslavs, calling for them to overthrow Tito, anyone who was suspected of supporting Stalin after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform was imprisoned. At first, the country was isolated from both East and West, the latter alienation due to its "bitter dispute with Italy over Trieste, the regime's refusal to compensate foreigners for nationalized property, continued Yugoslav support for the communists in Greece, and other issues."<sup>31</sup> The Soviet Union put economic and political pressure on Yugoslavia, hoping, no doubt, to bring it to its knees for its defiance. Tito changed his tactics as a result, taking steps to ingratiate himself and his country to the West, and succeeded in gaining economic aid from Western nations, importing weapons from the United States and securing military support, an arrangement which stopped short of Yugoslavia becoming a member of NATO.<sup>32</sup>

Along with the break from Stalin came a break with Stalinism. The tool utilized to accomplish this break was socialist self-management wherein workers formed councils to assume control over management and production. This device was largely a paper tiger, however, since government-appointed directors had veto power over council decisions. Foreign trade was still controlled by the federal government but some market mechanisms were instituted, giving rise to the system known as "market socialism". It was a period of political and economic decentralization which resulted in interregional (and, hence, interethnic) conflict and competition. Since the federal government still controlled the purse strings to a large degree, the fact that economic initiatives were handed over to the republics meant that, in effect, a zero sum game had emerged: whatever one region got meant less for another. Such a system was especially galling to the Croats and Slovenes, whose republics were more developed and, hence, more economically prosperous than those to the south. These people resented the diversion of economic resources to less profitable enterprises in

the less developed republics, since the system was based on political expediency, not rational economics. Republican leaders became national leaders and regional rivalry took on the character of ethnic conflict. A conservative faction of Serbs and Montenegrins called for a cessation of economic liberalization and recentralization. Since Serbs and Montenegrins were overrepresented in the state and party apparatuses, the other ethnic groups became alarmed, fearing the spectre of Serb hegemony once again, and opposed such a trend. Hence, we can see how the prewar experiences of the unitary state influenced the postwar federation: any call for recentralization of federal power away from the republics, usually on the part of Serbs and Montenegrins whose numbers were greatest within the federal ranks, threatened the other groups who feared that such a move would constitute the loss of their autonomy and domination by Belgrade. Once the conservatives were defeated, the party was reformed to devolve power away from the central organization to the republican ones, resulting in the loss of loyalty to the centre.<sup>33</sup>

Accompanying economic liberalization was liberalization of a more general nature, a kind of early Yugoslav version of Gorbachev's glasnost. The effect of such an atmosphere was more personal freedom for Yugoslav citizens, cultural and religious freedom for the various ethnic groups, and a rise in the standard of living. Self-management was extended into the social sphere, allowing for local councils to be established to deal with most facets of daily life. Thus, the Yugoslavia of the 1960s enjoyed a form of Western-style "Enlightenment", a phenomenon which had far-reaching effects on its culture and the consciousness of its peoples. These reforms also effectively opened up spaces in the Yugoslav society for activities and ideologies to fill as they could not when centralization and repression were present. By giving freedom, the state essentially opened the doors for the people to demand more. Although a detente was reached with the Soviet Union and links were forged with the

West, Yugoslavia retained a non-aligned stance, looking to Third World countries for peers and support and gaining prestige in that area.<sup>34</sup> Poised between East and West, a trendsetter of sorts in the Third World, Yugoslavia was something of an anomaly, a patchwork rather than a synthesis of the capitalist and communist systems, as it attempted to negotiate through the treacherous shoals of its own multinational internal affairs. Tito enjoyed a fair amount of success at exploiting Yugoslavia's international position and further cultivating his country's appealing facade.

The ethnic landscape in Yugoslavia was violently disturbed in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the Albanians of Kosovo and western Macedonia and the Croats respectively. Although both uprisings were quelled and liberal reform came to a temporary halt, constitutional concessions were made transforming Yugoslavia into a loose federation, giving the republics and provinces more control over what had heretofore been federal responsibilities and a veto over federal decisions. All of this was accomplished despite Tito's call for renewed democratic centralism and his insistence that the central party organization, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), was to regain control over political and economic life. The rise of nationalism, however, had alarmed federal authorities to the extent that the new Constitution, which was enacted in 1974, entrenched the reforms of the 1950s and 1960s, including de facto republican powers for Vojvodina and Kosovo and the recognition of Bosnia's Muslim Slavs as a "nation". Republican and ethnic "keys" (i.e., that equal numbers of representatives be chosen from each republic, regardless of population or size) were introduced to ensure widespread representation of ethnic groups in appointments to federal administrative elected bodies, even in the party.

All this, coupled with the fact that Tito stated in 1964 at the Eighth Congress of the League of Communists that he did not believe that unity in Yugoslavia required

the elimination of nationalities and the creation of an artificial identity, fuelled the smouldering fires of various nationalisms, despite Tito's apparent commitment to damping down these very flames.<sup>35</sup> At this point, there was no longer any assumption in Yugoslavia that nationalities were disintegrating.

As a consequence, the republics at last came into their own as fully legitimate agents of popular sovereignty....This congress thus laid the basis for subsequent political decentralization. A change in nationalities policy provided the preliminary thrust toward the transformation of Yugoslavia into a system in which the republics could advance their distinct interests in an autonomous way -- a balance-of-power system.<sup>36</sup>

Thus, it can be seen that nationalities policy in Yugoslavia during the Tito years, although officially characterized by the slogan "brotherhood and unity", was, in reality, an odd juxtaposition of pro-nationalist decentralization and antinationalist, pro-centralist rhetoric. Tito discouraged any overt display of republican nationalism (amply demonstrated by his actions towards the Albanian and Croatian nationalists) even while he augmented their power and, hence, the power of their respective elites. Because he himself dominated the political scene as the undisputed head of state, with all the power and legitimacy accruing thereto, he had been able to ensure the continued equilibrium and cooperation of the republics. This approach was not entirely without sense when it is recalled that Yugoslavia, from its inception, was a collection of weak nations seeking strength in unification, mutually suspicious and sensitive about collective rights. Self-management and the supremacy of the Communist Party were meant to ensure unity among the peoples of Yugoslavia, as they worked towards common goals and espoused the same ideology. Growth in the economy and prosperity, along with a relatively secure international position, during most of Tito's years in office were important factors contributing to tolerance and cooperation; as long as the economic pie was big enough to provide ample shares to everyone, it was easier to turn a blind eye to the fact that some republics were



getting more than others.<sup>37</sup> In addition, the threat of the Soviet Union gave all Yugoslavs, regardless of nationality, a common enemy; while there was the possibility that an invasion like those in Hungary and Czechoslovakia could occur in Yugoslavia, it was in every nationality's interest to cooperate with the others and present a unified front to the outside world. In addition, with the West buttressing the country in its efforts to control the spread of communism to Italy and Greece, Yugoslavia enjoyed a sense of security probably greatly disproportionate to its real problems. It had managed to survive dismemberment by Hitler and the catastrophe of civil war; it had emerged like a Phoenix from the ashes, became modernized and prospered, all with relative harmony among its varied peoples.

By the late 1970s two factors on the Yugoslav horizon were gaining significance: Tito was growing old and sick to the point where it was becoming obvious that his days were numbered, and economic conditions were worsening. Tito himself worked towards a unified collective leadership in the hope of preventing the rise to power of any single individual or group. He had struggled to create a system of checks and balances in his country, envisaging that his strategic distribution of power to various groups and use of socialist ideology would equalize economic disparities, political rivalries and ethnic hostilities. Unfortunately, Tito did not pay enough attention to domestic economic conditions, something that would prove to be a catalyst to nationalist mobilizations over the next decade or so.<sup>38</sup>

Economic problems, in addition to the absence of a strong federal leader to fill the void left by Tito's death in 1980 were to have fatal repercussions for the country because of the constitutional arrangements set out in the 1974 Constitution. "The institutions established to cope with the running of Yugoslavia after Tito's death could not cope with the situation because in essence they had been created to deal with a system which actually had a Tito-like figure at the top."<sup>39</sup> Despite his best

efforts, Tito had underestimated the deleterious effects of his liberalization and decentralization programmes on the Yugoslavia he had attempted to create; he believed that the ideology of "brotherhood and unity" would carry the day. Perhaps he had also underestimated how pivotal his own personal presence had really been for the continued success of the "Land of the South Slavs". Having so effectively blocked the possibilities for any single individual to gain substantial power, Tito had, in essence, sentenced the federation to death due to the fact that there was no "heir apparent" waiting in the federal wings to step into his shoes. Without the unifying influence of Tito or another strong leader with power and national legitimacy, decision-making by consensus in a highly decentralized country where republics represented ethnic majorities, deeply suspicious of one another and plagued by a bloody past, became increasingly difficult. In addition, Tito's handling of the national question was ultimately unsuccessful because it exacerbated oppositional factors which aroused nationalist feelings among the various groups. His system of checks and balances was based on mutual jealousies and suspicions, not on true consensus. Centralization was a threat to those groups which had striven for autonomous status; decentralization was a threat to Serbs who believed their own status and that of the Serbs in other republics besides Serbia would be undermined. Decentralization also brought great interregional and, hence, interethnic conflict and competition. Yugoslav-style federalism itself seemed to fuel nationalist tendencies by giving excessive autonomy to the various republics while depriving the central government of any real power to mediate. Oppositional circumstances were germane to every "solution" pursued and ethnic conflict accompanied them.

As has already been suggested, this condition was exacerbated by the escalating economic crisis, largely outside of Yugoslavia's control: the rise in oil prices in the mid and late 1970s which caused the terms of trade to deteriorate; the

world recessions of 1974–1975 and 1980–1983 that decreased the demand for Yugoslavian exports; an increase in real interest rates and tightening of lending conditions which accompanied the latter period;<sup>40</sup> "the collapse of the COMECON economies, and European protectionism destroyed international support for the Yugoslav economy."<sup>41</sup> Within Yugoslavia itself, national-republican rivalries began to surface, causing economic and political disputes that fuelled the deficit (which had risen from approximately US \$6 billion in 1977 to around \$20 billion in 1980) and stymied economic growth. During the second half of the 1980s, "[r]eal incomes declined by at least 30 per cent and inflation, at its peak in late 1989, reached 2,000 per cent."<sup>42</sup> Unemployment soared in the poorer republics.

The unstable federation was dealt another lethal blow by the interethnic strife in Kosovo, one of Serbia's autonomous provinces. Albanians make up the ethnic majority due, in large part, to their very high birthrate and the voluntary "ethnic cleansing" of the Serb population which began to migrate out as a consequence of the greater power granted the Albanians under Tito's programmes and the 1974 Constitution. In this region, which some have called the "cradle of the Serb nation" because of its historic importance to Serbians,<sup>43</sup> serious ethnic conflict began as Albanians clamoured for a continuation of liberal nationalities policies begun under Tito; they demanded that Kosovo be elevated to de jure republican status, among other things.<sup>44</sup> Demonstrations began to take place among the Albanian population which were condemned by Serbia's republican leaders (and some hardline Albanian leaders) as counterrevolutionary and irredentist.

While it is true that the Albanians suffered repression under the domination of the Serbs, who did not recognize them as a legitimate nation in Yugoslavia, after 1968 Albanians were permitted far greater freedom of cultural expression and, after the 1974 Constitution, far more political autonomy. It is somewhat ironic that they

were granted so much by the Yugoslavs since their cultural expressions tend to bind them more closely to Albania than Yugoslavia (the Hoxha dictatorship in Albania did not allow as much freedom) and politically they are most likely to be irredentist. Furthermore, Albanian mass culture harkens back to earlier times: they still live in large extended families reminiscent of historical tribes where women are secluded in the home under strict male authority and deprived of education; they practise blood vengeance, the arranging of marriages and some polygamy; they have the highest rate of illiteracy in Yugoslavia and their standard of living is low due to high unemployment and an underdeveloped economy.<sup>45</sup> In other words, in Serbian eyes, the Albanians represent a somewhat atavistic group in Yugoslavia; they are throwbacks to a feudal history modern-day Yugoslavia has striven for years to escape. Many Serbs no doubt view the Albanians of Kosovo as a painful reminder of Ottoman rule, especially when they live on the very site where the Serbs suffered the military defeat that cost them so much as a nation. It is not surprising, in light of these circumstances, that Albanians would feel that Serbs treat them as second-class citizens, particularly those Albanians who have managed to attend university and have thus acquired some social mobility. For all these reasons, the bitterness of ethnic strife between the Serbs and Albanians is understandable.

Serbian opposition forces began to emerge in response to the problems in Kosovo. Militant Albanians were jailed, the press in Belgrade began to blame the central government for, in effect, encouraging the ambitions of the provinces. The Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (SKS) claimed that "Serbia was the only republic not constituted as a state due to the disruptive role of the autonomous provinces."<sup>46</sup> Put another way, it appeared that every other territorial ethnic majority was given its own autonomous republic and permitted to administer its own affairs to suit itself and its needs, except the Serbs. "Weak Serbia = Strong

Yugoslavia" was increasingly galling to many Serbs, especially when the reality appeared to be more "Weak Serbia = Strong Everybody Else". In 1986 the Serbian elite published the "Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences" wherein it was alleged that Serbia had been the victim of discrimination in economic and political terms. It called for self-determination for the Serb nation. When Slobodan Milosevic became a political force after 1986, Serb nationalism gained a definitive leader and spokesman. Milosevic was, in effect, a catalyst of sorts, providing the articulation required for the convergence of "private troubles" with "public issues". At least in the short term, he was able to furnish a "voice" for those Serbs who were experiencing disaffection, in addition to a focal point for others whose feelings were already leading them in the direction of nationalism.

The emergence of Milosevic on the political scene in Yugoslavia has served as a threat to the existing nationalities policy and, indeed, the 1974 Constitution. Only in light of this man's political career can the ensuing virulence of the various nationalisms in Yugoslavia be fully understood. It is suggested that the turning point in Milosevic's career and simultaneously for Yugoslav nationalisms was April 24th-25th, 1987 at the Field of Kosovo when Albanian police attacked Serbian and Montenegrin protesters and Milosevic took the side of the protesters.<sup>47</sup>

In his speech to the assembled Slavs, he spoke of the injustice and humiliation they were suffering; of their ancestral land; of the proud warrior spirit of their forefathers; of their duty to their descendants. The speech was aimed at the people's emotions...Milosevic endorsed the view that the Serb nation was at war, and offered the nationalists the support of the party. He thereby, in effect, removed Kosovo Serbs (and Montenegrins) from the jurisdiction of the provincial authorities, tearing up in the process the existing constitution. The head of the League of Communists of Serbia was speaking not on behalf of the party (which, of course, includes also Albanians and other non-Serbs), not on behalf of the republic's (ethnically heterogeneous) working class, but on behalf of the Serb nation -- anywhere in Yugoslavia. In a direct challenge to the fundamental principle of the Yugoslav federation, he was thus endorsing the bourgeois nationalism recently re-formulated by the Memorandum.<sup>48</sup>

The weak and ineffectual federal government, paralyzed by its own internal strife and lack of power, failed to respond adequately to this monumental challenge by Milosevic and the Serb nationalists in part because the leadership was split as to how to deal with the challenge and also because of the ruling party's continued adherence to the principles of democratic centralism and Stalinist party unity. The federal party in Belgrade sat by in a state of paralysis and watched what was happening. In Slovenia and, to a lesser extent, in Croatia, there was some anticipation of the coming events, but Serbian party hardliners protected the nationalists by insisting that liberals and enemies of the system were to be found among the highest office-holders in the country, thus turning every criticism of the Serb nationalists into an attack on party unity and a threat to the party's control. Milosevic exploited this situation to the utmost, using it to shield his forging of a nationalist-conservative coalition.<sup>49</sup>

In many ways, 1987 marked the turning point in Yugoslavia as leadership throughout the land began to change, moving away from the traditional Tito-style Communist type to a kind that resembled prewar Yugoslavia. The League of Communists of Serbia came under the control of Milosevic who successfully ousted his mentor, Stambolic, and purged the highest stratum of the party of liberals. He proceeded to reverse most of the gains accruing to Vojvodina and Kosovo under the 1974 Constitution, depriving minorities (especially in Kosovo) of their rights. Thanks to his strategic use of the party's own ideological apparatus, Milosevic was able to paralyze the federal party and the leadership of the other republics, at least for a time, while he built his own power base from a coalition of conservative and nationalist forces.<sup>50</sup> His opposition was mainly from Vuk Draskovic, leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement, a nationalist party with designs on Macedonia as a Serb territory as well as anti-Albanian sentiments, and Vojislav Seselj, head of the Serbian

Chetnik movement, an extreme Serb nationalist.<sup>51</sup>

In 1988, due to mass demonstrations in Serbia and rallies elsewhere, the pressure resulted in the replacement of the Montenegrin leadership to one that was sympathetic to Serbia's aspirations. Vojvodina and Kosovo experienced the same changes in their leaderships as well.<sup>52</sup>

The Croatian League of Communists, which included a disproportionately high number of Serbs, lost its grip on the leadership of that republic in the late 1980s as oppositional parties began to form and clamour for multiparty elections. The agendas of many of these parties involved nationalist issues. The Communist party had little choice but to give in. Hence, elections were held in 1990. Franjo Tudjman and his nationalistic Croatian Democratic Community party won the elections, despite the fact that he had only received a 42% share of the votes cast. The Croatian Democratic Community was also the party of choice among most of the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina and succeeded in winning 44 of the 49 seats won by Croats in the Bosnian elections.<sup>53</sup>

The Serbs of Croatia reacted to the loosening of Communist Party authority and the upsurge of alternative parties with Croatian nationalist overtones by organizing themselves. It is very probable that they were unwilling to wait around to see whether this new breed of Croatian nationalism contained any Ustasha elements for fear of another encounter with virulent anti-Serbism.<sup>54</sup> The Serbian Democratic Party was founded in Knin with Dr. Jovan Raskovic as its leader. When newly-elected President Tudjman did not visit Serb majority areas and the republic adopted a new flag and other symbols which harkened back to Ustasha times, the Serbs of the Krajina began to mobilize for autonomy, holding a referendum on August 3rd, 1990 which had been banned by Croatian authorities. In light of Tudjman's openly nationalist electoral campaign, the banning of the Serb referendum added insult to

injury. Despite measures taken by Croatian authorities, in January of 1991 the Serbs virtually established their own government in the Krajina region.<sup>55</sup>

Tensions in Slovenia, the most developed and liberal of the republics, escalated throughout the late 1980s, especially once Milosevic had established his power in Serbia. By September of 1989, the Slovene Assembly had passed amendments to the constitution of the republic paving the way for secession. Slovene nationalism found voices in the Communist Party and the opposition party, DEMOS. In the 1990 elections, DEMOS won the majority of seats but Milan Kucan, leader of the newly-renamed League of Communists of Slovenia-Party of Democratic Renewal, won the presidency. In July 1990, Slovenia had, for all intents and purposes, declared its independence from Yugoslavia, although the word "secession" was still not being used. This, however, was a mere formality as Slovenia began to negotiate with Western nations for closer economic and political ties.<sup>56</sup>

Alija Izetbegovic, who had been jailed in the 1980s as one of the "Sarajevo Muslims", having written a treatise promoting the establishment of an ethnically pure Muslim state, became the leader of the Party of Democratic Action in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This party carried the elections of December 1990, winning 86 of the 240 possible seats, forming a coalition government with the other big winners, the Serbs and Croats.<sup>57</sup>

Among the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina there was political organization under the leadership of Radovan Karadzic, who formed the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an offshoot of the party which had been formed in Croatia by the Serbs. Due in part to the atrocities committed in the region during the Second World War and also to the postwar partitioning of the Serb nation within Yugoslavia, the Serbs of Bosnia experienced political revitalization. The new party formed a Serbian National Council in Banja Luka and later won 72 of the total 85 seats won by Serbs in



the republican elections of December 1990.<sup>58</sup>

Macedonian leadership underwent similar changes as Communist Party control gave way under pressure and oppositional parties emerged. In 1990 two nationalist groups were created: the Movement for All-Macedonian Action (made up mostly of intellectuals and led by Ante Popovski) which criticized Bulgarian and Greek oppression of Macedonians within their borders; and an even more radical one known as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity, led by Ljupco Georgijevski, whose platform called for improved relations with Slovenia and Croatia, along with the return of some territories under the control of Serbia. Aroused by fears of Serbian hegemony (a common sentiment apparently) and the nationalist claims of Draskovic, the two parties formed an alliance called the Front of Macedonian National Unity to face the upcoming elections of November 1990. There was much controversy surrounding the elections but it appeared that ultimately Georgijevski's party emerged victorious with 37 seats out of a possible 120 in the assembly. This party, however, split into two factions in January of 1991 when Vladimir Golubovski challenged Georgijevski for the leadership.<sup>59</sup>

From this brief overview of the changes in leadership throughout Yugoslavia, two things become very clear: (1) Milosevic was not the undisputed leader of the Serbs in Yugoslavia or even the voice of Serb nationalism; and (2) many varieties of nationalisms, both inter- and intragroup, were on the rise, turning the political landscape into a virtual free-for-all as factions arose to challenge the existing power structure. The fall of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc had severely undermined Communist authority to the point where Yugoslav Communists came to realize that they could no longer unilaterally hold onto their power. Their only hope for survival lay in allowing the existence of oppositional parties and opening elections

to a multiparty system. They were gambling that their opposition would be weak and fragmented and that the masses would continue to support them as the incumbents. Unfortunately for the Communists, they had underestimated their opposition and overestimated their own support. Communism could not unify the country in the face of nationalism which was causing the various peoples of Yugoslavia to forsake one another and pursue their own sectional interests.

Slovenia and Croatia were the first republics to secede in the summer of 1991. Federal tanks moved out of their barracks within twenty-four hours of the declaration. Slovenian defence forces and police fought back with barricades and antitank weapons. The European Community sent in negotiators to attempt to work out a truce between the Slovenians and the federal government. The United States and European Community refused to acknowledge Slovenia's independence at first, although this was a temporary situation with recognition forthcoming in the long run.<sup>60</sup> More vicious fighting broke out in Croatia after its announcement of secession, largely due to the size and territorial concentration of the Serbian minority within that former republic. Yugoslav Army troops moved from Slovenia to Croatia and United Nations peacekeeping troops were sent in. Croatia has been formally recognized as independent by Canada, the United States and the European Community. A ceasefire was eventually achieved, after Serbs seized one-third of the territory, consisting mainly of their enclave.

Bosnia declared its independence in October of 1991, evoking great resistance from the Serb population. Under the leadership of Karadzic, they have fought with the Muslims for over a year, taking over approximately 70% of the former republic's territory. Since the Muslims were largely urban, while the Serb population tended to be agrarian, there is some validity to the Serbs' claim that they are simply securing their own land. Thus far, there has been no success in the negotiation of

a ceasefire and peace for Bosnia, despite the concerted efforts of Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance. Croats and Muslims, formerly allies, have recently engaged in fighting, while Serbs and Muslims continue their combat in other regions of Bosnia.

Macedonia declared its independence in 1991 but has failed to gain recognition by the majority of the international community due to pressure from Greece which fears that an independent Macedonia would have designs on Greek territory occupied by its own Macedonian minority. Kosovo Albanians have also declared their independence but only Albania appears enthusiastic about such a declaration. This is likely due to the fact that international recognition of the independence of a region within a Yugoslav republic (and Serbia and Montenegro continue to call themselves Yugoslavia) would have serious repercussions for the territorial integrity of both Croatia and Bosnia. Serb-controlled regions in both republics have proclaimed their own independence but this has not so far been recognized because these regions ostensibly belong to the "independent" states of Bosnia and Croatia: international recognition of Kosovo would logically have to lead to the same recognition for the Serb-controlled territories.

Oppositional factors within the former country of Yugoslavia have had a major influence on the current events unfolding before the eyes of the world. The extreme devolution of power to the republics under the Yugoslav federal system which deprived the federal government of most of its power, coupled with the rotating, ethnically-represented presidium, rendered the centre virtually redundant. Nationalisms arose in response to other nationalisms which then created a backlash in the former, arousing an endless spiral which ripped apart the country. However, external factors also played significant roles in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The fall of the Soviet Union and the liberation of the Eastern bloc from its former subjugation have already been mentioned as important influences on the situation in

former Yugoslavia. The secessions of the former Baltic republics from the Soviet Union probably played a large part in the decisions of Slovenia and Croatia, as well as the willingness of Western nations, such as Austria, to negotiate closer economic and political ties with republican governments. The former Yugoslav republics had both a precedent and support for their secessions. Economic conditions underscored matters in the country, making people more sensitive to political issues. Historical factors were also involved because they offered possible precedents for future circumstances and otherwise helped people to interpret what was happening within Yugoslavia.

Germany's influence on the European Community probably dealt the final blow to Yugoslavia. By being the first country to recognize Croatia and Slovenia as independent states and taking the stance that any use of force in that area was unacceptable, it set the tone for the policies of the other members of the Community. Such policies included economic sanctions being imposed on Serbia, because it was perceived that Milosevic was the master puppeteer pulling all the Serb strings, and an arms embargo. The United States joined in, employing the same policy measures. The Vatican recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in January of 1992, conveniently ignoring similar declarations among non-Catholic peoples in the former Yugoslavia. When the European Community and the United States recognized the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina in April of 1992, they inadvertently set the stage for the destruction of the former republic, since it had so much to lose with independence due to the historical claims made on its lands and peoples by Croats and Serbs. The United Nations approved the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and NATO, the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe and Western Europe imposed a naval blockade on them as well.<sup>61</sup> In addition, the strict adherence by the West to the principles of the Helsinki Accord (for example, that no

boundaries would be changed by force) and internal disagreements and ambivalence among Western governments about intervention helped to create greater upheaval.

All of these Western policy measures were designed to apply pressure on Milosevic to make him put an end to the civil war and curb the nationalism of the Serbs. However, the Western powers did not seem to realize that the various leaders of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia were not simply Milosevic's minions, that they, indeed, had minds of their own and personal causes for which to fight. Western governments also failed to foresee the kind of backlash their measures would precipitate among the Serbs; they underestimated the level of paranoia such actions could generate as the Serbs watched their former allies turn against them to lend their support to previous enemies. The West seems to find it difficult to understand the spirit of the Serbs which makes them increasingly defiant in the face of adversity. It has seriously miscalculated the depth of the grievances Serbs nurtured over the postwar years in Yugoslavia. Of course, the role of Western media cannot be ignored as they presented obviously biased reports of events in Yugoslavia, denying any and all validity to Serb claims, portraying them as barbarous monsters who turned on their former countrymen for no credible reason. An example of such misleading reports is that of the "breadline massacre": Western media immediately denounced Serbs for firing on Muslim civilians waiting to purchase bread in Sarajevo; shortly thereafter, the UN verified that it had actually been Muslims who had shelled their own people, information which the media rather quietly conveyed to the public. In short, the often misguided and misdirected efforts of the West have helped to escalate the civil war rather than alleviate it.

Our discussion in this chapter has attempted to highlight the insights to be gained from the macro approaches to nationalism by using the former Yugoslavia as a case study. We have looked at the factors which led to the emergence of social

movements, such as the inadequacy of institutional guides, the rise of leaders to articulate the grievances of certain groups, social and political factors which provided fertile ground for discontented individuals to mobilize collectively for change, and the presence of ideologies. The generation of ideologies was significant because it helped to bridge the gap between private matters and public issues, using the powerful tool of nationality or membership in an ethnic group. Thereafter, people could point to a specific reason for the troubles they were experiencing and find scapegoats for them. Most importantly, we looked at oppositional factors, both within the country and outside, which contributed not only to the events leading up to its disintegration, but also to the evolution of the civil war itself. Opposition forced some peoples apart while it drove others together. Ethnic identities became even more salient as individuals and groups experienced opposition while ideologies gave them a framework for interpretation and an agenda for action. Viewing events using these macro approaches assists us in understanding how the soil was fertilized to spawn such violent nationalisms in former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, we are left to ponder why these conditions did not produce identical results; that is, why did so many factions arise within groups and why was not every member of each group aroused to the same extent? For answers to these questions, we must turn from the observation of aggregates to the "verstehen" of individuals. In the following chapter, we will meet individuals through the device of interviewing to discover how social self-identity played a role in the nationalisms of former Yugoslavia.

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43. This is where the Battle of Kosovo was fought in 1389 wherein the Serbs were defeated by the invading Turks. Five hundred years of oppression under the Ottoman Empire followed.

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## CHAPTER V

### FINDINGS

This chapter will present the findings gathered primarily from face-to-face interviews conducted with six subjects, descriptions of whom have been provided in Chapter III. These findings will be augmented by those garnered from numerous informal conversations, both in person and over the telephone, as well as those extrapolated from various media reports and interviews. The goal behind the gathering and analysis of these findings is to determine from the individuals themselves how they feel about nationalism vis-a-vis the current conflict in Yugoslavia. We were most interested in ascertaining whether these people could provide empirical grounds for the revised model of nationalism proposed in Chapter II.

As has already been stated in Chapter III, to discover how people feel about particular issues must be achieved through discussions with them. The study of aggregates does not provide the human face for which we are searching. Our search must take us to the subjects themselves. Only an individual like the young Serbian warrior from Knin can offer the insight that the fighting between the Serbs and the Croats in the Krajina region, in his opinion, does not represent nationalism. "It is not nationalism," he stated firmly. "It is just people fighting for their homes. Nobody can take away your home. It's yours and that's all. People will fight for their homes."<sup>1</sup> What this young man, who led a unit of ten men in the combat zone, describes as "just fighting for your home" could easily be taken as -- and, for the most part, is taken to be just that -- nationalism by an outside viewer. A man named "Zjelko" (probably a misprint or misspelling of "Zeljko") was quoted in an interview in Harper's Magazine as saying, "'I don't fight for nationalism -- I sleep with girls of all nations. I don't fight for religion -- God is no place. I fight because I want to be back down there [Sarajevo] with my books and my CD player and my Gitane cigarettes.'"<sup>2</sup> Such illustrations bring out the pertinent question of whether we can

justifiably attach a label to a particular phenomenon because to us, as outside observers, it resembles something we know, or whether we must listen to the voices of those intimately involved in the phenomenon and accept their view as a viable reality.

On the topic of nationalism as a *psychosocial* manifestation, we know that myths regarding the "golden age" of the past are promulgated, that cultural and territorial integrity are involved with the way people feel about their "nation" or ethnic group, and that self-esteem and social self-identity are part and parcel of the collective identity. This becomes ever more clear when we read that "a furniture designer in his forties" told a journalist: "'We, the Serbs, are the oldest and the most courageous people in the Balkans, but Communism oppressed us. Now we do not want Islam to make us backward. Muslims are primitive; they want our women to wear a veil. Unlike the Islamic mujahideen, the Serbs do not want to impose themselves or the Orthodox religion upon anyone.'"<sup>3</sup> Such statements, for the most part, could have been uttered hundreds of years ago, when the Serbs were threatened by the encroaching Ottoman Turks and gallantly struggled to keep their lands and way of life. Yet, for him, they are just as true for today as the Serbs and Muslims wage armed combat against one another, killing the very people with whom they have, in essence, each lived for decades. Another man, harkening back to previous wars and referring to the "myth" of the Serb warrior, told the same journalist: "We are heavenly people because more of us are in heaven than on earth."<sup>4</sup> The implication that Serbs are martyrs and have always been so is unmistakable. It seems evident that this man is invoking a justification for why he and his Serb compatriots are, yet again, taking part in a bloody war. Perhaps it is to save his own sense of self-esteem as an individual and as a member of a particular group. Another similar justification comes from the aforementioned Zjelko: "'Serbs, we are just like Jews. We are God's

people, chosen to suffer. Hungarians, Turks, Germans, Germans again. Now it is Croats and Muslims. So you see, always we are victims.'"<sup>5</sup> Equating Serbs with Jews gives them the same long-suffering, martyr-like image; we are led to understand that Serbs have been oppressed for many, many years and that it is time to stop being victims. Such an interpretation of Serbian activity is in direct contrast to what most of the Western world believes, but, if this is the interpretation of this man as an individual and as a member of the Serb ethnic group, it is difficult to deny it. Who can properly arbitrate claims of oppression?

General Ratko Mladic, commander-in-chief of the Bosnian Serb army, in a Globe and Mail interview, talked about the "1.4 million Serbs [who] gave their lives for the second Yugoslavia" (i.e., post-World War II) and that "one out of every three Serbs gave his life" during the First World War to create the first Yugoslavia. According to the article, Mladic admitted that it was this history that provided a "driving force" for the Bosnian Serbs. It seems that Mladic considers himself to be continuing that heroic legacy and is proud of that fact. He appeared angered by Western accusations, responding, "'Who has the right to call me a war criminal when I was born here? These lands have belonged to us for centuries.'" His deep attachment for the land, or the territory occupied by Serbs, something which crops up time and again among the Serbs, is his vindication in his own eyes. Presumably it is excusable to be fighting for such a noble cause as the land of your ancestors rather than mere self-interest. In the article, Mladic also recounted the painful story of a lifelong friend, a woman whose hand had been cut off when she was only two months old by unnamed mutilators during the Second World War, demonstrating how the personal attachment to a significant other can arouse our own feelings of who we are and what kind of people we are, causing a particular social self-identity to come to the forefront and become the most salient one. It is possible that the emotional tie created in him a

ground for nationalist sentiment to grow.<sup>6</sup>

However, although it would seem that nationalism has caused ethnic groups to completely forsake one another and turn entirely inward, and that hatred and intolerance for one another are the order of the day, we read about people like Marica Josipovic, a Serb from a predominantly Croat town in Bosnia, who had to leave her home and husband behind when she fled for safety, telling a journalist for Time that "neither she nor her husband has any interest in killing neighbours with whom they have lived harmoniously for years." This same woman left her goats in the care of her Croat neighbours and recounted that conscripts of both militias (of whom her husband is one) "sneak home at night to guard their own property, often standing shoulder to shoulder; when the sun rises, they report for duty in opposing camps."<sup>7</sup> In the same article, we read about a Muslim businessman from Sarajevo who states, "'I grew up with Serbs. We chased women together when we were young.'" He goes on to accuse Serb leaders of promoting the ideology that any Serb who does not join in the battle in Bosnia is a traitor.<sup>8</sup> The ubiquitous Zjelko adds his own dimension to this version of reality. He is fighting in the hills above Sarajevo at the time of writing, ostensibly killing Muslims whenever possible, yet he is quoted as saying that he does not "bear his former neighbours any personal grudge. 'We still talk all the time,' he said. 'On the radio.' The two sides shared frequencies; when not trading gunfire, they swapped insults."<sup>9</sup> Such sentiments seem anachronistic in an internecine war which has been repeatedly described as a "bloodbath". We expect to hear people saying things like "'Killing Serbs is hard work. When we fight, it is an eye for an eye. No compromise,'" uttered by a Croat paramilitary fighter in Mostar, Bosnia. Or the Croat peasant who told a European Community monitor, "'Dead Serbs are good for my crops.'"<sup>10</sup> These are the dimensions of nationalism with which we are more familiar and which we have come to expect. After all, does it not make

sense that people who are killing one another simply because they belong to different ethnic groups should hate one another? Apparently this is not necessarily the reality. Hence, we must admit that there is a more sophisticated psychosocial mechanism at work in some cases under the rubric of behaviour we have called "nationalism".

Perhaps we must consider that nationalism may, indeed, require forsaking all others but not hating them; perhaps nationalism has more to do with historical circumstances and oppositional and/or structural factors than with simple hatred and intolerance. There is the possibility that social self-identity, both at the individual and collective levels, demands that certain actions must be taken for its preservation which may, fortunately or unfortunately, require that others not of the group be sacrificed. Perhaps when the threat to self-identity is perceived as being so great, individuals believe they must form clear ties with similar others in an effort to preserve it collectively, no matter who else's identity must suffer in the process. Maybe other aspects of the individual's identity must also suffer for a time to protect the one that has become salient. In the case of one Serbian woman from Mostar who fled to a refugee camp, identity was sacrificed almost completely: "'I've lost my identity. I'm no one now.'" <sup>11</sup> Others who feel that the ethnic identity is not worth sacrificing other self-identities, like the conscientious objector cited in an article in The Globe and Mail, may go to extremes to protect their personal integrity -- like committing suicide. <sup>12</sup> Some, like the liberal, antiwar members of the Belgrade Circle, a group of intellectuals and professionals, meet and stage protests against Milosevic and his government. They revile the actions of their Serb counterparts in Bosnia, calling the actions taken by Serbs there "genocide". One member stated, "'This is a struggle between modern Serbia and primitive Serbia, and primitive Serbia has modern Serbia on her knees.'" <sup>13</sup> Evidently the Serb identity of such people is



moderated by the strong presence of other self-identities in their psychosocial makeup, something which causes them to behave in ways we would not call "nationalist". Their ethnic identity is not threatened to the point where they would be willing to participate in the actions of the other Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia; it may be argued that it is the level and diffuseness of their self-esteem that play a role in the choices such people have made.

We have already observed the influence of *leaders* and *ideology* in some of the above-noted comments, specifically those referring to the characterization of Serbs unwilling to fight as being "traitors" and to the struggle between "modern" and "primitive" forces in Serbia. A stronger sense of this influence is demonstrated by the Serb peasant family from Croatia seeking a new home in Serbia when the husband states, "'Until a few years ago, we never thought about who was Serb and who was Croat. Now we are told it makes all the difference if you light a white candle in church instead of a yellow candle, or cross yourself with three fingers instead of two. A whole life in my town, thrown away. For what?'" Yet, his teenaged son, evidently feeling the effects of ideology in a somewhat different manner from his father, declared, "'Yugoslavia was just a bad dream. Serbs will never live together with those animals again. Never forever.'"<sup>14</sup> A Muslim from Tuzla, Bosnia, told a Time journalist, "'I don't understand anything anymore, and neither does anyone else. It's the politicians who have made this mess.'"<sup>15</sup> Evidently there are those who perceive that, whatever people may or may not have felt, or whatever their ethnic identity might have been prior to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, leadership and ideology were significant factors in the evolution of the civil war. Leaders and the ideologies they disseminated helped to divide individuals into opposing camps and provided interpretations of the situation and the character of the opposition, in addition to showing them the way to remedy the problem.

*Structural factors* are brought into focus by the half-Serb, half-Slovene man from Sarajevo, whose wife is Muslim, when he describes the role played by the demand for multiparty elections in Bosnia and the resulting election of November 1990. The implication is that such freedom to vote for the party of one's choice rather than just the Communist Party, and the appearance on the political landscape of many different parties with various agendas, led to political and social splintering. He states that his acquaintances voted for ethnic parties: "'At that moment, it seemed like a political game. It was like a marriage quarrel: you say an ugly word to me, I'll find an uglier one to throw back at you. No one imagined it would end like this, and everyone I talk to says he'll never again give his vote to an ethnic party.'" The influence of history was felt by the same man who argued with his Serbian mother over which group deserved the blame for the interethnic warfare. The mother, who had witnessed the slaughter of members of her family at the hands of the Ustashi during World War II, became incensed enough to call her own son an "Ustasha".<sup>16</sup> Once again, we see how history plays an important role in the way people perceive their present reality and the current events of their lives. Structural factors, including history, the "opening up" of the political system as Communism in Yugoslavia lost its hold over individuals, and the struggle for "democracy", already being waged by their Eastern European neighbours, compounded the other phenomena at work in the lives of the Yugoslavs and assisted in precipitating the conflict among them.

General Mladic indicated the importance of both external and internal structural factors when he was interviewed for The Globe and Mail. External factors included what he called the "betrayal" of former compatriots who were willing to enter into combat to secede from Yugoslavia and the "ignorant and misguided" efforts of Western powers which have denounced only the Serbs for their part in the civil

war. Mladic also believes that Germans and Muslims are conspiring to divide Europe between them and that, while the rest of the world naively stands by, only the Serbs are fighting to save themselves -- as they have been doing for five hundred years. He railed against the myopia of the Serbs which did not permit them to see the sad state of the Yugoslav federation or to prepare adequately for their own defence, declaring, "'Yugoslavia would never have been lost if Serbs were not blind to Croat and Muslim deceit.'" This was one of the internal structural factors cited by Mladic, along with the fact that Serb army officers had been repeatedly passed over for promotions in favour of Croats and Muslims during Tito's rule.<sup>17</sup> These structural components, at least for General Mladic, were significant in terms of the creation of the current civil war because of their effect on the people who were touched by them. Perceptions and interpretations were shaped by the structural factors present; such factors, in effect, set the stage for the way in which people would perceive and interpret their context. Structural factors, both external and internal, provided the oppositional element in the equation which served to solidify intragroup relations and intergroup rivalries.

Having undertaken this preliminary discussion, we shall now turn to the interviews and observe what the interviewees perceived to be the factors that contributed to the civil war in former Yugoslavia and the rise of various nationalisms.

#### Psychosocial Factors/Self-Identity

As we saw from Chapter II and the review of literature on social self-identity, human beings are usually a collection of various identities, stemming largely from the roles they play in society and the way these roles are integrated into their personal conceptions of themselves. Self-esteem may be high or low, specific or diffuse, based

on how much gratification we receive and from how many sources. Emotions are profoundly significant in terms of identifications we make with others and how we interpret any given situation. The culture in which we live provides us with symbols that take on salience and help us to form our sense of self, as well as to express it. Hence, social self-identities are contextual: they become active when the setting or time is right for them while others recede into the background. When the integrity of self-identity is threatened, we will go to great lengths to protect it, for this integrity is deeply felt and just as deeply desired. Because we become unique individuals by identifying ourselves with groups, collectivities are intrinsic to individual psychosocial well-being. In other words, our personal well-being is intimately interwoven with the well-being of the groups with which we identify. If we come to believe that one of the groups in which we claim membership is being threatened, such a threat becomes very personal; it is a threat to our own integrity.

Dr. George Vid Tomashevich, an anthropologist, eloquently summed up nationalism as follows: "It is the inflammation of a group's collective spirit which comes and goes but tends to persist as long as foreign bodies, i.e., irritants, are present." He believes that nationalism is inevitable, regardless of whether Western nations approve of it, because "group identity has not been transcended yet to a panhuman identity. Since we are all still divided along cultural factors, it is unrealistic for some nations to ask others to forego this." Another reason for the perpetuation of nationalist sentiment, according to Dr. Tomashevich, is that, when "your own group is under attack, [this particular identity] will transcend all other identities -- especially when threatened with extermination."<sup>18</sup> Such a comment illuminates how social self-identity is a collection of identities and provides an example of why, under certain conditions, one identity would take precedence over the others. Furthermore, the element of opposition and how it works to promote

identity and collective solidarity are highlighted by these statements.

Most of the interviewees believed nationalism to be a feeling embedded in the hearts and minds of individuals that required the right moment or context in combination with leadership to be stimulated. Marijan simply stated that nationalism was a concept associated with one's nationality and how much importance one gives to it, nothing more. Paul stated that nationalism was like a family feeling — that the nation was like a large family and nationalism was the same kind of feeling one had for one's family. Nationalistic feelings stem from the need to belong and the ethnic group provides us with a focal point for that need; that is, we seem to be able to relate better to members of our own ethnic group. Nationalism is also a survival mechanism for Paul. We can ensure our survival personally and as a species through this mechanism because it gives us a reason to band together and fight off threats. He illustrated his point by providing an analogy of a family at a Serbian dance where everyone, including the family, is Serbian. A member of the family may have criticisms of the others, but there is still a sense of pride and belonging to that family. If that member hears someone outside the family criticizing it, he/she will defend them, right or wrong, because that is his/her own group and his/her identity is wrapped up with that group. Thus, even though the outsider is a member of the same ethnic group, he/she is not a member of the family and poses some sort of threat to the family identity and, in this way, to the individual family member's identity as well. This is nationalism on the micro level, according to Paul. The same sort of dynamics operate on the larger scale when the family is an ethnic group within society.

Jovan states that nationalism is stronger than any other desire; it is virtually uncontrollable, but is capable of controlling people. It is a powerful feeling stemming from culture and a particular way of life. Nationalism can develop in multicultural

societies like Canada where there are no deep, longstanding traditions or in countries like Yugoslavia where ethnic roots are profound. Nationalism can be a good thing if it means keeping ethnic culture and religion alive or when it is more like patriotism; but, when it becomes aggressive and chauvinistic, it is a highly destructive force. According to Jovan, nationalism is not an ideology, people do not have to be conscious of it to feel it; it does not take root in the hearts and minds of people through propaganda but through symbols and striking deeply-felt chords in people. Also, for Jovan, nationalism requires a specific moment in order to flower. An organized movement cannot be successful if the feeling is not already inside people and if the time is not right for it. Jovan also stressed the fact that groups are divided amongst themselves as well, that not all members of an ethnic group or nationality will have the same vision of what is right for the group to fulfil its nationalistic goals.

For Milan, nationalism stems from the fact that individuals fall into categories of people or groups with certain religious and ethnic characteristics. Nationalism depends on how strongly people want to protect their own, how deeply they feel for their own group, how deeply they understand it. He stated that he was raised with an ethnic identity and believes it is very important (even though he actually believes being a nationalist is not a good thing), especially for Serbs because throughout history they were always being chased, persecuted, attacked by outsiders. The implication is that he feels it is necessary to stand up for his people because he is part of that historical current, it is part of his legacy as a member of the group.

For Tony, nationalism is the way a group of people "says who they are". It cannot simply be a feeling, because some people will feel one way while others will feel another. Croatian nationalism started a long time ago because people were trying to say who they were. According to him, nationalism is not political, politics is something else. He is a Croat, but not from Croatia proper, and his family moved to

Serbia when he was quite young. He recounted how the children had teased him and made fun of him, calling him an Ustasha. Upset, he had had to go home and ask his mother what that was. "A real Croat will not go along with fascism," he stated firmly on that subject, evidently distancing himself from the whole matter. Tony had also had difficulties finding a job when he had finished school, saying that he thought it was because of his nationality. Furthermore, his father had been passed over for promotions in favour of Serbs even though his father had been in the Party. In these ways, Tony had always perceived latent conflict between Serbs and Croats.

Peter stated that nationalism can only exist among "nations", those peoples who have their own language, history and culture. His use of "history" implies that they have at one time or another existed independently, presumably in their own state of some kind. Yet, a nation does not have to have a state, according to him. In addition, nations are much greater than mere ethnic groups because the latter are just small groups of people within a larger state. Using this definition as a point of departure, Peter stated that Muslims in Yugoslavia cannot have nationalism because they do not have their own language or culture. Further, he believes nationalism to be a feeling, a kind of pride; if nationalism is nothing more than an ideology, then it can become fascism. Nationalism has to be created or socialized, it is not simply an innate quality. Serbs are not nationalists, according to Peter, because they would not be in their present situation if they were. Serb nationalism arose spontaneously because of fear of the other groups. Only Serbs were ever "Yugoslavs" in the former country; they respected their government because they have always had their own state, with the exception of the years spent under Ottoman rule. Peter thinks we are all nationalists to some extent because we are raised in certain contexts; however, when nationalism becomes chauvinistic, that is "something else". He said that some groups of people cannot be nationalists without chauvinism because they have nothing else to

distinguish them but their hatred of certain others. According to him, Serb nationalism is the kind that "the harder you press, the more it jumps". For instance, if the world is going to accuse them of ethnic cleansing, then they are going to do it. They are just defending themselves, but presumably they will become aggressors if they are pushed into it. Peter believes that nationalists undergo a change in identity because they look into the past and hope they will be glorified like the heroes of old.

Another acknowledgement made by the interviewees was that there had always been some nationalistic sentiment expressed in Yugoslavia. Milan recalled when he was a youth a Serbian goalie on a Croatian soccer team that he followed had left the team and gone to Belgrade; immediately thereafter Milan had heard that Croatians were swearing at Serbs and hurt them and he was shocked by this kind of action. He said, "Croatian people start all the time," and explained that there had always been vandalism in Croatia whenever a Serb had displayed an ethnic symbol or if anyone had said he/she was a Serb. Croatians were always "boiling", according to Milan.

Tony, a Croat, stated:

Serbs are allowed to wear the red star, they put the Chetnik symbol on it -- no problem -- [even] if they are Communist. With Serbs, everything goes. When the Communists ruled in Yugoslavia, Serbs, they know who they are, but everybody else was different story. I give them credit there -- to Serbs. They fooled everybody for fifty years. They did and they're doing it now. I give them credit there. They did it right -- getting army, get organized, get so much money from Croatia and everybody else -- pile up over there and build everything up.

He seemed to believe that only the Serbs had been allowed to be openly nationalistic, although there had always been nationalism in Yugoslavia among various groups and this could especially be observed in the army, when men would band together with other members of their ethnic groups and keep to themselves. Tony said that "probably everyone feels some nationalism and you want to be free to express yourself and represent a large group of people."

Peter believes that every other group in Yugoslavia was allowed to be



nationalistic, except the Serbs. Indeed, it was very fashionable to be a Croat or a Slovene, but a Serb could only be a Communist or a Yugoslav, otherwise members of the other groups in the country screamed hegemony. In fact, according to him, Serb nationalists — and only Serb nationalists — were jailed in Yugoslavia. When asked why Serbs would tolerate such discriminatory practices, Peter responded that it was because the West had abandoned the Chetniks during World War II and the Serbs had felt compelled to embrace Communism. He is referring to the fact that the Allies swung their support over to Tito and his Partisans near the end of the war, leaving the Royalist forces and their supporters without assistance. The Partisans won the civil war; it was they who were left to rebuild Yugoslavia after World War II.

Jovan also stated that he had experienced nationalistic sentiments while he had lived in Yugoslavia. He had always felt uncomfortable about that sort of thing because he had considered himself to be Yugoslav. But every group felt oppressed from time to time, especially when times were tough. Serbs blamed Muslims and Muslims blamed Serbs if any of them could not get a job. He had known of some small secret societies but had never thought they amounted to much. He explained that nationalistic sentiments could be felt in simple ways on the streets and sometimes in "unhealthy" situations; for example, if people were sitting around discussing nationalism, they could be intelligent and intellectual about it, but, once they started drinking and the group was even slightly nationalistic, pure emotion took over.

Paul had visited Yugoslavia in 1989 before nationalism had really burst on the scene. In Sarajevo he had been hanging around with Muslims and could not believe that they hated Milosevic. In Vojvodina people had loved Milosevic, but in Sarajevo they hated him because he was Serbian. He had immediately thought about the fact that he, too, was Serbian. In Sarajevo Paul had experienced nationalistic sentiments among the Muslims.

When asked whether they had been nationalists in Yugoslavia or were nationalists now, Jovan and Marijan said they had not been before and did not consider themselves to be now. Jovan said that he had, from time to time, gotten "excited" over nationalistic things but that he had not liked it. He did acknowledge that it was not really fair to say that everyone had suffered the same during the Second World War because that was not true: Serbs and gypsies had suffered the most. Previously he had believed that if that was the price a nation had to pay to achieve something greater (i.e., Yugoslavia) then it was all right to say that everyone had paid the same price. However, now that nobody seemed to be for unity in Yugoslavia anymore, he feels a strong desire to say that it was Serbs who died during the Second World War and the First World War. But that is not being a nationalist, according to him -- that is just being fair. He denies that he is a nationalist because he does not feel any ethnic hatred. He does admit that, perhaps if he were still over there and he saw a soldier on the street in a different uniform (other than the Yugoslav Army uniform), he might feel differently.

Tony always called himself a Yugoslav because he had married a Serb and so had his brother, but now he calls himself a Croat because Yugoslavia no longer exists; now he represents his nation. He never considered himself a nationalist in Yugoslavia. It appears that here he has very little choice since people have begun to call him an Ustasha. "If you're a Croat, you're right away Ustasha," he complained. Tony's comments draw attention to the fact that social construction plays an important role in the creation of identity.

Peter stated that he is a nationalist and that he derives an identity, a sense of belonging and a sense of continuity from being such. He said, "I don't want to be a pumpkin without roots." He wants to help his people because he feels he must. He believes that socialization has a great deal to do with his sense of nationalism and

considers that, if someone claims to be a Yugoslav, it is because he gets something from being that. He is willing to go very far to see his goals as a nationalist fulfilled; however, if he were still in Yugoslavia, he would not fight because he has a family, even though he would find other ways to help his people, probably in a more humanitarian fashion.

Jovan thinks that everyone in the former country of Yugoslavia has to fight now, whether they are nationalists or not. "If you want to stay alive, you cannot be neutral, you must go one way or the other." He would go to the Serb side, but he would not dress up like a Chetnik. He would be fighting as an individual because he would not feel ethnic hatred, only hatred towards the soldiers who were fighting against him. At this point, Jovan said that nationalism is passed down from one generation to another but it depends on the individual how much he/she will adopt of this legacy. It also depends on the moment and the surroundings in which one is raised. If one lives in a situation for a long time under certain pressure, then surely one will give in to that pressure.

For Jovan, nationalists are people who have not been able to "find themselves" in other ways; nationalism gives them something to be because it is a formula to follow. In Yugoslavia, he believes, successful people are not likely to turn to nationalism unless their economic success is somehow tied to nationalistic concerns. It all boils down to economic matters. Nationalists will die for what they believe in but there are other reasons for that besides money. Economic matters drive one to think about nationalism and can drive one to war, but people do not just die for money. He cited the example of Yugoslavians going off to fight in the Spanish Civil War: people are ready to die for an idea, if it means enough to them. Tough economic times make people very nervous, according to Jovan. They start fighting with their spouses, families, friends, coworkers and then anyone they encounter in the street.

The situation is ripe for blaming other ethnic groups, especially if their political leaders happen to be in power. Jovan is, in essence, making reference to our model when he discusses people who, he thinks, would be most likely to embrace nationalism. He also refers to ideology when he mentions the "formula" these people are able to follow.

Marijan said he was not a nationalist because he had not been raised that way. He has not personally suffered any effects of war and perhaps that is why he has no nationalistic feelings. He becomes very upset when he hears people of his generation spitting on Tito when they were the beneficiaries of his system. He stated that much of the literature on nationalism and Yugoslavia in the West is written by emigres who left Yugoslavia either voluntarily or under duress, so theirs is not a "pure" view, they are biased because of their personal experiences. He said that, if he were in Yugoslavia now, he would defend his own backyard, not for nationalism, but because it is his. He believes 80 to 90% of the people fighting over there now are doing the same thing: defending their homes and nothing else. He said that nothing could induce him to go fight for somebody else, but that he would die to defend his home and his family.

Paul considers himself to be a nationalist, but not a "true" nationalist, the distinction between the two being that a "true" nationalist would not be here in Canada but over in Yugoslavia fighting. If he were in Yugoslavia, he would probably be fighting first for his family, then his town, his region/province and finally for his country as a whole in that order. If he could not justify fighting for his entire ethnic group, then he would not fight at all. But Paul admitted that all these reasons for fighting stem from personal motives; it all started from the self. It is all the same thing: nationalism is protecting your own home on a larger scale. "By protecting my home, if your home gets protected as well, that's a secondary gain," stated Paul.

Yet, for Paul, nationalism is anything from moral support to dying for your ethnic group. "It all depends on how much you love your people," he said. He thinks that Maslow's hierarchy of needs is a good parallel for nationalism: first you fight for your own survival, then you fight for other things. He thinks that nationalism and self-esteem are tied but that nationalism has more to do with a sense of belonging and the need to survive. Paul said it is easy to get ignorant people to take up arms but that more sophisticated people will do so as well if they believe they have the right reason. He does not hate others because of an ideology, but he would kill them for survival. "We can't all survive, someone's got to perish. If that's true, then it's not going to be me," he stated firmly.

Milan, of course, is a dyed-in-the-wool, romantic nationalist and is the first to admit it. He stated that he had not been a nationalist while he had lived in Yugoslavia. However, since coming to Canada and seeing how freely people expressed nationalistic sentiments, he has become one. Milan declared:

I would fight. I would die. I'm different because I was raised there, I know from my grandfather, my relatives -- I know what happened in the World Wars and I see what's going on. When you live there...it's just inside of me. I bet people like I am in Yugoslavia are 80%....It has to do with me. I feel these are my people, my nationality, my pride. I wouldn't let anybody step on them. The reason is simple: Serb people have been dying for years, so why not me? Who am I? If my grandfather died for these people, why shouldn't I? I don't want my grandchildren to belong to somebody else, they belong to me, they belong to the Serbian people. I already asked to go and fight, but they said no. If they called me right now, tomorrow I would go, no question, and I would go on the first line -- because my heart is there. And I wouldn't step back one inch. If I go over there and fight, if they catch me, they would never catch me alive. I would never go into their hands. I would be the toughest I could until I died. I'll go all the way and do whatever has to be done for my people.

Tony made a rather astute observation about the character of the Southern Slavs of the Balkans, one that may offer insight into the current conflict: "You know our people -- could be friends today, drinking together -- tomorrow we gonna kill each other -- like that! [snaps fingers] I don't know why." What is most interesting

is that, after all the disparaging references to Serbs, he still referred to the South Slavs collectively as "our people"; the second part of his statement illustrates vividly the kind of love/hate relationship these people have maintained for generations.

It is worthwhile to summarize the major contributions of this section at this point. One issue that has come through time and again is that nationalism is intimately connected with social self-identity, or how we view ourselves, including the level and diffuseness of our self-esteem. From Dr. Tomashevich's belief that group identity is still as viable as it ever was, regardless of whether some Western nations vindicate it in some instances or not, to Tony's persistent, irresistible reference to "our people", bringing Serbs and Croats together again, we see how important identity is in any discussion of nationalism.

Emotions are also intrinsic to nationalism, as was demonstrated by the fact that nearly all of the interviewees believed nationalism to be a kind of feeling. Paul likened the emotions involved to be similar to those experienced within the context of the family. In essence, we feel close to those who belong to our group because we are alike and because we are all members of the same group; by the same token, people not belonging to our group or "family" arouse defensive sentiments in us if they appear to threaten the group. Jovan posited that the feeling of nationalism comes from culture and way of life, an insight reinforced by Milan's belief that the intensity of nationalism depends on how strongly an individual feels about his/her own group and how much he/she wishes to protect that group. Despite the fact that Tony said nationalism is not a feeling, his conceptualization of it being a way for a group of people to "say who they are" suggests that emotional attachment to a particular culture or collective identity is present; otherwise, there seems to be little reason for the desire to demonstrate such identity. According to Peter, without the sentimental attachment to nationalism, it becomes nothing more than an ideology,

which can then become a dangerous thing. Yet, Peter also believed the feeling of nationalism to be something socialized into people (i.e., it is socially constructed) rather than being inherent in human nature. Another insight offered by Peter is the notion that nationalists undergo a change in identity; that is, nationalism can bestow a hitherto lacking social self-identity or "awaken" one that has been latent.

Most of our interviewees thought that nationalisms had always been present in some form in former Yugoslavia. Peter suggested that only Serb nationalism had ever been de facto outlawed while the others had been "fashionable" and Tony augmented this observation by his own: that it had been apparent in the army especially because men had tended to hang around with others from their own ethnic group. Jovan believed that nationalism had only appealed to those whose identity had been lacking in diversity; in other words, nationalism gave certain people something to raise their self-esteem which was suffering generally in the rest of their lives.

Some of the interviewees called themselves nationalists while the others did not. Those that eschewed nationalism seemed to be those whose identities derived from a sense of being "Yugoslav". This Yugoslav identity may stem from the fact that some of them were from Sarajevo, which was a cosmopolitan, mixed city before the war where Croats, Muslims and Serbs cohabited in relative harmony and intermingled, along with the fact that being from Sarajevo itself bestowed a specific identity on many of its inhabitants, who called themselves "Sarajlije". Another possibility is that some of these men are married to women of other ethnic groups, making it rather more difficult to lay claim to being a nationalist. The ones who called themselves nationalists tended to indicate that such an identity gave them a sense of belonging, being part of a historical entity.

In short, we have all the aspects of social self-identity apparent in the

responses of the interviewees. They demonstrated that emotion, level of self-esteem and desire to protect a possibly threatened identity were at the root of nationalism. Their responses were couched in terms of a need to ensure the integrity of their identities: those who consider themselves nationalists indicated their commitment to their specific ethnic identity and the desire to protect it; those who do not consider themselves nationalists were also protecting their identity which is not connected to their particular ethnic group but to other sources. One of the tools which we use to frame our interpretations and which also provides the content for our interpretations of ourselves and our specific context is ideology.

### Ideology

Two phenomena are intimately connected with ideology: power and praxis. Ideologies are created to deal with power, its acquisition and maintenance. Ideologies are also inherently action-oriented since they are a combination of diagnosis (formulating "the problem") and prescription (delineating the action required to remedy "the problem"). All ideologies are interest-bound because they arise from actual circumstances. There are multiple ideologies in society, but some have the power to become hegemonic and become a type of overarching, all-pervasive value-system; yet, even a hegemonic ideology must always compete against alternatives that attempt to replace its power. Ideologies can become utopian when they seek to destroy the existing order in an effort to achieve their goals. Their greatest power at the individual level derives from their ability to "speak" to us, or to give voice to our idiosyncratic needs, desires, goals, or even shortcomings. In other words, we are more likely to wholeheartedly embrace an ideology when it serves to articulate the



otherwise vague thoughts and feelings we experience.

Another manner in which ideologies gain power is through their moral aspect. When we conclude that what we believe in has a higher moral purpose than mere self-interest, we can be driven to greater extremes in our attempts to realize our ideologies. Nationalism may be a quintessential illustration of ideology because it derives from the material circumstances of a group of people; it vies for power with other ideologies as it presents its platform of diagnosis and prescription, assisting the group in its interpretation of its circumstances; it is often utopian when it aspires to nation-building or, at least, nation-destroying; and it purports to present its agenda based on some moral code, emphasizing the benefits of its programme for future generations. Often the greatest power of ideology is its subtlety; that is, ideology is frequently promulgated in various guises such that people may only subliminally experience its effects.

Despite the fact that most of the interviewees did not deal directly with the matter of nationalism as an ideology, Peter eloquently observed that nationalism is a feeling, a kind of pride. If it were only an ideology, then it could easily become fascism. In this statement he demonstrates the emotional connection involved in nationalism: if it is devoid of emotional content and is restricted to the intellectual, purely cerebral sphere, nationalism can become a form of extremism that is highly dangerous to those whom it excludes. In short, it becomes "heartless".

None of the interviewees thought nationalism was a particularly good thing in and of itself. If nationalism were just a cultural phenomenon to keep ethnic cultures from dying out then, according to Jovan, nationalism might be a positive thing. But for Yugoslavia, nationalism is deadly. Marijan voiced almost the same opinion. Milan stated that he thought nationalism was responsible for all the wars. It is inevitable, according to him. Nationalism will always come back. It takes only one country in the

world to espouse nationalism for the whole world to explode into nationalisms. Nationalism is the most sensitive thing in human beings, Milan said. "I could tell you something hurtful that was personal that would make you mad, but if I say something about you using Serbian, you'd kill me. Because [when that happens], you've brought my nationality into it. You've insulted my entire nation, not just me. You hate my whole nation, not just me," he explained. Nationalism is about drawing a line between people and saying "you're not like us". Paul believes that nationalism is good for survival, but on another level it is bad because of the suffering and persecution associated with it. It is not really a question of good or bad, but "we need to breathe," he stated. Nationalism provides a common denominator to give people a reason to band together for survival; if they do not do that, they will perish.

We can see from the above discussion that, in spite of the fact that few of the interviewees directly addressed the matter of ideology as it pertains to nationalism, there have been numerous indirect references to it, both in this section and in the one preceding. Jovan raised the matter of the subtlety of ideology, stating that it is transmitted to people through symbols and by striking deeply-felt chords. It would appear that the matter of the subtlety of ideology is highly significant from the point of view that few people realize when they are speaking from an ideological position; therefore, ideology is not just a coterie of ideas, it is most importantly a way of viewing the world. With regard to the point that even a hegemonic ideology must struggle against its potential rivals, Tony suggested that nationalist ideologies had always been competing with Communist ideology in Yugoslavia and that the former had prevailed over the latter, presumably because they arose from people's material conditions and "spoke" to them at a deeper level than Communist ideology. Milan provided the insight that nationalist ideology helps to draw the line between groups of people, creating the "us/them" mentality and Paul added that nationalist ideology

bestows a reason for people to band together in groups to ensure their own survival as a collectivity. These statements would appear to support the view that ideology acts as a diagnostic tool as well as a prescription for the curing of perceived ills. Moreover, ideology also assists in integrating the structural factors that influence the evolution of nationalism by setting the stage for it and placing it within a context.

### Structural Factors

Structural factors play an important role in any individual's life. Often we are not even conscious of all the influences in our lives or even how much "the big picture" affects our day-to-day existence. The interviewees all seemed to be very much aware of how "context" or structural factors shaped the rise of nationalisms in former Yugoslavia, as we will see below. The greatest significance of these factors is their "oppositional" character; that is, the way in which these factors work to create opposition for certain groups that, by their very response, may create opposition for others. Once the spiral of opposition starts, it can escalate to vast proportions, leading to untold destruction. We shall see from the following responses that opposition can be real or perceived and that perception is the most significant variable in the equation. The structural factors have been grouped into those external to Yugoslavia and those that were internal.

#### Internal Structural Factors:

When asked about how the political system of Yugoslavia might have contributed to the rise of nationalism, Marijan and Jovan, both recent immigrants, said that they thought the political system had been completely oriented to containing nationalism among the ethnic groups of Yugoslavia. According to Marijan, "brother-

hood and unity" (bratstvo i jedinstvo) among all the peoples was the main goal. There was no sense that any one group was being oppressed or that any republic had greater power than the others. Overt displays of nationalism, like the Croatian uprising of the early 1970s, were immediately and decisively crushed to preserve brotherhood and unity. Marijan believes that his generation (those born in the 1960s) is not predisposed to nationalism because they were raised under that system, but those responsible for the Croatian uprising were of an older generation with different ideas stemming from the system under which they had been raised. He stated at this point that feelings about nationalism probably stem from family upbringing because the children of those involved in the Croatian uprising might very well have nationalistic feelings instilled in them by their parents and they might hate the political system. After Tito's death, when the presidium became based on the ethnic key and presidents came from the various republics, the system of brotherhood and unity began to disintegrate; nationalism started to grow as political leaders started vying for power and special considerations for their own republics/ethnic groups.

While Marijan and Jovan believed that Tito's political system was geared to preventing nationalism, the others appeared to believe that it was largely responsible for helping nationalisms to develop. Paul cited the Communist regime itself as being a structural factor that contributed to the disintegration of Yugoslavia before the rise of nationalisms. Marijan proposed that family history also played an important role since those whose families had suffered at the hands of other ethnic groups would likely still bear animosity towards those groups.

Jovan thinks the Yugoslavian political system was unique and full of beneficial elements for everyone, but that the economic situation in the country brought about the wave of nationalisms. While there was a shared sense of patriotism for

Yugoslavia, everything was fine; the moment people became freer, when they started to create capitalistic enterprises, they began to break away and look to their own interests. Once the economic situation deteriorated, outside interests could move into Yugoslavia and start destroying the system and awakening nationalisms. It is not that economics awakened nationalism per se, but that a space was created so that people could use nationalism for their own ends. Jovan also believes that the whole political system was oriented to keeping overt nationalism at bay, that people were free to express themselves culturally and even religiously, if they wished, but that all ethnic groups were treated equally. There may have been inequalities among people of various ethnic groups, but the system was not responsible for that. The implication here is that inequalities were due to individuals with particular interests and presumably some sort of power or access thereto.

Jovan stated that many people believed that Tito gave power and freedom to the republics and that this led to nationalisms among the various groups, but that in his view this is incorrect. First, the republics were not pure nations, they were all ethnically mixed, and the great mobility allowed in Yugoslavia contributed to people mixing even more in the various republics and even intermarrying. He defended Tito's devolution of power away from the central government on the basis that culturally and geographically the republics were so different that it could not be expected that one set of rules/laws would obtain universally. Greater flexibility was needed to ensure the integrity of every republic. Nevertheless, republican rules/laws still had to adhere to the framework set out by the federal rules/laws. This was functional, not disintegrative.

Milan, on the other hand, who was born in 1940, found the Yugoslavian political system to be repressive. He said he had lived fairly well materially, but that there was no freedom, people could not speak their minds or criticize anything done by

political leaders. Anyone who dared do such a thing or declared any bias towards an ethnic group disappeared overnight. There was a great deal of fear and suspicion of one's neighbours. That situation was good in a way because it kept everyone in Yugoslavia "tight"; that is, they had to cleave together as Yugoslavians and toe the line, so it benefitted the nation as a whole.

The 1974 Constitution was an attempt to destroy the Serbs, according to Milan, because the Serbs were split up and Kosovo was given too much. (Milosevic, stated Milan, is only trying to recoup for the Serbs what Tito took away from them with this Constitution.) Tito was trying to destroy the Serbian people because he knew they were too strong and powerful. That was why he created a nationality out of the Muslims -- to protect himself. He removed all Serbs from high-ranking political office, like Alexander Rankovic (head of the police) and Milovan Djilas, or had them killed, like the then-president of Serbia. As for Serb hegemony, Milan said it was a lie because Serbs have not had any real power since the Second World War except for Rankovic, who killed more Serbs than Tito. The big three of the state at the time were Tito, Kardelj and Bakaric -- two Croats and a Slovene. Tito only allowed "stupid" Serbs to hold any power, people like Stambolic who "didn't know what one plus one was." These three were responsible for building up Croatia and Slovenia, especially Slovenia, because of Kardelj, ensuring that the most and the best went to those republics while very little was left for Serbia and virtually nothing for Bosnia. The whole notion of Serb hegemony is just "Croatian politics", said Milan. People are afraid of Serbs because they are the largest ethnic group and because "almost 80% of Yugoslavia was Serb country" from the thirteenth century empire of Czar Dusan.

The political system definitely contributed to the rise of nationalisms, said Milan. Tito should have kept a tight rein on nationalism for about ten years, then slowly started to give people back their freedom. He should have allowed people to

do whatever they wanted to do in terms of their ethnic groups, as long as they did not attempt to infringe on any other ethnic groups. He gave the Croats greater freedom because of the Vatican, but he did not give such freedom to the Serbs. However, because such a tight rein was held on ethnic expression for so long, once people became freer, they began to hate others of different ethnic groups. "[Tito] should have started in the 1970s to give freedom and I don't think this would be happening now," Milan stated.

Paul stated that the Yugoslavian political system was rotten because it was Communist; that is, just another form of dictatorship. Even though Tito might have had the right idea in bringing everyone together and trying to establish brotherhood and unity, the fact that it was Communist made it wrong. Tito was just continuing what a Serb king had done anyway (i.e., establishing Yugoslavia). The federal system was bad because it cut up Serbia which was stronger than and superior to the other republics. That was Tito's way of creating a balance so he could better control the country. The Communist system indirectly contributed to nationalisms because of the power vacuum created by Tito's death. It was made out to be a fair system but it was not because the people in power were able to do things for their own ethnic groups and by manipulating the national or public trust. According to Paul, political leaders in Yugoslavia were running a "scam" because they held that being against them and their actions was the same as being against the whole country. "You're against me, you're against the whole country and you should go to jail," said Paul. But this only worked for a while until the country was completely broke and unbalanced in the end. There was a lot of wealth in certain areas and not in others; people revolt against that, there is a lot of unrest, and the whole system ends up paying in the long run. The masses revert to nationalism: "That's our family. We're all Serbian. Let's do something that's right for us and our family in order to survive."

Paul believes that Milosevic is manipulating nationalism for his own ends, but it is good to have him because Communists are good for making war; they do anything they want and do not have to answer to anybody for anything. They are also very disciplined. That is what Serbs need. Milosevic was trying to push a war: "Go ahead, make my day, give me a reason." Once Russia collapsed and the Eastern bloc was cut loose, the situation became a free-for-all; Milosevic realized the time was ripe for doing something and that it was in the interests of the Serbian people to do something. He wants to protect the Serbs.

Marijan thought that another factor which might be responsible for the emergence of nationalisms in former Yugoslavia was the suffering some families had experienced at the hands of the Chetniks or Ustashi during World War II. He believes that the descendants of these families would probably bear hatred towards the entire ethnic group to this day.

Regarding the political element, Peter pointed out that decentralization played a significant part in the rise of nationalisms. For instance, the 1974 Constitution crowned the events already taking place in Yugoslavia throughout the 1960s, granting the republics the authority to change their own laws with the exception of Serbia, which was unable to do so because of the de facto republican status given to Vojvodina and Kosovo. Hence, only Serbia could not administer itself. The republican borders which were established were purely administrative, with very little coincidence with ethnic boundaries. Thus, they were not "natural" in any sense of the word. The republics did not represent "nations" because the Serbs were divided into other republics besides Serbia. The authorities did not allow the Serbs to all be together in one republic because then they would have been the largest nation and, hence, a threat to the others. Furthermore, having agrarian Serbs in the more urban or industrial republics meant that the Serbs could supply food for the other groups



which tended to be more urban.

Because of the fear of Serb hegemony, Milosevic's proposal of a "one man/one vote" system was rejected. The Serbs were numerically greater than any other individual group in former Yugoslavia, so a democratic system would have given them the political edge, stated Peter.

Passing references were also made by Peter to, first, the fact that the Serbs constitute a nation which is another reason they will not tolerate minority status in an independent Croatia or Bosnia; and, second, that Western intervention in the affairs of the former Yugoslavia has played a more significant role in the conflict than economic matters. Nevertheless, he feels that the current situation was inevitable, regardless of whether Tito had been living or not.

Marko, a Serb from Serbia proper who was present for one of the interviews, made the observation that it is one thing to know where historically people have lived, it is quite another to claim that territory as belonging to you. Serbs have traditionally inhabited the lands where they live now and, regardless of whether the seceding republics of the former Yugoslavia were granted these lands under any constitutional arrangement, or whether Croats or Muslims moved into them, the lands are still Serb lands. Marko provides yet another vivid illustration of how profoundly attached to the land Serbs appear to be, suggesting that ancestral territory plays a very large role in Serb culture and, hence, nationalism.

An observation made by Tony was that Serbs -- presumably in the guise of the Communist authorities -- "always encouraged outside workers"; that is, they encouraged Yugoslav citizens (presumably disproportionately Croats) to become guestworkers in other countries. The goal of such a promotion was to destroy the numerical equality between Serbs and Croats so that the Serbs could come to dominate in Yugoslavia. This was resented deeply by Croats.

The transition from emotion to action requires the proper context, according to Peter. "It's one thing to say something when your feet are on dry land and another when your feet are in mud," he said. "Those Serbs in Bosnia know from past experience what awaits them just because they are Serbs."

Peter believes that nationalism is a good thing because it makes people fight for themselves and their family and keeps their identity going. "Croatian is good -- everyone's is good -- as long as they don't bother others and try to force others to do things their way," he stated. However, there is a negative aspect to nationalism: "Nationalism is like a Pandora's box -- when you open it up, you never know what you will find."

In Tony's view, the Serbs came into the Balkan region later than the Croats; thus, presumably, they have less claim to the lands than do the Croats. The republics are due to the Communist system; that is, the borders are the creation of that system. The Second World War confused and disoriented so many people that, after the war, when they were moved from one area to another in an attempt by the Communists to mix them up, people almost lost their identity -- but not quite, Tony hastened to add. The Communists had intentionally tried to equalize the numbers of Serbs and Croats in certain areas through their programme of resettling people. Communism promised the land of milk and honey to people, so they were willing to turn away from the Church. Serbs especially embraced Communism in order to reap benefits from it; they took over jobs for which they were not qualified and kicked others out, according to Tony. The Communists had sent Serbs to Croatia to run companies in the name of brotherhood and unity but this strategy never really worked except in theory. "Their ideology [of brotherhood and unity] backfired," said Tony with conviction. Once the Berlin Wall had come down and the Soviet Union had disintegrated, the ideology was there. The ideology he is referring to appears to be

that of the nationalist variety.

Furthermore, according to Tony, the Communists had been planning for the current conflict in Yugoslavia since World War II because "Serbs benefitted most from Croatia's riches, which they then divided amongst everyone, but made sure their army got the most." Since the Serbs had used the old system to support "their" army, they were unwilling to tolerate a change to a confederation.

Tony believes that a confrontation was inevitable between the Serbs and Croats because, although they speak the same language, they are politically very different. These differences have caused conflict between them for many years. Although he did not elaborate on what these differences were, it might be assumed from earlier references to Serbs that he considers them to be somewhat right-wing in contrast to the more liberal Croats. In Tony's opinion, Yugoslavia had been artificially constructed by the European powers in 1918 and, after all this time, people had simply had enough. He also mentioned the fact that the economic crisis of the 1980s had contributed to the current confrontation.

Having looked at some of the structural factors present within the former country of Yugoslavia to examine their effect on the rise of nationalisms, we will now proceed to those that occurred outside the country. External factors are those that are located in the international forum. Even though their effects are specific to former Yugoslavia, their character does not derive from within the country. These factors would include such things as influences from other countries, international politics and economics.

#### External Structural Factors:

Several interviewees mentioned the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe as a factor in the development of nationalisms in

Yugoslavia. Without a common enemy to fear, the various ethnic groups could look inward and turn suspicious eyes on one another.

In Peter's opinion, some of the structural components involved in the rise of nationalisms in Yugoslavia were related to religion and politics. Insofar as religion is concerned, he stated that the Catholics and Muslims were able to organize themselves better than the Serbs since both of those creeds allowed for the discussion of nationalist politics within their organizations while the Orthodox Church did not. He suggested that the nationalism promulgated by the Catholic and Muslim religions was one of intolerance of Serbs. Peter does not believe that Croatian and Slovenian nationalisms are economically motivated but he did comment on the economic factor of market socialism, stating that market mechanisms were only applied to industrial goods, not agricultural, thus disadvantaging the largely agrarian Serbs. As such, the economic factor has distinctively political overtones. Jovan and Paul also mentioned economics as being an extremely significant component of the current situation, although their references appeared to pertain more to the former Yugoslavian economic system within the international context.

The fall of the Soviet Union and the liberation of Eastern Europe, the misdirected interference of Western nations in the emerging conflict (i.e., the recognition of the seceding republics as independent states, the involvement of the UN, European Community and United States in negotiations, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, etc.), religious and economic factors were all discussed by the interviewees as issues that affected the burgeoning nationalisms in former Yugoslavia. All of these matters provided opposition in some way to some group; as one group took action to remedy its situation, it created opposition for another group or groups. The spiral was established and caused the situation to escalate to the point where nationalist mobilizations precipitated the collapse of Yugoslavia.

Mobilization for action to deal with perceived problems is something which usually requires some kind of organization; organization generally calls for leaders; the way leaders present the situation and propose to deal with it (in addition to their own personal agendas) has great significance for the kind of action which will be taken, as we shall see below.

### Organization and Leadership

The conceptualizations of organization and leadership emerge from the literature on social movements. Some form of organization is intrinsic to mobilization. Mobilization evolves from dissatisfaction with the status quo and the decision to effect a certain kind of change — whether that be to prevent or precipitate it. Social movements are inherently political due to the fact that they aim to challenge the power structure and redistribute power to other groups, preferably their own. Leadership plays a vital role in mobilization because leaders create a focal point for the masses and help to disseminate information. Movements open up spaces in society to allow for new identities and frames of reference. They can change institutional guides and frequently reflect the realities in society. They are also a product of their historical times and their contexts. Most importantly, social movements establish the "Other", i.e., by delineating those of the outgroup and the ingroup, and indicating against whom action must be directed. In addition, social movements are forms of interaction on the collective level. Ideology and personal commitment are both significant elements of social movements. Nationalism is a form of social movement for it involves demands and action; thus, organization and leadership are part of nationalism.

Jovan stated that nationalism had to be organized. Marijan also believes it has

to be organized and not just feelings because the Yugoslavian political system had not allowed for nationalism, therefore somebody had to instill it. In order to instill such feelings, nationalists had to be organized because there was no other way of transmitting such information in Yugoslavian society; it was not something readily available.

Milan, however, was adamant that nationalism did not need to be organized -- "if you feel it, you go for it," according to him. He said that he personally has such strong feelings of nationalism, he would do anything, including die, for those feelings. He would die for his fellow Serbians and he believes that "99.9% of Serbs" in former Yugoslavia feel the same way.

Peter also believed that nationalism does not need to be organized -- it is a feeling of belonging -- but it does require leadership for mobilization to occur. The Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia were terrified but for them to take action required that they have a leader. Milosevic only awakened something that was already there. Someone has to come along to awaken the feelings that people already have before they will take action in any collective manner. Long-term leaders are necessary to those nationalists whose nationalism is artificial (i.e., ideological) only. In addition, propaganda is required only by those without history, culture or language. It would appear that the rationale behind Peter's statement is that any nationalism without an emotional foundation and/or material distinctiveness (i.e., those that are not "natural") demands that leaders be present at all times to guide it and ideologues to create and promote it.

Nationalist organizations are interest groups based on national criteria, Peter stated. Nationalists do not have to belong to nationalist organizations to be true nationalists. He is the only one of the interviewees who is actually a member of such an organization and advised that the reason he joined was because the organization

had an agenda which suited his personal views. By being a member of a nationalist organization, Peter feels that he is "doing something for his nation". He does not believe that his organization is a political one because its members are not fighting to establish a state, their goal is greater than that. His organization is a humanitarian one.

According to Peter, leaders and members have the same agenda. In his organization, leaders are only so on paper. The only benefit they derive is that they enjoy seeing their names somewhere. A hierarchy exists within his organization simply because it has a programme of action; "every organization must have a hierarchy to get things done because every stratum must have its own role". His particular organization also allows everyone to contribute although he admitted that those with more money and experience with Croats and Muslims command more attention because they possess greater resources which the organization can utilize.

All the interviewees thought that leaders were very important for nationalist groups. Milan believes that a good leader is essential for the Serbs right now to rally them as a nation because they are fighting for their lives. He despises dissension among the Serbs because that just weakens the nation; the Serbs can argue amongst themselves after the war is won. He loves Milosevic and, the more the world hates him, the more Milan loves him -- because he cares about the Serbs and no one else. Milan believes Milosevic is the most astute politician in former Yugoslavia at the moment because Milosevic waited for the right moment and took advantage of it. Izetbegovic is "history"; the war is over for him and he destroyed his own people because he could have remained a part of Yugoslavia, kept his presidency and nobody would have touched his people. But he let the Croatians, who were supported by the Germans, Austrians and Hungarians (a reference to external factors), push him into a very foolish secession. Izetbegovic still thinks somebody from the outside is

going to step in and help him by attacking the Serbs but he is wrong, according to Milan. The Serbs are too strong because they have a powerful and astute leader.

Paul thinks that leaders provide a focal point for nationalism. The goals of leaders may differ from those of the rank-and-file members but that is what separates good leaders from bad leaders: bad leaders have their own agendas while good leaders are moral leaders of their people, not just self-interested individuals. Good leaders put the interests of their people before their own. He thinks Milosevic is smart, although he reserves judgment at this moment as to whether Milosevic is a moral leader or not; he may simply be self-interested. Only time will tell. Paul stated that Milosevic set up the Croats to pull out of Yugoslavia and that the Croats just played into the hands of the Serbs. If they had not seceded, the Communist system would have deteriorated to such an extent that everything would have collapsed; the military would have collapsed and been divided equally among the republics. The Croats were stupid for seceding because Milosevic pulled the Yugoslav Army out of the republic back to Belgrade and then waged war on the Croats with all the military equipment at his disposal. Paul said, "Serbs should build a temple to Tudjman. Look what he did. What he did was the stupidest thing in the world -- not for us, but for Croats. To secede. He gave us an excuse to pull all the military that's been building for forty years and attack them. The guy ought to be shot -- if I was a Croat. He didn't use his head." According to Paul, the Muslims were even stupider: they saw what happened to the Croats and they seceded anyway. The Muslim leaders took a gamble at a million to one odds; they ruined Sarajevo. For the next hundred years, Sarajevo will be nothing but "a bunch of rubble". The Bosnian secession was good for the Serbs because now the Serbs will take what they want and make a new Serbia.

According to Jovan, leaders are always necessary. They do not have to be



intelligent or competent, they simply have to "sing the right song". Leaders exploit the tendency in human beings to want to blame anyone other than themselves for their own situation. "Even if we know we are to blame, if a leader comes along to blame someone else, people immediately follow that," Jovan stated. A leader must come from the group itself, but he must be an extremist. He must have a strong feeling of nationalism, otherwise he would not know how to present it to the masses. It is not easy for an outsider to come along and use the masses because he would not understand them. All leaders want position. Most people just want a better life and if nationalism presents a better life to them, they will go for it. Cultural traits are used to raise the morale of a group and strengthen their nationalistic feelings in order to better reach their goals. The context is there, but so is the feeling; they are tied together and cannot exist without one another.

Marijan believes that leaders are necessary for nationalism because it cannot develop spontaneously. At the moment when a leader emerges, he can easily influence others if they have lost everything and have nothing further to lose. A good speech can sway these people, especially Balkans, thanks to their nature. There is no nationalistic feeling in people's hearts, there must be some influence from another to turn people around or someone has to really pound nationalism into another's head. Everybody knows who they are, but nationalism comes from the outside: "You're something less because you're whatever and that's no good. Things will be better for you if you follow me and you will have what you want." Promises are made to people by leaders. "Our people are easily led because socialism made them lazy and they lived too well. Someone comes along and promises better [and you follow him], especially if you don't have to work for it," Marijan explained. Leaders always have different goals than rank-and-file members because if their party succeeds, then they get position and power. They become the bosses. They are definitely

motivated by self-interest.

Tony stated with conviction that "only crazy people like Milosevic become nationalists". He believes that ordinary people are not interested in nationalism because they just want to live and be left alone. Only the "big guys", or leaders, want nationalism because they have their own agenda: they want to achieve their own goals and they want power. He noted that all the current nationalist leaders in former Yugoslavia were trained by the Communist system so they all adhered to the same ideology.

Context and national feelings are both necessary, according to Marijan. The side that won in Croatia only won because Tudjman had "the best lines" to gain votes from the people. He was the best talker, but he cannot really do anything for them. Milosevic would not have won in Serbia if there had been better opposition or someone with a better line. It was not nationalism that brought these leaders to power because every leader was preaching nationalism; it was social and economic factors. Tudjman put these things together best. If Tito were still alive, there would be no possibility of this current situation coming about because Tito was the only legitimate leader.

Only Peter among the interviewees was actually a member of a nationalist organization; hence, his observations offered some particularly interesting insights into the role of organization. For example, there is an apparent paradox in the fact that he does not believe that nationalism requires organization, yet he himself joined an organization because its agenda suited his own since he wanted to help his people. We must assume that a mediating factor in this instance is that Peter is outside Yugoslavia; hence, he must join an organization (and, indeed, organizations per se must be formed) in order to lend assistance to the cause of ethnic nationalism. Presumably, if he were actually in Yugoslavia, he would not need to become a member

of an organization because he would not need such an entity to mediate his actions; he could take direct action. However, the question remains as to how effective could the actions of one individual be when nationalism is the cause. Adamantly Peter insisted that leaders and rank-and-file members have the same agenda, regardless of the fact that they do not occupy the same position within the hierarchy; stratification within his organization is only to accomplish tasks, he told us.

Milan seemed to echo Peter's sentiments when he stated that all that was necessary for nationalist mobilization was the feeling, that organization and leadership were superfluous. Jovan and Marijan believed that only organization could have facilitated the growth of nationalisms in former Yugoslavia because the whole system had been established to deny nationalism. Leaders were considered to be absolutely necessary for nationalism for various reasons, including rallying the people, providing a focal point and assisting their followers in the achievement of goals for the good of the whole group. Paul stated that the last point distinguished between good and bad leaders since bad leaders are self-interested and only using the group to achieve their personal goals. Jovan and Marijan suggested that leaders are important because they articulate "the problem" for the masses, who then become ardent followers based on their own self-interest. Tony thinks that only leaders truly desire nationalism because they can aggrandize themselves while ordinary people simply want to live and be left alone. Such a conceptualization does not explain, however, why an ordinary person would follow a leader and embrace nationalism.

Therefore, we are able to see that leadership is very important for mobilization and the achievement of nationalist goals for two reasons: an individual is not capable of effecting such far-reaching changes on his/her own and, in order to succeed in having demands met, some sort of organization, however loose, is required to

delineate those demands and present them in coherent fashion to the proper authority. People running amok, no matter how great their numbers, are rarely able to achieve specific goals. Institutional change is especially difficult without some form of organization because such change is not simply spontaneous and cannot be accomplished in "one-off" fashion. In short, social movements, even in their loosest incarnation, are mandatory when massive change is desired -- or when there is an attempt to stop it.

The frequent references to self-interest should be particularly noted. We get the general feeling that nationalism for the purpose of self-interest, whether it be that of leaders or followers, is not condoned by these interviewees. It smacks of exploitation when nationalism, presumably, is about freedom. Yet, when discussing the definition of nationalism, the interviewees indicated repeatedly that they believed nationalism had everything to do with the self and identity. It is fascinating to observe this paradox in their conceptualizations. What it would appear to suggest is that nationalism is a social end (in spite of the fact that individuals benefit from it) while self-interest is purely selfish (only for the benefit of the individual). The former is acceptable; the latter is reviled.

From all of the above, it is apparent that the major elements of our model of nationalism are present and intimately intertwined. Although the findings were broken down into thematic sections, these were somewhat artificial since there was a great deal of overlap in what the interviewees actually said. Psychosocial factors, or self-identity, were laced with numerous references to structural and ideological elements. The same is true for the discussion of structural factors: references to ideology, identity and organization were frequently intrinsic elements. As such, the interviews eloquently illustrate how deficient any one single approach to the study

of nationalism is; they must be combined, as in the case of our model, to provide an adequate conceptualization of the emergence of nationalism. To that end, the following chapter will undertake a discussion of the model in light of the history of former Yugoslavia and the findings from the interviews and attempt to draw conclusions.

ENDNOTES

1. "Alex" from Knin, Personal Conversation, 27 June 1993.
2. Tony Horwitz, "Balkan Death Trip: Scenes from a Futile War", Harper's Magazine (March 1993): 36.
3. Anna Husarska, "Unsafe Zone," The New Yorker (12 July 1993): 30.
4. Husarska 36.
5. Horwitz 36.
6. Paul Koring, "Painful Memories Drive Serb General", Globe and Mail [Toronto] 28 June 1993: A9.
7. Jill Smolowe, "Land of Slaughter", Time 139.23 (8 June 1992) 18.
8. Ibid.
9. Horwitz 36.
10. Horwitz 41-45.
11. Smolowe 18.
12. Milovan Mracevich, "Among the Serb Opposition", Globe and Mail [Toronto] 10 June 1993: A13.
13. Ibid.
14. Horwitz 38.
15. James L. Graff, "Battle for Bosnia", Time 139.17 (27 April 1992): 35.
16. James L. Graff, "One Family's Torment", Time 139.20 (18 May 1992): 56.
17. Koring A9.
18. Dr. George Vid Tomashevich, Telephone conversation, 6 July 1993.

## CHAPTER VI

### DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The case of the former Yugoslavia offers an excellent illustration for our model of nationalism for several reasons. The first is that there was a variety of ethnic nationalisms in the country, all of which influenced the evolution of others, and were reflexively affected by them in turn. The second is that there were numerous structural factors in evidence, both external and internal to the country, that provided opportunities for some groups and opposition to others. The third reason that former Yugoslavia served as such fertile ground for study is that the conflict generated some very strong opinions among those with ties to the area, affording a wealth of information and spirited opinions to emerge in the interviews that were conducted. Since we could not actually go into the fray, it seemed almost as beneficial to speak to former Yugoslav citizens in this country to gain a deeper understanding of how the rise of nationalisms might affect individuals. The magnitude of the conflict provided the fourth reason; such an explosion of virulent nationalisms in a country that enjoyed relative harmony for more than forty years deserves closer study. The fifth, and final, reason stems from the first two cited above: the multiplicity of nationalisms and structural/oppositional factors produced a fascinating reflexive effect that allowed us to look at the same phenomenon from various angles. In short, former Yugoslavia as a case study for a new model of nationalism granted us a richness of information akin to a research goldmine.

Our model of nationalism attempts to integrate the major structural approaches to the study of nationalism, which address themselves primarily to macro-level factors involved in the phenomenon and the treatment of the human beings who take part in it as aggregates, and the less-popular psychological perspective, which concentrates on how the participants (still paradoxically viewed as aggregates) personally experience nationalism. Our desire was to provide a linkage between the two approaches; the conceptualization of social self-identity was employed as the



linchpin of our linkage because it was the best way to explain why some members of a particular group might embrace nationalism while others would not.

### The Social Movement Approach

Certainly the macro perspectives have given students of nationalism important insights into the matter, a fact we have not omitted from our new model. The literature on social movements aids our understanding of how groups mobilize for action and how they organize themselves to do so. We learned that a social movement is characterized by collective, deliberate action designed to bring about change, that such action must have some degree of organization and that there must be a commitment to the aims and beliefs of the movement on the part of its participants. The word "change" is somewhat misleading in this context, for movements may also form to prevent change from proceeding. Social movements are rarely unidimensional; that is, they encompass a variety of goals and often these goals have a moral ethos. The moral dimension affords a great deal of strength to the movement in general and can lead it down the path towards becoming an antisystemic movement. The moral content of movements is profoundly significant since any action arising from it will affect a great many people. Participants in the movement play a number of roles, including those of leadership and the formulation of ideology.

Social movements are intimately involved in culture for two reasons: frequently they reflect changes already occurring within society and, in addition, they serve to encourage cultural shifts. In their latter guise, movements help to create new spaces in society and bring hitherto undiscussed issues into the public forum. Because of their "mass" character and its accompanying anonymity for participants, social movements can achieve the heights of altruism or sink to the

depths of atrocity. They, therefore, require a certain amount of abandonment of individual social identity to effect the group consciousness. In other words, our sense of "we" comes to take precedence over "I". Yet, we contend that individual social identity is never wholly transcended in favour of that of the group. Individuals do not become mindless, faceless "human matter" over an extended period of time, even if there are brief instances when "mob mentality" may take over. The fact that human beings employ their own frames of reference while participating in movements, using their cognitive skills and individual consciousness to interpret events and situations, assists in ensuring the retention of individual social identity even while individuals take on collective social identity and play their part in generating group consciousness. Hence, we see a dialectical process occurring within movements.

Social movements provide new social identities, both for their participants and society at large, as they create and disseminate knowledge that was not previously present. They themselves are a product of their historical and symbolic context and they, in turn, make contributions to history and culture. One of the most important aspects of this function is the formation of the "Other", or the opponent, be it the government, state, or other groups. It must be remembered that the "Other" is not simply an abstraction; it is a real social actor. The formulation of the "Other" requires that some aspects of reality be filtered out while some are emphasized. Thereafter, social movements are involved in an ongoing interactive process with the "Other" and with other political and social factors.

The presence of social cleavages contributes to the emergence of social movements due to their very nature: people become divided; communication among groups is often virtually non-existent; and there is very little cooperation among them. Such cleavages render fertile soil for movements to spring up because of

various group norms, values and worldviews; social institutions often seem inconsistent with some of these, further exacerbating cleavages. When existing institutions come to be identified with one group, the others will become more estranged and direct their discontent or animosity against those institutions. Hence, organized opposition will entail homogeneous segments of people whose shared values, norms and worldviews will provide the necessary factors to ensure their own solidarity as well as their coherent attitudes towards the institutions in question. Discontent will be amplified if opposing segments have experienced a relative decline in their members' achievements or if members' expectations are rising more than their actual achievements, which may, in reality, be rising as well.

Pursuant to the above, it becomes evident how important organization is for group mobilization. Organization can be based on the "community", wherein members are bound by personal ties, or "association", involving members bound by specific social roles such as occupation or religious affiliation. Intercommunication among members is paramount for effective organization, as is leadership. Organizations frequently rely on subgroups at the local level; such reliance carries its own inherent difficulties since there is potential for disagreements among local subgroups and between the subgroup and the central organization. This potential can result in factionalism which may ultimately determine the fate of the social movement; that is, whether it becomes institutionalized and/or routinized or dissipates. Such insights provide the basis for an understanding of social movements as collections of individuals and groups in an ongoing dialectical process of interaction and interpretation rather than as a seamlessly unified, monolithic entity always working in concert. Although the discussion of the organization of social movements seems to take leadership for granted, we must concede that the presence and character of leaders are crucial elements in any sort of mobilization.

To characterize nationalism as a social movement is a fair assessment based on our understanding of the former as a set of demands related to political change as opposed to simply a sentiment directed towards one's country, homeland or ethnic group. Nationalism only gains power and force when it is taken to the grand scale, entailing many followers. Hence, organization and leadership are crucial requirements for any sort of meaningful, far-reaching achievements. By its very nature, nationalism can be categorized as a social movement since it involves a homogeneous segment of society with shared values, norms and a particular worldview and often a coherent network of communications and community leadership. The communal basis for organization is present in nationalism and the moral component would find fertile ground among the members of an ethnic group and their culture. Since nationalism involves a set of demands for institutional, political change (or to defend the status quo), it also entails deliberate action oriented to attaining these goals. In addition, commitment of individuals is secured by nationalism because it is intimately connected with social self-identity; it gives a new sense of identity through its ideological component and requires some sacrifice of individual identity in favour of the collective one. Previously ignored or unresolved issues are brought into the public forum by nationalist movements which can become institutionalized and/or routinized through the creation of political parties or governing bodies.

Therefore, we may conclude that nationalism does constitute a social movement to some degree when it is characterized as a set of political demands. The case of former Yugoslavia has demonstrated that such a representation was present among the various ethnic groups as their historical grievances took shape in the form of political parties in opposition to the reigning League of Communists. These alternative political parties/movements began to demand multiparty elections, attaining this goal by 1990. However, we must apply a caveat to the social movements

literature here by pointing out that the extant social cleavages among ethnic groups did not result in unified social movements wherein one organization represented all those in a particular sector. For example, in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia, there were several political parties organized around nationalist goals competing with each other. This is also true of Serbia. Although Milosevic emerged in the earliest stages as the leader of the Serbs and provided a focal point for Serb nationalism, we see from a review of the situation that other leaders appeared at the head of other groups with alternative visions of Serb nationalism.

In order to do a comprehensive analysis, we will step back into Yugoslav history before dealing with the present. During the years between the two World Wars, there was much political strife between Serbs and Croats as the latter, represented in parliament by the Croatian Peasant Party, struggled against possible Serb domination. The solution sought by the Croat nationalists was the replacement of the unitary state by a federal one; when tensions mounted sufficiently, the Croats boycotted the Beograd government and established their own parliament in Zagreb. The ultranationalist Ustashi also emerged during this period. In Macedonia, IMRO split into two factions, one demanding that Macedonia be annexed to Bulgaria, the other favouring a Communist Balkan Federation. The Ustashi, in their quest for nationalist goals, took extremely harsh measures against the Serbs and others during the Second World War, while the Serbs split into the royalist Chetniks and the pro-Communist Partisans. These two Serb-dominated groups often fought each other over their alternative visions.

Tito's regime sought to quell the kind of nationalist sentiments that had led to the violent internecine strife which culminated during the war by instituting the policy of "brotherhood and unity" and repressing overt nationalism. Despite these measures there were, nonetheless, displays of nationalism throughout the post-war

period, as well as latent nationalist sentiment that ultimately dictated the terms of the 1974 Constitution. The "Croatian Spring" of the early 1970s was instigated and spearheaded mostly by intellectuals while the Albanian uprisings in Kosovo also involved leadership by the upwardly-mobile segment of that group. As has already been stated, such movements, or at least organized mobilization of ethnic groups, led to the constitutional reforms entrenched in 1974, which gave more power and autonomy to the republics and, hence, the ethnic groups.

Serb nationalism was first led by a group of academics from Beograd with their published Memorandum, but it really only took off when the protests of Serbs and Montenegrins at the Field of Kosovo were legitimated by Slobodan Milosevic. The green light was effectively given to Serb nationalists when a "legitimate" government official endorsed their concerns and offered his support, not just to the people in situ but to all Serbs everywhere. The "voice" given was not so important for its articulation of concerns or ideology, but because it emanated from officialdom. Hence, Milosevic came to be regarded by many as the leader of Serb nationalists and continues to retain such title in the eyes of many — especially those outside former Yugoslavia — in spite of the fact that a number of other leaders at various levels from regional to local have arisen to challenge him and have a considerable number of followers who espouse a variety of visions of the "Serb nation".

Some of the people interviewed openly blamed leaders for actively partitioning former Yugoslav citizens into ethnic groups and turning them against one another. Even families were torn apart by such ideological divisions, a phenomenon amply demonstrated by the "Sarajlija" of mixed descent and married to a Muslim whose Serb mother, in the heat of an argument over which group bore the responsibility for the civil war, called him an "Ustasha". What others perceived as a "political game" of various nationalist parties demanding open elections turned out to be a deadly war

game because, once these organized nationalists gained the avenues of legitimate power, they put their political agendas into effect. Several interviewees stated emphatically that leaders were crucial in whipping up nationalist sentiments among groups of people; a few of these believed that such actions were taken simply to realize leaders' personal agendas and to attain power for themselves, not because these leaders wanted to achieve something for "their people". All of the interviewees reflected the belief, in one form or another, that the present civil war would not have taken place, especially on such a grand scale, if there had not been leadership and organization to mobilize the people and give them a focal point around which to rally. Certainly the secession of republics would not have taken place had nationalism not been organized.

Thus, we have seen how important the elements of organization and leadership are for the nationalisms of former Yugoslavia. The aspect of nationalism that falls under the category of social movement is one that cannot be ignored in a case where a country with a substantial history has degenerated into the kind of chaos where republics have seceded and former neighbours are brutalizing one another. Our overview has highlighted some interesting and rather contradictory matters for consideration, however. The Serbs have demonstrated that their brand of nationalism is no more unified than that of any of the other groups. There is not one coherent movement of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims or Macedonians. Each ethnic group is subdivided into a multiplicity of movements with distinct worldviews and aspirations, although those groups currently engaged in combat may have greater similarities among them. Leaders within ethnic groups are as much in conflict with one another as with those of other groups. It should also be recalled that not every individual ascriptively belonging to any single group is engaged in a nationalist movement of any kind.

The literature on social movements does not engage such anomalous phenomena. It leads us to believe that those with certain sectoral interests will organize in unified fashion, although there may be factionalism within these social movements. What the case of former Yugoslavia suggests is that the competing organizations are not so much factions as distinctly separate groups. These groups have had alternative visions from the beginning and there seems to be little agreement among them, let alone solidarity. If "national" groups provide the most conducive breeding grounds for nationalist social movements because of their shared culture, values, norms and worldviews, then how can we account for all the subdivisions among them, evidently arising from highly differentiated ideologies? And how do we reconcile the fact that many people in former Yugoslavia have chosen to stay out of organized social movements and, as much as possible, out of the combat? Or that some choose solidarity with those who are touted as being their enemies? The literature on social movements, to some extent, preaches about the converted; that is, it tells us many insightful things about those who join social movements. It informs very little when it comes to those who remain outside them or why such people might choose to do so. The motivations of these people are unknown to us and remain unexplained if we attempt to understand nationalism purely from the point of view of organization and mobilization.

### The Ideological Approach

The macro approach which conceptualizes nationalism as an ideology provides us with another way of looking at the phenomenon. At the outset, we should remember that ideology is an integral part of social movements, so we must bear in mind that the "nationalism-as-ideology" perspective still involves some sort of



organization and leadership. However, by approaching nationalism from the point of view that it is an ideology, we gain insights into the more philosophical, albeit still quite pragmatic, dimension of nationalism. This aspect allows us to address ourselves to some extent to the question of why people would join nationalist movements.

Despite the difficulties with the definition of the term "ideology" itself, we may assume that ideology is a coherent set of ideas pertaining to a particular subject. However, it is more than that, for power is intimately connected with ideology. In short, the "set of ideas", when related to a subject that pertains to social interests or social order, generates its own power and seeks to gain more. Ideology emerges out of particular interests and addresses itself to those interests; it relates to real conditions experienced by individuals in their daily lives. It can take many forms from anthropological to exploitative; it can also be positive in that it provides an ameliorative guide. Ideology not only provides the content of people's values, needs and desires, it also helps to shape them. As it shapes the way people think, it also shapes their actions, which reciprocally influence the ideology, taking on the character of a spiral effect. It can also distort reality to legitimate the interests of a particular group, although this does not make it simply a tissue of lies. This facet of ideology seems to refer to what was called the formation of the "Other" in the social movements literature. Ideology gives people something to believe in, an anchor in the storm from which to generate meaning; it can also be a kind of "desideratum", articulating future goals.

It is important to keep in mind that, even though there might be an ideology which dominates in a particular society, having attained hegemonic status, there are always competing ideologies. Just as societies, no matter how homogeneous in terms of ethnic composition, are composed of many strata and status groups, ideologies are similarly diversified. Most people are not involved in the actual production of these

ideologies; rather, they participate in perpetuating and disseminating them.

Ideologies may be conservative or utopian. Conservative ideology generally subscribes to the belief that the current social order is worth maintaining, although it may allow for some tinkering. Utopian ideology, on the other hand, promotes the idea that change can be accomplished only by way of the destruction of the existing order. Thus, utopian ideology is a call to action. Ideology may move back and forth along this continuum, although it is likely that, once it has become utopian, it will not return to a more conservative type.

Nationalism incorporates many of the foregoing aspects of ideology, a fact which makes it readily viewed by many as a prime example of this phenomenon. Minority nationalism is often utopian, while that of the State or dominant group (often referred to as "patriotism") is frequently conservative. Nationalist ideology springs from the material conditions experienced by a group of people and articulates their concerns, giving them both a diagnosis of current conditions and a prescription for a remedy. Thus, it, in turn, shapes the thinking of this particular group of people, who then may take action in accordance with the ideology they have embraced; such action may cause a change in their material conditions which will bring about concomitant alterations of the ideology.

Power is an important factor in nationalism. Nationalist ideology seeks to empower the ethnic group; it attempts to shift power from other groups to its own; it is concerned with fundamental questions pertaining to the social order. Reality is frequently distorted by nationalist ideology when constructing the national identity, including its history, the situation in which the ethnic group finds itself, and the characterization of the opposition. As an ideology, nationalism can be a positive factor in the lives of the members belonging to the ethnic group. While the dominant ideology may be exploitative, nationalist ideology will tend to give the ethnic group

a much more favourable impression of itself, building on ethnic culture, creating a mythical "golden age" in its history, emphasizing the best characteristics of its membership. By doing this, it raises the level of self-esteem of its members and, thereby, raises group self-esteem. It becomes the centre of people's lives and the ultimate answer to every question. Nationalism as an ideology in most cases must compete with the dominant, or hegemonic, one which can propel it along the continuum from conservative to utopian. Once it becomes utopian, totally committed to changing the existing social order as the only possible means for achieving its goals, there is little hope that it can be turned back. This assertion would certainly seem to be true in the case of former Yugoslavia.

The country was originally built on the foundations of an ideology which emphasized the similarities among the South Slav peoples and insisted that the only way in which these peoples could throw off the yoke of foreign oppression, and keep it off, was to join together to form their own nation. One area in which the ideology failed was that it did not take into consideration the many non-Slavic minorities also dwelling on those same lands. From the start, these minorities were a source of discord because the authorities wrongly assumed that they would simply be absorbed into the Slavic mainstream. The ideology that had stressed the similarities of the South Slavs effectively enough to bring them together, was not as efficacious in the long term for it did not sufficiently acknowledge the varied histories of groups which gave them very different orientations. The Serbs saw themselves as leaders for the others while the latter feared a return to subordinate status by a dominant group. The Croats especially perceived that their due under Serb domination would be oppression and a loss of autonomy, so they clamoured for their own administrative body in a federal state. In the interwar years, nationalist ideologies began to gain credence and to replace the ideology of South Slav union. The emergence of the

Ustashi and IMRO are evidence of this rise of nationalist ideologies competing against the dominant one.

After the Second World War, a new ideology came to dominate in Yugoslavia, that of Tito and his Partisans. Nationalist excesses had wreaked so much havoc throughout the country that the new Communist Party was able to impose a strict anti-nationalist "brotherhood and unity" doctrine. The Communist ideology also suppressed for a time other political ideologies with its one-party system, closed elections, and federal structure. However, the dominance of this ideology was somewhat short-lived, for once the country was able to rebuild and modernize, bringing some measure of prosperity, nationalisms began to gain ground once more.

Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, nationalist ideologies posed such a great challenge to the Communists that reforms were undertaken in attempts to appease these groups. There were uprisings, notably among the Croats and Albanians, wherein groups demanded more rights to exercise their cultural interests and administer their own destiny. Despite the fact that these movements were decisively quashed and the ringleaders harshly dealt with, their demands were effectively met through constitutional change. As has already been stated, the 1974 Constitution entrenched numerous concessions to nationalist ideologies, among them the ethnic "key" to be used in filling positions of authority, greater republican autonomy, and the de facto republican status granted to Kosovo and Vojvodina. Concessions were made to the Serbs and Montenegrins as well to curb their potential nationalism from attaining power by permitting them to hold high positions in the army and governing bodies. However, the net result of such attempts was the opening of social and political spaces to allow for the blossoming of nationalist ideologies to seek ever-greater power. This, in concert with the declining role and power of the central government, caused the dominant ideology to lose ground and create even more room

for the expansion of nationalist ideologies.

Economic crises during the 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union and its constellation of Communist satellites contributed to the greater burgeoning of nationalisms within former Yugoslavia. It was becoming more and more evident to the varied citizens of that country that Communist ideology was universally dying a slow death; its legitimacy was at an all-time low. There was little to stop nationalist ideologies from replacing the once-dominant Communist one -- which is exactly what took place by 1990 throughout most of the country. To some extent, Serbs continued to adhere, at least nominally, to Communist ideology since it retained some features that could be viewed as a kind of nationalist ideology for these people. Serbs and Montenegrins had experienced some benefits under the dominant ideology so they were not as susceptible to purely nationalist ideology. However, this was more true for those living in Serbia proper and Montenegro. For Serbs in other republics, the realities of other nationalisms awakened them to the need for a nationalist ideology of their own in order to act as a response and defence.

Serbs in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia could not afford the luxury enjoyed by their counterparts in Serbia and Montenegro because they were minorities in these republics, lacking the strength to defend the dominant ideology in the face of Albanian, Croatian and Muslim nationalisms. Theirs had to be a nationalist ideology, so when Milosevic made his famous speech at the Field of Kosovo and took measures to roll back the gains Albanian nationalism had made, Serbs found their champion and proceeded to create their own nationalism. Other leaders emerged on the scene, contributing their own variations on the same theme, vying for the newly-created role of leader of Serb nationalism against Milosevic.

The dominant Communist ideology was thoroughly discredited outside Serbia and Montenegro by the early 1990s and passionate rallying to various nationalist

ideologies led the former Yugoslavs right into civil war and keeps them battling one another in an epic power struggle. In spite of huge losses of human life, immense social and physical dislocation, and untold suffering on all sides, nationalist ideologies remain strong, regardless of whether they are articulated in the minds of the combatants.

Hence, while few of our interviewees directly referred to the role of ideology in nationalism, there were implicit references in many of their responses. Even Zjelko, the man who said he does not fight for nationalism, he merely wants to return to Sarajevo to listen to his CDs and enjoy his Gitane cigarettes, implies nationalist ideology for there is reason to question why taking up arms is necessary for his return. We must ask why he did not choose to evacuate to Serbia until the fighting was over, rather than picking up a gun and shooting his former compatriots. The men who talked about Serbs being "heavenly" people and the oldest and most courageous peoples in the Balkans fighting to throw off yet another oppressor were articulating the myths of Serb nationalist ideology, even if they did not realize it.

The Muslim businessman from Sarajevo who accused Serb leaders of promoting the notion among the members of their ethnic group that any Serb who did not fight in Bosnia was a traitor was all-too aware of the effects of ideology on nationalism. Peter stated that, if nationalism is based only on ideology, and not on sentiment as well, then it can easily become fascist. (The distinction between the kind of thing he is talking about and what is currently taking place in former Yugoslavia may be lost on some -- including the writer!) Milan described the effects of nationalist ideology when he gave the illustration of being insulted personally as opposed to being insulted as a member of an ethnic group. "You've insulted my entire nation, not just me. You hate my whole nation, not just me," he stated. Disliking or discriminating against someone because of the group they happen to belong to is part and parcel of

the construction of the "Other", the drawing of lines between people and separating them into "us" and "them".

Tony's comments explained why nationalist ideology reaches people at a deeper level than Communist ideology; it "spoke" to their material conditions with greater eloquence. Jovan commented on the subtlety of nationalist ideology, how it enters the consciousness through, and becomes identified with, symbols and profound emotions. Both these interviewees were referring to the power of ideology: its ability to become an interpretive tool in our lives and shape the way we view reality, often without our being aware of its presence. By shaping our thoughts, ideology also shapes our actions. This is the praxis of ideology, its translation to action. Ideology effectively mirrors our daily experiences; the kind of mirror we use will determine how we "see" things. If the ideological mirror is a nationalist one, then we will view reality in that particular light and govern ourselves accordingly.

Thus, it becomes clear to us how significant the literature on ideology is for understanding nationalism. We have come to comprehend how nationalist ideology can become part of our day-to-day lives, often without even being conscious that it has entered our world, and how we come to live out our ideological orientations. Diverse ideologies compete for our loyalties and their power lies in how well they can frame and describe our experiences and conditions. They have the power to change our world because they give us the power to do so. Yet, we still have to ask why there are people living under the same material conditions and having similar experiences, but manage to elude the grasp of nationalist ideology. We wonder why these people do not embrace it, why it does not become their way of interpreting reality, why it has no power to move them. Since the literature on ideology does not adequately engage these questions, we must search for answers in another place. For this reason, we must explore the psychological dimensions of nationalism.

### The Psychological Approach

Social scientists tell us that the self is a process, not a product. Although self and identity are not one and the same, neither can exist independently of the other. Identity is one of the most important aspects of self and it is formed through interactions with others. When we interact with another social actor (be that a human being, group or more abstract entity), we not only take our own role, we also take on the other's role; thus, the interaction occurs on two levels: the actual interaction and the one playing in our heads. Throughout the course of said interaction and afterwards, we interpret our selves within its context and how the other social actor reflected our selves back to us. This reflexive interpretation is part of Mead's conceptualization of the formation of the self, for only when we are capable of "taking the role of the other" are we then capable of creating the "me" of self. The "me" is the socialized self, the component that has been taught the rules, norms, values, mores and behaviours appropriate to the society into which we have been born. This component mediates between our context and our "I" which is the spontaneous, untamed self with which we are born. The "I" is roughly similar to Freud's "id" or what Douglas refers to above as the "subjective I" or the "inner self". Language is crucial to the conceptualization of self because we cannot interpret our selves or our interactions or take the role of the other without a coherent set of symbols to guide us. Hence, language is not only the means of communication with others, it is also the means of communication with our selves.

Interactions with others require us to play roles. These roles become incorporated into our sense of self once they have been validated by others, as well as by our own volition. The collection of roles, in reality a collection of social identities, makes up our self-identity. The social context in which we live will



determine to a large extent what kind of roles may be available to us. Contrary to popular opinion, the self is not fully formed and immutable by the time we reach adulthood; we are always in the process of acquiring new identities. While the old ones can never be truly discarded, they may become latent or less salient during some phases of our lives.

Emotions are very much a part of our selves. They form the basis for our rationality. In concert with our values, they act as guides whenever we take action and, in fact, determine to a large extent whether we will take action. When powerful emotions become aroused, they can take over the entire sense of self to the exclusion of other factors, according to Douglas. Whether this is merely a short-term, episodic occurrence or one of longer duration is not elaborated by Douglas, but is surely something that deserves greater future consideration.

Because the self is encased in an anatomical structure of singularity, it may appear to be independent of others. This, however, is not the case, for we are all to be found in collectivities. In other words, regardless of the fact that our bodies cause us to be separate entities, we are nevertheless always members of groups, often by virtue of the very bodies which house us. For instance, if we happen to be born with anatomically female bodies, we are part of the social and biological group known as women. More importantly, social groups provide us with references. We constantly compare and contrast ourselves with others as we attempt to discover who we are and we describe ourselves by referring to groups. These groups are not only to be found in the present, but the past as well. Throughout our lives we are always engaged in the process of struggling against being subsumed by the collectivity, yet identifying with it.

Another significant aspect of our identity is self-esteem. We derive our self-esteem from pleasurable experiences; these experiences may be diverse or concen-

trated in one area. The more pleasurable experiences derived from various sources, the higher our level of self-esteem and the more diffuse it is. Most of us seek pleasurable "strokes", or the reaffirmation that we are good, worthwhile people, while avoiding as much as possible negative experiences which end up making us feel badly about ourselves. If our level of self-esteem is generally high, when caught in a negative situation, we may try to rationalize or attempt to find something in it which can be converted into something positive. This may be less true for those with generally low self-esteem, although it is possible that even these individuals, when they have one source of pleasurable "strokes", may be able to apply the saving mechanism in a situation relating to that source. Again, more study must be done in the future to determine how "saving" mechanisms might operate.

A further way that self-esteem may operate is that, whenever an individual finds him/herself in a negative situation, such as where failure has occurred, an external factor can be blamed in lieu of the individual's lack of skill, knowledge or otherwise. In other words, we can save our self-esteem to some degree if we can find someone or something else to take the blame for a negative experience. We will then avoid such a situation in the future, if at all possible, since a repetition of the negative experience may prove that external factors were not actually to blame, but that it was due to our personal shortcomings. Those with high self-esteem who perceive dissonance in a situation between reality and self-perception will take steps to remedy the dissonance.

Guarding our personal integrity, or the integrity of our self, is one of the most important experiences of our lives. Our self is our most meaningful possession and we will do virtually anything to protect it. After all, who we are is invested in our sense of self and losing our identity is perhaps the greatest trauma we can suffer. When a social identity has been incorporated into our self, we become attached to it;

therefore, when it is threatened, we will do whatever we believe it takes to defend it. This defence becomes complicated because we have a whole coterie of social identities, some of which may come into conflict while we are in the process of protecting our threatened identity. Hence, we may find ourselves in a situation where we personally, albeit epiphenomenally, threaten our own social identities. Under such circumstances, our course of action will then be influenced by which social identity is most salient. What may help to determine the salience of a given identity is how our self-esteem is affected: if self-esteem suffers more profoundly by the threat of one identity as opposed to another, we will probably move to defend that one and sacrifice the other.

The link between the individual and the group is established by way of "social identification". This device consists of self-cognition and social-cognition; that is, an individual identifies a group, identifies him/herself as belonging to that group, then interacts with other members in accordance with that identification. Affectivity is not necessary for individual identification with the group; cognition is the key. Cognition of self is crucial for the linkage between the individual and the group because the primary question involved with group membership is "Who am I?". Once identification has been made with a group, the individual will attribute positive characteristics to it because such an attribution is significant for self-esteem. If positive characteristics cannot be attached to the group, the individual will be motivated to exit in some manner.

Regrettably, the aforementioned elements of the self and self-identity are largely omitted from most of the existing theories of nationalism as a psychological phenomenon which tend to concentrate on only one or, at best, a few of them. Such theories tend to emphasize either the personal choice and/or the sentimental attachment to ethnic identity, one of the many possible social identities available to

us. Nationalism in this sense may be conceptualized as a rational choice based on value-maximizing behaviour and a cost/benefit analysis appraising self-interest and social reality. This process may apply to groups as well as individuals. Thus, nationalism may involve the calculation of personal skills in terms of possible future demand for them in the anticipated state. Such analyses and appraisals rest on the desire to maximize pleasurable experiences and enhance self-esteem.

Spicer's theory rests on the persistence of identity systems in the face of opposition. In his interpretation, nationalism arises from the identification of ethnic groups with their culture. This theoretical representation also posits a close relationship to historical factors in that culture is cumulative and members of the group have the sense that what they share has been shared by previous generations. Such a relationship helps people to continue the historical process and fulfil group destiny. Oppositional factors are highly salient in terms of the group and individual identity for they assist in the creation of the "us/them" orientation and because opposition strengthens group resolve to cleave together for resistance against assimilation. We would posit that ideological elements are implicit in Spicer's conceptualization since they would naturally be part of the identity system. He also delineates three spheres of participation (communication through shared language, common moral values and political organization) which readily remind us of the components of social movements.

The theory proposed by Spicer posits that symbols utilized by the group generally arise from the land and language. Other theorists of nationalism who examine the psychological dimension also incorporate these concepts. In addition, shared history and communication play important roles in their theories. Therefore, we can see that frequently when we discuss psychological orientations, we are in reality speaking of psychosocial ones. If we conclude that the psychological

dimension involves attachment to land, history and a common language, then we must conclude that personal affinities spring from social sources.

Ethnic identity is not just one of many identities, or merely primordial sentiment, it is also a resource to be employed in accordance with a particular situation the individual may face. Power, perception and purpose comprise elements of ethnic identity, according to Royce, because they involve the group in jockeying for an improved sociopolitical position against the dominant group, the creation of a distinct culture and identity different from those of other groups, and the group's desire to enhance their own conditions. All these matters pertain to nationalism for such is usually the vehicle for their realization. The choice available to individuals of whether to employ their ethnic identity for a particular goal is also the choice between espousing nationalism or not.

Another conceptualization of the psychological aspect of nationalism comes from Scott, who weds Spicer's notion of opposition with primordialism, and proposes that primordial sentiment is an intervening variable between opposition and ethnic solidarity. In other words, opposition does not lead directly to ethnic solidarity (and, hence, nationalism); primordial sentiment must intervene to strengthen ethnic identity and cause members of an ethnic group to experience more powerful ties among them. Causation is circular so that a spiral can easily develop, escalating nationalism rapidly and climactically. In summary, external factors lead to a rise in personal sentiments, which results in greater ethnic solidarity, and hence nationalism, as the group undertakes the task of dealing with the opposition. Therefore, in Scott's version of nationalism as a psychological phenomenon, we see the importance of external factors.

Psychological nationalism begins with patriotism for Doob. Patriotism is based on the personal feelings individuals have for their land, compatriots and culture. It

implies commitment and reciprocity. However, such feelings are not innate; they must be learned. Furthermore, external factors (called "stimulus patterns") influence the perception of individuals as much as their sentiments. Distinctiveness is the hallmark of Doob's psychological portrayal of patriotism. He contends that every living organism must distinguish itself from others by perceiving its own distinctiveness. Distinctiveness is also bestowed upon significant others, evoking a sense of psychological connection and lending them higher status than to others perceived as being outsiders.

Nationalism arises from Doob's presentation of patriotism because he asserts that all groups must seek preservation and/or expansion. When a patriotic group experiences a threat from another group or groups, it will turn inward as a defensive measure; as discontent with its own way of life or perceived alterations thereto escalates, nationalism will ensue, for the group members will make demands and start to take actions to have those demands met. For Doob, the behaviour of nationalist groups is that of nationalist individuals writ large. Any tensions within the group can be blamed on "the enemy" (those perceived to be posing the threat).

The foregoing studies have all proposed insightful and meaningful dynamics of individual psychology with regard to nationalism. Unfortunately, they still treat individuals as aggregates and imply that all who qualify as part of the group, or who have an ethnic identity, or have a rationally-prescribed stake in the future of the group, will embrace nationalism. None of these theorists has really got to the heart of why a human being would direct his/her energies towards the group or why he/she would lend any salience to his/her ethnic identity. The factor of human motivation is virtually ignored in these theories. Furthermore, there is little attempt to establish how individuals actually become members of a group; that is, how does the group traverse that gap between something which is highly abstract to that

which has real, individual human beings acting in concert with one another.

Bloom's version of psychological nationalism hinges on his elaboration of the notion of identification. This theorist augments, to some extent, the other approaches with his endeavour to describe how human beings come to identify with other social actors in both the abstract and in material terms. His version of the human psyche is distinctly psychosocial. A purely social phenomenon, identification takes place through interaction with significant others and continues throughout our lives. Identification is based on emotional attachment and rests on both the gratification of primary needs for survival as well as acceptance by the social environment. Ideology assumes an important role in this identification as that which guards identity; any threat to ideology is a threat to identity, collective and individual. The response of the group to such a threat will be affected by numerous factors, including both external and internal, but may result in mobilization. Nationalism for Bloom is the consequence of unsuccessful nation-building and, thus, represents nation-destroying as an ethnic group seeks to create its own, new nation. His contention is that individuals experiencing a threat to their identification with the "nation" will form a national identity and begin to act in concert with others in the same situation and with the same identification to form the national identity dynamic which is the potential for mobilization of the mass. Mobilization, or nationalism, will occur when national identity has successfully transcended all others, something which only happens when the individual experiences a direct benefit from the espousal of such an identity. Structural conditions are also part of Bloom's elaboration of nationalism as they may play the important role of "triggering" national identification and/or mobilization.

In summarizing Bloom's contribution to the literature on the psychological dimension of nationalism, we may state that, although he has omitted a number of

significant aspects of self-identity, in contrast to the other theories he has given an insightful presentation of the more social aspects of individual psychology. His rendering of identification theory goes one step further than the other theories by suggesting how idiosyncratic motivation can occur with regard to nationalism. Unfortunately, Bloom, like the others, falls into the trap of conceptualizing individual motivation in terms of collective psychology; that is, he still views it in aggregated form, as a kind of mass psychology, without adequately establishing the linkages between the individual and the collectivity.

Utilizing the case study of Yugoslavia to highlight the insights offered by the literature on the psychological dimension of nationalism, we are struck by the divergence of historical and religious identities among the South Slav peoples which inevitably formed very different ethnic group identities in the present. Even among the members of one particular ethnic group, the Serbs, we see a varied history; some moved into the Krajina region, under Habsburg domination, others lived under Ottoman rule until the liberation of Serbia, while still others were to be found in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Slovenian history was dominated by German occupation while the Croats lost their independence to Hungary at the beginning of the twentieth century and did not regain real independence until the Second World War. The split between Muslim overlords and Christian serfs characterizes the history of Bosnia while that of Macedonia demonstrates that these people were buffeted about among various dominating groups. Considering these histories of foreign oppression, it is not difficult to understand why some ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia would have been extremely wary of any sociopolitical arrangement that so much as hinted at inferior status. It is also rather clear why the Serbs considered themselves the rightful leaders of the country, considering their early success at freeing themselves from Ottoman rule and becoming independent.



Furthermore, during World War II, the creation of the fascist Croatian state, which encompassed Bosnia as well, helped to forge a new identity for the Croats and Muslims, as well as one for the Serbs. From that time forward, despite the fact that the puppet state had been administered by the ultranationalist Ustashi and that most definitely not all Croats are Ustashi, there was a suspicion among many that Croats and Muslims, when given power and independence, were likely to become fascist killers. In other words, the legacy of that era left the impression that such an identity might be lurking within the ethnic identity of Croats and Muslims. Concomitantly, another identity added to the repertoire of the Serbs was that of victim (although such identity might already have been present because of the Ottoman experience).

The Tito era was characterized by the official attempt to create a Yugoslav identity. "Brotherhood and unity" was the catchphrase at that time. The Serbs, to a great extent, seemed to be willing to embrace that identity, possibly because for them it was interchangeable with their own: they were Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia was Serb. This is perhaps why the Croats especially appeared highly unwilling to adopt such an identity; with the already close linguistic and cultural similarities between Serbs and Croats, the last thing Croats would voluntarily accept would be a national identity so closely linked to the Serbs. Albanians were alienated by the notion of a Yugoslav identity because they are non-Slavic. After the reforms of the 1970s, they established an ethnic identity of their own that drew its inspiration from Albania proper and, in the late 1980s, Albanians in Kosovo demanded that they receive full recognition from the authorities as Albanians, not Yugoslavs. Muslims gained a new identity at roughly the same time when it was declared that they constituted a "nation" of their own.

Due to their very special position during the Cold War, Yugoslavs were granted

a new identity. Seen as very "Western" by their Eastern European neighbours and as mavericks in the Soviet sphere of influence, they were the darlings of the Western world which sought to keep them from falling under Soviet domination and possibly drawing Greece and Italy along with them. Yugoslavs became the leaders of the non-aligned world and enjoyed a privileged status among Third World countries, notably Egypt, whose president, Nasser, attempted to build a socialist state modelled on Yugoslavia. Their identity during those years can be characterized by the phrase "Something in Between" which was the title of a film that effectively showed how truly confusing such a position can be.

As we mentioned previously, when Slobodan Milosevic became the champion of the Serbs, he helped to forge a new identity for these people, drawing on the warrior myth of the past, pointing out the degradations they were suffering and their effects on the future generation as well. He capitalized on the "victim" identity and galvanized the Serbs: but not all of them, however, for we have seen that other leaders and followers emerged with differing orientations from Milosevic. Thus, it is apparent that the Serbian identity splintered to some extent. This is also true of the Croats, Slovenes, Muslims and Macedonians; in no case did only one person arise to fashion an identity for and lead the entire ethnic group. For the Serbs, their location within the country assisted in the splintering of their identity, for those who lived in Croatia or Bosnia experienced different contexts from those living in Serbia proper or Montenegro and, hence, they possessed varied identities.

Once the republics seceded from Yugoslavia, identities underwent enormous changes. Some considered themselves citizens of a new, independent state; some realized they were now in the minority and rejected such an identity; others believed they could hold onto their Yugoslav identity; still others became passionate nationalists. There were those who lost their identities completely, especially after

the fighting began and their worlds were turned upside-down. There were others who, although their actions would indicate that they were nationalists, rejected that identity, insisting they were only fighting for their homes. We heard this from Zjelko and from the young Serb warrior from Knin. Perhaps nationalism had acquired such a bad reputation under Tito's regime that these people could not embrace that identity, opting for giving their actions another rationale, another name.

We learned from some of the secondary interviews that "Serbs are the oldest and most courageous people in the Balkans" and that they are "heavenly people" because so many of them have laid down their lives fighting for various causes. Such statements allow us to see the identities these people have carved out for themselves. General Mladic is outraged at being labelled a war criminal, rejecting this identity based on his belief that his actions are justified because he was born in that place and because the lands have belonged to his ethnic group for centuries. His friendship with a woman who was mutilated as a baby during the Second World War contributed to his self-identity in a way that is unknown to us, although we might speculate that it aroused feelings of compassion, protectiveness, the desire for vengeance, and so on. Perhaps Mladic embraces the identity of "avenging angel", dedicated to righting old wrongs. It is possible that the Croat paramilitary fighter who stated that killing Serbs was hard work because it was "an eye for an eye" and there were no compromises espouses the same "avenging angel" identity that we attribute to Mladic. Ethnic hatred may have little to do with the fighting between the Serbs and Croats, Serbs and Muslims, or Croats and Muslims; perhaps these people are all fighting for their social identities and it just so happens that the others pose a threat to those identities.

The interviewees gave various interpretations of how nationalism related to self-identity. Dr. Tomashevich stated that, since we are all still divided along

cultural lines, it was unreasonable to expect that we could somehow transcend ethnic identities. He also maintained that when one's group was under attack, the identity associated with that group would feel threatened as well and become the most salient. For Paul, nationalism was a kind of "family" feeling. It gave the sense of belonging and assisted in survival. Paul's idea that nationalism is an identification fulfils Bloom's criteria: it satisfies primary needs for survival and ensures acceptance within the social environment. Jovan informed us that nationalism springs from culture and a particular way of life and that, as long as it remains patriotism, it is a good thing because it keeps the ethnic culture alive. In other words, nationalism as a facet of self-identity is valuable if it helps to maintain the ethnic group and culture; if those boundaries are transgressed, it becomes an identity that is destructive and undesirable. He also pointed out that not everyone belonging to a certain ethnic group would have the same view of what was right for the group. Our model would suggest that this is due to the fact that every member of the group has his/her own unique configuration of social identities which will influence the way he/she schematizes nationalism.

Being a Croat was an important identity for Tony, although he took pains to distance himself from the Ustasha identity. He indicated that, to some extent, the Croat identity had been forced on him by others and also that he preferred to think of himself as a Yugoslav but, now that the country no longer existed, he had no choice but to become a Croat. Marijan, on the other hand, acknowledged that he was a Croat, but demonstrated clearly that this identity was not in the least salient for him. He admitted that, if he were still in former Yugoslavia, he would fight for his home and family, but certainly not for his ethnic group. Clearly Marijan has no interest in identifying himself with nationalism, despite the fact that he revealed an identification with his home and family which might amount to the same thing in terms

of consequential actions.

Peter suggested that nationalism caused identity to undergo a change in that people hope to be exalted like the heroes of old, so they govern themselves in accordance with this hope. Jovan believes that nationalism appeals mostly to those who are not able to derive identities from other sources; nationalism bestows an identity upon these people. Furthermore, economic deprivation brings suffering to individual identity and self-esteem, giving people a good reason to begin looking for a scapegoat. Nationalism is the perfect vehicle for such people. Jovan also admitted that, although he does not consider himself to be a nationalist and never was, he had, from time to time, felt nationalist sentiments -- something he had rejected because these sentiments had not given him a pleasurable experience. According to him, if he were still in former Yugoslavia, he would probably be fighting, but not out of ethnic hatred; it would be mainly out of self-preservation. Peter, on the other hand, stated that he is a nationalist because he derives a sense of identity, belonging and continuity from it. For this man, nationalism provides roots. It informs him of who he is. He acknowledged that anyone who calls him/herself a Yugoslav does so because he/she derives personal benefit from such an identity. Paul thought of himself as a nationalist, but not a "true" one, because he was not in Yugoslavia fighting. Yet, he also admitted that he would probably be fighting first and foremost for his own family, then everyone else. Nevertheless, all these scenarios begin with the self: nationalism is nothing more than fighting for your home on a grander scale. For Paul, simple people will readily fight for nationalism, but more sophisticated individuals will not do so until they believe they have the right reason. Milan is an ardent nationalist because he places himself into the historical flow of his ethnic group and believes it is incumbent upon him to continue this history. His identification with his group may very well be the strongest of all those interviewed because

he conceptualized himself almost entirely in terms of his ethnic group and its fortunes.

A brief overview of the statements regarding nationalism made by the interviewees reveals how closely they connect the phenomenon with identity -- their own and that of others. They demonstrate over and over how personal nationalist sentiments are, how much they relate to how these individuals perceive themselves and how close is their identification with their ethnic group. They do not speak in terms of social movements or even, for the most part, of ideology (except in a disparaging manner evidently aimed at other groups); for them, nationalism is about them -- their identities, their emotions, their self-esteem. Some of them embrace it in various degrees, others reject it; all of them do so because of what they personally derive from it. Those who embrace it shine a very positive light on it; those who reject it make it seem negative. These characterizations originate in their own perceptions regarding their selves.

The only way we can truly understand the phenomenon of nationalism as described by these individuals is in light of the various facets of self and social self-identity. Some have made strong identifications with their ethnic groups while others have identified with different social roles. For some, their identification with their ethnic group is more salient than for others. Emotions appear to motivate the rational choices these people have made, shown by their references to that sense of belonging and the analogy to the family. Their socialization has taught them values which either make them feel a special attachment to their ethnic group or no such attachment. These emotions and values form the basis for their actions and their decision whether to act. Self-esteem is an integral part of their response to nationalism for, if they embrace it, they derive pleasurable "strokes" from it; if they do not, then they fail to experience these positive effects. Being a nationalist makes

some of the interviewees feel good about themselves while it makes others feel uncomfortable. In short, nationalism seems to be a very personal experience, one that is closely connected with feelings about self. If we fail to recognize the intimate nature of nationalism and how it relates to the way people perceive their own identities, then we fail to grasp the key to understanding the phenomenon. Nationalism will forever remain a mystery to us if we fail to connect it with personal social identity.

At the same time, the interviewees discussed the various structural and oppositional factors which had operated both within former Yugoslavia and from outside the country to set the stage for these personal sentiments and identifications. Structural and oppositional factors were as important as the psychosocial component for they provided the context within which social self-identity took place. These factors interacted, as it were, with social self-identity, as they influenced the roles people played and the identifications they made. To some extent, social self-identity reflexively affected the internal structural factors. Further opposition was created as a result. The process is an ongoing one as structural factors provide a frame for social self-identity which, in turn, acts upon that frame, attempting to reshape it as much as possible. The flexibility of the frame will determine to a great degree how social self-identity will respond -- whether it will be altered and in what way. The same interaction applies to ideology and organization as to structural factors. Ideology and organization are part of the frame in which social self-identity operates. It is imperative to bear in mind when considering nationalism that there is always an ongoing process occurring between the psychosocial element and the frame within which it is located, otherwise we will be left with the unidimensional and deterministic approaches of the macro perspective or the "mass psychology" of the micro one.

Therefore, we must come to the same conclusion with the existing, rather

skewed, psychological treatments of nationalism at which we arrived with the two macro perspectives: they fail to develop the full understanding of the psychosocial aspect, as well as the integration of the individual with the group. Thus, without the psychosocial dimension, they continue to present a somewhat deterministic approach to the subject. We are still left to wonder why some human beings embrace what appears to be a collective identity when others, who might belong to the same group and, indeed, identify with it, do not.

#### Towards a Comprehensive Model of Nationalism

Our theory, which presents the multifaceted nature of the psychosocial dimension, attempts to treat individual motivations, not in terms of aggregates, but in a more intimate manner, yet still demonstrates that individuals do form close connections with groups and are very much influenced by structural factors. Our theory does not attempt to reduce nationalism to a purely idiosyncratic phenomenon, which would be just as skewed and unidimensional as the existing theories we have criticized. What we endeavour to do is to situate the individual squarely within the context of the group, as well as the structural influences so inescapable in daily life. At the same time, we take care not to forget that every group is comprised of individuals who bring their own frames of reference and agency along with them; that structural factors can influence and limit options, but that individuals still have some options in terms of their responses.

When our integrated theory of the individual within his/her context is directed specifically to the study of nationalism, we demonstrate how idiosyncratic frames of reference, motivations and agency take their form and then become part of the social phenomenon of nationalism. We establish linkages at the psychosocial level between



the individual and the group, the individual and the external world, and, finally, between the group and that world. We show how nationalism involves a configuration of forces that causes people to turn inwards towards their own group and even towards their own personal interests and emotions. The phrase "forsaking all others" is most appropriate for the conceptualization of nationalism because it describes exactly the process which takes place and, in essence, facilitates the proliferation of nationalism.


Nationalism is all about our selves -- as social actors. We can have no concept of our selves without reference to the social, even in the most intimate sphere of our emotions and our inner or core selves, because we have no terms for describing those things without the social construct known as language. We cannot think about them without that system of symbols. We cannot think about our selves in isolation -- there must be reference groups, whether we embrace or reject them. When things happen in our world, historically and currently, they affect our selves not just directly but also in terms of the social identities that comprise who we are. We consider these events in relation to our fate, that of our families, progeny, friends, neighbours, and so on. When we feel threatened, we try to surround ourselves with allies and form a support network with others who are like us. Anyone not willing to join that network is conceived not as an ally but as an enemy. Therefore, we forsake all others who do not join with us. Together with our social allies, we can formulate a defence against the enemy and its threat. We can act in concert to accomplish that which we could not alone. All of us may have different ideas about how we should attain our goal, but our goal is the same. If we perceive that our allies are doing something that contradicts what we believe, or if we come to realize that we will be forced to act in a fashion that is not acceptable because doing otherwise would cause us to be expelled by the group, we may reorient our beliefs or we may choose to

reject the group as no longer representing allies and similar others. Yet, at all times, we must weigh our own experiences against external factors because we are always present within a specific context. Thus, we are engaged in ongoing social interactions which will affect our self-identities, and vice versa. Nationalism will bestow upon us a new identity or identities which we can accept or reject. However, it will also narrow our social world down to a dichotomous one wherein our most positive interactions will be only with those whom we believe are like us and allied with us, while our most negative ones will be with those whom we have forsaken in order to save our selves. Our self-esteem will derive from those pleasurable experiences and, in turn, make them more pleasurable.

Still, this is not the last word on nationalism. We have constructed what we believe to be a potentially optimal model of nationalism, employing an integrated, holistic approach. Nevertheless, we have not fully fleshed out all aspects of this model. More study should be done on the effects of powerful emotion, as was mentioned above, to discern whether to be entirely in its grip is a long-term phenomenon or one of shorter duration. We need to establish strong linkages between group membership in the abstract and material, or active, membership. It would be fruitful to examine the sociological constitution of "the group" -- whether it is truly a group or, in fact, an aggregate, something qualitatively different. Much more work needs to be done to integrate the finer aspects of psychosocial identity. Gender is a vastly significant issue in terms of the entire model, a matter that could not be adequately explored at this juncture. Of course, fieldwork is absolutely crucial to further testing of this model. And, finally, cross-cultural comparisons would serve to demonstrate the applicability of the model.

Figure 2

A New Model of Nationalism: Principal Elements



## APPENDICES

QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEWS FOR M.A. THESIS

1. While you were living in Yugoslavia, what was your impression of the political system and how it operated?
2. How would you describe nationalism? What does it mean to you?
3. Do you think that the Yugoslavian political system contributed to the rise of nationalisms?
4. While you were living there, were you aware of any nationalist feelings among various ethnic groups? Why or why not?
5. Did you think anything was being done by the political powers to discourage nationalisms from developing? Why or why not?
6. Were there any other factors in Yugoslavia that contributed to or discouraged nationalisms from developing? Was this true for all groups or just some?
7. Did you feel the nationalistic sentiments, if any, were organized (i.e., like a movement) or just feelings among certain peoples?
8. Did you consider yourself to be a nationalist? Why or why not?
9. Do you consider yourself to be a nationalist now? Why or why not?
10. If you were still in Yugoslavia, do you think you would have become a nationalist or at least would you be fighting? Why or why not?
11. What kinds of people do you think become nationalists? Do you think all of these people would be willing to fight for their nationalist beliefs?
12. Do you feel that nationalism arises spontaneously among people or do they need leaders?
13. Do you think that leaders of nationalist groups and rank-and-file members have the same goals?
14. Do you think that nationalist groups are unified or that people get involved merely to suit their own personal goals?
15. Do you think that nationalism arises out of a particular sociopolitical context or just spontaneously, based on ethnic/religious/cultural criteria? Why or why not?
16. Do you think nationalism is a good thing? Why or why not?

QUESTIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL INTERVIEWS

1. How would you describe nationalism? What does it mean to you?
2. What factors do you think contributed to the rise of nationalism(s) in the former country of Yugoslavia? Why?
3. Do you believe that the nationalistic sentiments in the former country of Yugoslavia were organized (i.e., like a movement) or just feelings among certain peoples? Why or why not?
4. Do you believe that nationalism must be organized? Why or why not?
5. What is a nationalist? How would you describe one?
6. What kinds of people do you think become nationalists? Why do you think they become nationalists?
7. Do you consider yourself to be a nationalist? Why or why not?
8. What, if anything, do you personally derive from nationalism? In other words, what motivates you, as an individual, to embrace this particular sentiment?
9. What led you to espouse nationalism?
10. How would you describe a nationalist organization?
11. Are you a member of a nationalist organization? If yes, why? If not, why not?
12. Do you consider yourself to be a leader of a nationalist organization? Why or why not?
13. Do you think that your organization has a pecking order? That is, are there different levels in terms of your membership? Are there things that divide your membership? Why or why not?
14. Are there any cleavages among the members of your organization? For example, are there divisions among your members due to age, gender, length of time in Canada/United States, social or economic status? If not, why not?
15. What are your organizational goals in terms of nationalism?
16. What are your personal goals in terms of nationalism?
17. Do you think that leaders of nationalist organizations have the same goals as rank-and-file members? Why or why not?
18. Do you think that your personal goals or beliefs differ from those of the rest of the organization? If so, in what way? If not, why not?

19. How far would you personally be willing to go in terms of actions for the attainment of your nationalistic goals?
20. How far would your organization be willing to go in terms of actions for the attainment of nationalistic goals?
21. If you were in the former country of Yugoslavia, would you be actively engaged in politics? Why or why not?
22. If you were in the former country of Yugoslavia right now, would you be fighting? Why or why not?
23. Do you think nationalism is a good thing? Why or why not?

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